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This dissertation examines the organization of an unprecedented 
rural development program of Indian collectives in Venezuela. 
Based partly on a case study of two empresa communities, the 
dissertation critically considers the contradictory objectives, and 
the forms and level of efficacy of state intervention in indigenous 
economies, vis!. vis these communities' own characteristics, needs, 
and active collaboration or resistance. The majority of data for 
this study was collected during six months of fieldwork in two 
empresa communities: the Bari empress of Saimadoyi and the Pume 
empresa of Kumani. Data were also obtained through interviews and 
archival research in national and regional government offices. The 
fundamental questions relate to 1) the broad economic and political 
factors, both historical and structural, that influenced the 
genesis and transformation of Indian policy from welfare to 
development and 2) the impact that these collective organizations 
had on the lives of those who joined the program. The analysis is 
rooted in the theoretical debates on how state policies are. 
generated in dependent capitalist economies, and debates on state-
induced agrarian transition in Latin America--particularly in the 
context of ethnic Indian communities. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE VENEZUELAN STATE, 
INDIAN COMMUNITIES and COLLECTIVIZATION 
Behind an apparently si:mple "fascination" of governments and 
academics with rural development in recent years lies the reality 
of an ever-expanding capital accumulation process which inches into 
the last frontiers of Latin America. Massive development programs, 
often supported by international agencies, have paved the road 
(sometimes literally) for the penetration of capital into these 
frontiers. There, capital encounters the last indigenous 
communities. The process of capital penetration is uneven and 
polymorphous. It has transformed communities in these frontier 
areas in varying degrees and in different ways. Some have remained 
"relatively autonomous" in their everyday reproduction, while the 
survival of others has become highly dependent on their 
participation in commodity production--either as buyers or sellers 
of commodities, including their labor. 
For the most part, rural development projects and agrarian 
reforms--let alone massive, capital intensive projects--in 
contemporary Latin America have not targeted the more isolated, or 
"corporate" Indian communities as their key clientele.l Rather, 
these programs have focused on those agrarian groups and classes 
that are better integrated into the capitalist market of both labor 
and agricultural commodities. In Venezuela, the thrust of 
programs for Indian communities has consisted of educational and 
1 
social relief programs administered under the paternalist 
orientation of the Catholic church, in a growing partnership with 
the Venezuelan government. 
Nevertheless, the planned or unplanned impact of economic 
development on indigenous communities in Latin America, and 
Venezuela specifically, has often produced profound transformations 
in the social and economic structures of these groups.2 Most 
notably, they have experienced new levels of proletarianization, or 
semi-proletarianization, as they become more dependent on outside 
commodities and have lost control over significant portions of 
their land base and resources. With the possible exception of a 
few small groups or bands in the more remote areas of the 
Venezuelan territory, most Indian communities participate, either 
as individuals or as a group, ·in the sale of labor power and food 
commodities in the local and regional market. The extent to which 
this takes place and its consequences varies significantly from 
group to group. The main point remains, however, that in the 
rather recent capitalist expansion and industrialization 
experienced by nations such as Venezuela, the accompanying 
transformation of the countryside has reached the last Indian 
tribes--more often than not as a secondary effect than as a clearly 
intended objective. 
In the 1970s, progressive anthropologists and other concerned 
individuals all over the world began to raise the alarm about the 
destructive effects of economic development projects on Indian 
2 
communities, including the erosion of their own economic base. This 
brought about a new concern with alternative, grass-roots, 
development. States often responded by paying at least some lip-
service to the vocal denunciations of these social scientists 
through the organization of new programs and new official rhetoric 
that bespoke of Indian "self-determination", and "self-efficiency". 
But, most importantly, it was reflected in the participation of 
militant social scientists as consultants or advocates for the 
independent development projects of indigenous groups.3 
In Venezuela, amidst serious charges of land invasions and 
genocide linked to state and private efforts to expand the 
agricultural frontier, Congress mandated the organization of an 
Indian Development program to be housed within the institute in 
charge of agrarian reform, "Instituto Agrarian Nacional," (IAN). 
This was without doubt an unprecedented event in the history of 
Indian affairs in Venezuela, and in fact rather unique in Latin 
America as a whole. By the late seventies, however, some were 
already arguing that this program was but a newer and more direct 
mechanism used by the state to incorporate Indian communities into 
the process of capitalist development. Moreover, criticisms 
focused on the organization of Empresas Indigenas (collective 
production enterprises) which were the main axis of the Indian 
development program. Several anthropologists argued that this 
collective "design" contradicted the Indian communities' leadership 
structures and traditional ways of organizing their production. 
Such contradictions, they contended, would inevitably lead to poor 
3 
program performance and, worse yet, social disorganization and 
cu 1 tura 1 death. 
This dissertation focuses on the Venezuelan Indian development 
program. It examines two intimately related questions. The first 
focuses on the particular economic, social and political factors 
that determined the apparent change in and the general evolution of 
Indian policy during the 1970s. The new policy--not always 
explicitly or clearly articulated--seemed to move away from a 
narrow focus on Indian education and social welfare to a concern 
with the modernization of Indian rural economies. Eventually, the 
form this modernization policy took was that of the organization of 
collective production units. 
Two major categories of factors are considered particularly 
crucial in the evolution of this new Indian policy and the economic 
development program in particular. One is the important role 
played by the "state" in facilitating impeding the process. The 
second is the particular social and economic configuration of the 
different Indian communities and social groups participating in 
this process. 
The second question, or set of questions, has to do with the 
overall impact that these collective enterprises and the Indian 
program in general have had on the lives of those who joined the 
program. How are Indian4 communities transformed by their 
participation in these types of development programs? How does the 
Indian's view differ from that of outside agents regarding what 
4 
this cooperative can do for them, for the preservation of whatever 
socio-economic and cultural patterns they deem crucial to their 
existence, and for the transformation of those economic, political, 
and social conditions they view as a threat to that existence? And 
ultimately, could this type of project, despite its origin as state 
policy, lead to meaningful, grass-roots development which, as Clay 
(1987:2) stated, " ••• is not separated from everyday life and 
strengthens the community by enhancing its ability to identify and 
work collectively to solve local problems and to defend its own 
interests." 
I focus most closely on two empresas: the empresa of Kumani 
organized among the Pume or Yaruro group in the state of Apure; 
and, the empress of Saimadoyi organized among the Bari in the state 
of Zulia (see Figure 1.1). The primary data for this study was 
collected during six months of field work in these two empress 
communities and from government archives. For a more detailed 
statement on the field research see Appendix A. 
I. Collectivization and Cooperatives: Basic Definitions 
and the Venezuelan Versions 
Before elaborating on the two questions posed above, it will 
be useful to arrive at some basic working definitions for, and 
fundamental distinctions between, such economic forms of 
organization as "collectives" as opposed to cooperatives, and 
subsequently locate the empresas lndigenas within these categories. 
It is to Boguslaw Galleski (1975, 1973, 1987) that we owe much of 
5 
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the analytical clarification of collective organizations vis-a-vis 
other forms of farm organization. According to Galleski, 
collective farms differ in such important aspects as the degree of 
socialization of property (means of production), labor, and 
distribution of output. "From this point of view collective farms 
may be placed on the continuum ranging from aggregates of family 
farms linked by certain forms of cooperation, to the fully 
integrated collective operation" (1987:104). As examples, Gal leski 
placed the Soviet ''Toz" form of organization at one pole, and the 
Soviet communes of the 1920s and Israe 1 i ''Kibbutzim" at the other 
pole of the continuum. 
Most cases of collectivized farms fall somewhere in between 
the two poles of this continuum and thus one observes several 
combinations of family-based and collective production. Some 
authors favor the term "cooperative" for those cases that £al 1 at 
the lowest end of the socialization continuum; for example, cases 
where production takes place at the level of independent households 
but utilizes the cooperatives services in areas such as credit 
solicitations or marketing of their products. The term 
"collective" is then reserved for those cases in which independent 
household production has totally disappeared and given rise to such 
organizations as state farms.5 
In Venezuela, the empresas Indigenas constitute a variation of 
the "empresas campesinas" (peasant enterprises) model elaborated 
within the juridical proscriptions on cooperation in general 
allowed by the agrarian reform law.6 The term empresas campesinas 
7 
was used loosely before 1973 and included peasant organizations 
that never achieved a significant degree of collectivization. 
However, in 1973, during the administration of Carlos Andres Perez, 
these organizations were redefined and given unprecedented levels 
of state support. They were designated as a "higher" form of 
cooperative, and, at least on paper, came to approximate more 
closely the ideal type of collective than had been the case with 
any of the previously established peasant organizations.7 The 
official definition of these organizations follows: 
An empresa campesina (peasant enterprise) is a non-profit 
civil unelected society constituted and organized by 
agrarian reform beneficiaries who have a collective title 
to land. The land, capital, and labor belong in common 
to all the members. Members assume, and share equally, 
the responsibilities for administering the benefits 
according to the amount of work contributed" (CIARA 
document cited in Cox, 1 ~81). 
These empresas campesinas were seen during the early to mid-
seventies as the latest answer to the Latin American agrarian and 
peasant questions.a The arguments supporting this new enthusiasm 
for collective enterprises were very similar throughout the 
continent. In Venezuela, proponents of the empresas campesinas 
within Perez's administration cited a number of advantages these 
organizations had over the family-farm model favored under the 
earlier phase of the agrarian reform. Among such advantages were 
the possibility of avoiding risks related to micro-crop failures; 
the benefit of economies of scale; more efficient and economic mean 
of distributing credit and other state resources, and, improved 
opportunities for incorporating these larger production 
8 
organizations into complex agroindustrial processes. (Cox, 1981; 
IAN-CIARA, 1976). The proponents of these organizations (which 
included the President of IAN at the time) also emphasized social 
and cultural goals, especially the notions of democratic self-
management (autogestion) and egalitarian distribution of work and 
outputs (Cox, 1981). This latter emphasis was largely reflective 
of the intellectual climate of the time and particularly the 
arguments for participatory democracy. 
The pro-Indian individuals or "indigenistas"9 hired to manage 
the IAN Indian development program, and outside lndigenistas (often 
anthropologists, sociologists, and lawyers) working with them, had 
argued from the beginning for the establishment of economic 
organizations in Indian communities based on communal principles. 
They believed these principles were more consonant with these 
communities' own social and economic organization. They were 
however constrained in their options of economic organizations 
allowed within the proscriptions of the agrarian reform law. 
Consequently, they chose to adopt the model of empresas campesinas, 
but hoped to adapt it to the particular characteristics and needs 
of the different Indian communities as the program developed. 
The IAN indigenistas also stressed collective ownership of 
land and means of production, and the collective organization of 
the work process. Much more so than with the empresas campesinas, 
however, the empresas Indigenas, as conceived by the Indigenistas, 
were to generate a permanent balance between family (or eventually 
community-based subsistence production and collective production) 
9 
destined for the market. Furthermore, the emphasis was to be 
placed on social and cultural goals, with only relatively modest 
goals for economic productivity. The small surplus expected to be 
produced by these empresas was to be in accordance with consumption 
needs that bad to be satisfied through the local market. This 
included a few food items and small tools (see Clarac and Valdez, 
1976 and Heinen, 1981a). 
In summary, the empresas lndigenas fell somewhere in the 
middle of the collectivization continuum devised by-Gal leski. For 
this reason, 1 will use the terms "collective" and "cooperative" 
interchangeably. Distinctions such as simple vs. complex or 
expanded forms of cooperation will refer to the distinction between 
indigenous forms of cooperation limited to individual tasks, and 
the more encompassing form of cooperation introduced by the new 
collective organization--in this case the empresas Indigenas. 
II. Structural and Historical Forces in the Evolution of 
Cooperatives and Collectivization 
The first question posed in this dissertation refers to the 
nature and structural location of the various forces that shaped 
the creation and evolution of a development program among 
Venezuelan Indians with its emphasis on the organization of 
collective enterprises. I have identified two major factors which 
I believe account for the particular evolution of this program. 
One is the "state" as a major actor in the articulation and 
implementation of this policy. The second, is the Indian 
10 
communities themselves as active, even if less powerful, actors in 
this historical process. A more valid way to understand these 
factors however is to see them as complex categories which must be 
carefully disaggregated in order to assess their impact in the 
transformation of Indian communities. It is to the examination of 
these two categories of factors that I now turn. 
A. The State and Rural/Indian Economic Development 
In Latin America, the state, as opposed to the peasantry, has 
been the major actor behind collectivization and rural development 
projects in general, and the success rate of these projects is low. 
Stavenhaggen (1975), de Janvry (1981), Fals Borda (1977), Huizer 
(1984a), and Zamosc (1986) have documented the collapse and 
parcelization of cooperatives, and the eventual disillusionment 
with collectivization programs. Writers link this abysmal record 
to the fact that such projects have been consistently tied to the 
national political and economic imperatives of capitalist 
development. In other words, cooperative movements, like other 
programs of agrarian reform in Latin America, have been molded to 
serve political functions such as pacifying the countryside, or 
economic functions such as increasing productivity of cheap 
foodstuffs. In this manner, the questions of subordination of the 
peasantry to the capitalist market and their participation in 
highly inegalitarian economic and social structures have been 
relegated to a subordinate position. For example, in his analysis 
of Mexican collective ejidos, Bartra (1976) shows that 
reorganization of the peasantry into ejidos by the Mexican 
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government during the late 1960s, was intended to ·avert a serious 
economic and political crisis should the decomposition and 
proletarianization of the peasantry continue unabated. 
Zamosc (1986), writing about Colombia, contends that 
institutionally supported efforts to mobilize the peasantry, and 
the organization of "empresas campesinas" (peasant cooperative 
enterprises) during the late 1960s, were part of a larger state 
economic and social strategy to resolve a severe crisis of poverty, 
unemployment, and capital accumulation. 
Fals Borda, (1977:15)10 in summarizing the classical works on 
the subject, concludes that in •~atin America, the cooperative 
movements have generally been stimulated by political motives: they 
are like a medium to pacify a rising people ••• they have taken place 
primarily during econo~ic and political crisis or in the middle of 
threats of a rural uprising; or when fears about the 'threat of 
communism" have emerged and the impact of the Cuban revolution is 
being measured." 
Although somewhat less critical of government goals, those who 
have studied Peruvian collectivization during the early 1970s write 
of the ultimate subordination of peasant empowerment, self-
determination, and equal distribution of rural resources, to issues 
of productivity and efficiency--both political and economic 
(Huizer, 1984; Kay, 1983; Long, 1978). 
Critics of the Venezuelan Indian empresas have also tied the 
birth of this program to broad economic and political goals of the 
12 
state. Generally, they view the program as a concerted attempt by 
a variety of state agents to transform the Indian population into 
either a full- or a semi-proletarianized peasantry!! contributing 
their cheap food and labor to the capitalist market. The program 
has also been seen as a mechanism of political control that 
allegedly thwarted a spontaneous Indian movement, and which, 
through clientelist politics, created an Indian leadership tied to 
the empress's administrative bodies and state-supported Indian 
Federations. 12 
However, the rather insignificant place that frontier or more 
isolated Indian communities have occupied in the overall pattern of 
Venezuela's economic development raises serious questions about the 
overall validity of these assertions. Most specifically, it 
challenges one to explore the apparent analytical 
extrapolation from the study of rural development among the more 
integrated sectors of the peasantry to that of the possibly unique 
historical situation of Indian communities within the state and the 
economy. 
I suggest that the first task in the consideration of the role 
of the state in initiating and implementing a new policy for Indian 
communities must be to make explicit the theoretical assumptions 
about "the state" and state po Hey-making with which one is 
working. In other words, it is necessary to understand what is 
meant by "the state" as that active participant in the elaboration 
of new policy orientations; and most importantly, to understand the 
various structural requirements as well as social forces and 
13 
political processes that shape state policies at different 
historical moments. 
This is all the more important because even those who argue 
that grass-root economic development is the only route toward 
meaningful forms of economic democracy recognize the relevance of 
some form of state support for these projects.13 In fact, the 
literature on collectivization and cooperatives invariably 
recognizes the significance of "state commitment" to these 
collective forms of production as a key ingredient of success--
particularly in third world countries.14 But as the few works 
cited above suggest, state support for collectivization does not 
necessarily equal a commitment to the transformation of the 
agrarian structure to increase equality. This historical fact has 
often been translated, in theoretical terms, into a discussion 
about the constraints placed on collective organizations existing 
within a capitalist vs. a socialist context. The UNSRID studies 
that Fala Borda directed, for example, concluded that the 
capitalist market inevitably undermines the development of true 
cooperatives in Latin America. Yet, the experience of socialist 
countries, both in eastern Europe, as well as experience in Africa 
and to some extent even Nicaragua, suggest that, for many complex 
reasons, there is no necessary equivalence between collective 
agricultural production and emancipatory goals (Deere, 1986; 
Gal leski, 1973). 
The analytical and historical tools adopted in this work are 
14 
of course those that contribute to the understanding of the 
capitalist state as it operates within the Venezuelan context. A 
major concern in the examination of such a state will be to 
establish the constraints limiting state action and policies of the 
sort considered here. Some of those constraints have to do with 
the presence of particular classes in the state and with external 
constraints emerging from a predominantly capitalist world economy. 
To that extent the discussion should, at least indirectly, 
contribute to the broader discussion of whether the capitalist 
context places unique constraints on the evolution of cooperatives 
toward economic democracy and the elimination of exploitative 
relations in the countryside. 
B. The Venezuelan State, Classes, Parties and Changes 
in Indian Policy 
Authors concerned with explaining the origin of the Indian 
development program and of the empresas specifically have not 
always been either very explicit or sufficiently consistent about 
their conceptualization of the Venezuelan state and the policy-
making process. At times they seemed to have adopted a rather 
narrow "instrumentalist" view of the state and directly trace the 
Indian program to the conscious actions of individuals representing 
dominant economic interests. At other times, the emphasis seems to 
come c 1 oser to a "re 1 ati ve autonomy" view of the state whereby the 
new policy results from the actions of state agents with enough 
foresight to integrate the demands of Indians into state activities 
in the interest of social peace and ultimate preservation of 
15 
dominant political and economic relations. 
According to Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo (1983), for example, 
the changes in Indian policy circa 1970 resulted from an internal 
struggle within state and COPEi party factions regarding the 
interpretation and implementation of this party's rural development 
policy, especially it touched with the frontier areas. These areas 
had acquired a special significance around this time because of a 
growing state and private interest in expanding the agricultural 
frontier and developing the rich mineral deposits located in the 
area. These were also the areas where the majority of the 
Venezuelan Indian population resided. Accordingly, the 
"desarrol listas," situated primarily within the National Border 
Council, and thus charged with articulating a new border policy 
coherent with these "dominant economic interests", favored a policy 
of colonization and development of these areas, and subsequently of 
territories traditionally considered Indian territories. To the 
extent that Indian populations were at all considered, their 
participation in the process of frontier pro.tection and development 
was posed in terms of individual families integrated into the 
COPErs integrated rural development programs. 
On the other hand, there was _the ''neo-lndigenista" faction 
whose members occupied executive posts within the Institute Agraron 
Nacional (IAN), which was, charged with the agrarian reform 
component of the rural policy, and the Comision para el Derarrollo 
del sur (CODESUR), a new agency created to oversee the overall 
policy of economic development in the Venezuelan southern 
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territories. According to these authors, the COPE! faction of neo-
Indigenistas, apparently more concerned with the political fallout 
of the desarrol lista perspective, favored a ''more subtle" approach 
to frontier development and Indian integration, one that was also 
more atuned to the new Latin-American views on the Indian issue and 
which selectively incorporated into its ideological justifications 
terms such as "self-determination" and self-development. 
The indigenistas proposed to achieve their aim of 
"control ling" the Indian population through a two-prong-economic 
and political-strategy. The political strategy was the well-tested 
method of a top-down organization of Indian Federations and a 
national Confederation which would essentially operate under the 
umbrella and with the blessing of the COPEI government. According 
to Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo, these Indian Federations were 
explicitly "designed by criollo Indigenistas in order to control a 
threatening and massive Indian movement which did not have a 
visible leadership", while COPE! gained a new political 
constituency. But these authors saw in the leadership of the 
Empresas lndigenas a still more effective means of control. This 
leadership, they allege, was created by these same Indigenistas 
with the "hope that they learn how to channel economic and social 
change in the direction wished by national and/or international 
economic interests ••• " (1983:513). 
In what they attribute to a case of •~ureaucratic 
inefficiency," the strategy of the desarrollistas, despite the 
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dominance of this group within the current regime, was ultimately 
defeated and the Indigenistas successfully created a political 
space for Indian-specific development programs. However, these 
critics argue, this brought COPEI an unexpected windfall as the 
Indigenista development program not only averted any possible 
confrontations between Indians and criollos, but the tenets of such 
a program were coherent with national economic interests--
especially as stated in the National Plans. Despite changes during 
the following administrations of the opposition party AD, the 
program continued and ultimately the de-mobilization of the Indian 
population was largely completed. 
The scenario presented by Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo seems 
reasonable enough. Especially when evaluated against the 
historical backdrop of similar state-peasant relationships. 
However, their argument suffers from several theoretical and 
empirical weaknesses. I wil 1 only point to a couple of problems 
here. 
It is never made totally clear, for example, why IAN 
Indigenistas and their allies were so intent on controlling the 
Indian population. However, the implication seems to be that their 
location within the COPEI party (not strongly documented) and 
within the state's structure (though not all pro-Indian program 
elements were), indicates that their interests are perfectly 
coherent with those of other party and state agents. 
Parties and political structures are thus ultimately 
characterized as monolithic entities within which, despite a lack 
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of consensus about concrete strategies, the interests of individual 
social actors are homogeneous and ultimately correspond with 
dominant national economic interests. In addition, as their 
argument progresses, their tone becomes increasingly 
conspiratorial. 
The central problem in explanations such as those provided by 
these authors, lies in their dismissal or at least their inadequate 
consideration, of structural and political limitations to policy 
formulation and developments emerging from Venezuela's economic and 
class structure. The authors are certainly aware of the larger 
changes occurring in Venezuela's pattern of development and 
capitalist accumulation. However, the connections they establish 
between such changes in the economy and the state are overly 
simplistic and fail to capture the complexities and contradictory 
nature of the policy-making process. According to the underlying 
logic of their argument, "dominant economic interests" are broadly 
identified, yet within the context of a class analysis. Political 
parties in power articulate policies address these economic 
interests while supporting their own political position and their 
party and state agents unproblematically carry them out. The only 
opposition to such a dynamic lies outside of the state. In this 
context, policies result primarily from political decision-making 
among state agents who unproblematically and homogeneously 
represent dominant "national" economic and political interests. 
Th . l. . . 15 e1r argument suffers from an extreme po 1t1c1sm. 
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Instrumental and even conspiratorial theses are not totally 
out of the question when considering the ways in which the dominant 
class and state agents impose their agenda on a particular society. 
But first, this is something that has to be demonstrated; and 
secondly, its proof lies partially in the consideration and 
subsequent discarding of alternative explanations. A way out of 
what are essentially mechanicistic explanations is to seriously 
explore Venezuela's accumulation pattern and the specific types of 
demands it places on the state at different historical 
conjunctures, regardless of individual motives of state officials. 
As we do so, however, it is imperative to also discern (not simply 
assume) the nature of class forces and interest groups embedded in 
state and party structures. 
In considering the factors that shaped Venezuela's new Indian 
policy and development program in the early 1970s one must examine 
much more closely the structural location and political space 
occupied by Venezuelan Indians in the overall pattern of social and 
economic relations. Two related issues immediately come to mind. 
One is the negligible contribution of most Indian economies to 
V~nezuela's capital accumulation process and the high risks and 
costs associated with a state-induced modernization program of such 
economies vis a vis a more integrated peasantry. Secondly, the 
evidence of a ''massive" Indian movement is minimal at best. At 
this point then, neither economic nor political motives as 
discussed by Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo seem to be sufficient for 
explaining the genesis of the program. 
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This is not to imply that once the reality of a new Indian 
policy was apparent to different class and political actors, such a 
policy was is not subject to different structural and political 
constraints that may, in fact, bring it closer to the dominant 
interests represented in the state. But ~his is exactly what must 
be explored. In Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo's argument, these 
constraints are glossed over and the only limits to Indian policy 
considered are those emerging from bureaucratic inefficiency or 
political decision-making. At the end of their argument they do 
consider why, despite the apparent capacity of state managers to 
direct policies toward national goals, programs like the Indian 
development program produce disappointing results. At this point 
they entirely switch their focus to the internal characteristics of 
the Indian communities and argue that the "traditiona 111 structure 
of these communities were substantially incompatible with the 
empresas lndigenas' design. 
There are very legitimate reasons for looking at the limits to 
state policies and development programs as emerging from the local 
environment within which they are implemented; and a major part of 
this dissertation is dedicated to such analysis. However, this 
complements but cannot substitute for the analysis of structural 
and political constraints operating at the broader level of the 
state itself. Before I explore an alternative approach any 
further, I will review another author's interpretation of the 
events that led and followed the genesis and evolution of a new 
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Indian po 1 icy in the 1970s. 
Andres Serbin (1983) offers a more theoretically sophisticated 
analysis of the formulation of the new Indian policy which was 
established by the 1970s. He correctly starts his analysis by 
stating his main assumptions about the Venezuelan state and the 
process of state policy formation and implementation. Working 
within a "Gramscian/Poulantzian" conception of the state, Serbin 
argues that in peripheral societies like Venezuela, political 
society is dominant vis a vis civil society. The undeveloped or 
restricted nature of the capitalist market (and thus of civil 
society) in these societies, places the weight of the system's 
legitimation on the state apparatus. In this manner, the state 
becomes extraordinarily interventionistic. It seeks to buffer the 
highly deletarious effect of these societies' pattern of capitalist 
development through the selective incorporation of members of the 
subordinate classes and groups within the standard clientelistic 
practices that characterize the Venezuelan state, and the various 
regimes which have prevailed in the last decades. The Venezuelan 
state, promotes, through its control over oil revenues, the 
reproduction of political parties and officially backed popular 
organizations as the main vehicles for clientelistic arrangements 
and thus selectively channels resources to different 
constituencies. 16 
Given this scenario, Serbin sees the new Indian policy's 
primary objective as one of formally and systematically 
incorporating the increasingly restive Indian population into the 
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corporatist and clientelistic arrangements of the Venezuelan 
political system. The ultimate goal being to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the entire political system. Serbin subsequently 
explains how the two major components of the Indian program, i.e. 
the Indian Federations and the Empresas lndigenas served--and were 
ultimately constrained in this scope by--these specific and general 
purposes. The state-supported Indian Federations mediated the 
"definitive" incorporation of the Indian population into the 
political clientele of the party in power. Similarly, the empresas 
Indigenas were mechanisms of economic incorporation which not only 
helped legitimize the democratic nature and general benefits of the 
system, but in his view, inexorably transformed these traditional 
economies and subordinated them to the Venezuelan capitalist mode 
of production. 
In my view, Serbin is correct in focusing on the issue of 
legitimacy as an important factor influencing the direction taken 
by this policy and state policies in general. But his analysis 
suffers from some of the same limitations found in Arvelo and 
Perozo's argument. I will discuss only those points that in my 
view are most problematic and conflict with my own analysis of the 
Venezuelan state and policy formulatation processes. 
First of all, like Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo's, Serbin's 
analysis remains confined to the political sphere. To be sure he 
justifies this by dismissing from the beginning the relevance of 
the economic realm and thus the relevance of classes, especially 
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dominant classes, as major social actors in the process of 
reproducing peripheral societies. In these societies, "the weight 
of social relations is born in the political camp, and 
specifically, in the workings of the state" (1983:29). Class 
forces embedded within the political structure such as the state 
and the parties are never considered. Almost no one would disagree 
with the fact that the state and party structures in countries like 
Venezuela tend to play a much larger and interventionistic role 
than found in more advanced industrial societies. However, this 
assertion must be approached with caution and cannot be equated 
with a blanket dismissal of class dynamics as embedded within these 
political structures and thus determining political processes. 
Much of what Serbin assumes also needs to be explained a~d 
empirically corroborated. He ultimately does not adequately 
support hie main argument that maintaining the system's legitimacy 
was the major force behind a new Indian policy. For one thing, 
legitimacy questions are only important to the extent that there is 
a potential for the disruption of the larger process of capital 
accumulation and the reproduction of the system as a whole. I have 
already expressed doubts about the extent to which a largely 
isolated Indian population constituted enough of a threat as to, .2,Y. 
itse 1 f, provoke a major po 1 icy shift. But only through a concrete 
examination of Indian participation in the economic and class 
structure can one support or dismiss such an argument. In 
addition, he tends to emphasize the potential electoral weight of 
the Indian constituency as the more immediate reason behind COPErs 
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support for the policy. Although there are no exact figures, all 
accounts indicate that only a tiny minority were in any position to 
participate in elections then and now. 
Secondly, his argument that the new policy served to enrich 
the hegemonic ideology already based on populist and nationalist 
tenets, by imbuing it with notions of "traditional" Indian values 
is also vague and questionable as a major explanatory factor behind 
a new policy formulation. No doubt this can result from such a 
policy, but it is not clear how these ideological factors lead to 
new policies. 
His conclusion about the process of economic incorporation of 
Indian economies into Venezuela's capitalist process also needs to 
be empirically corroborated. This cannot be simply deduced from a 
broad and implicit vision of the inevitable consequences of capital 
penetration (whether induced by the state or not) in the 
countryside. As I said at the beginning, the penetration of 
capitalist relations in the countryside takes place in a highly 
uneven fashion and produces different results. Most importantly, 
one has to establish which of these Indian economies could in fact 
be properly characterized as "traditions 1-subsistence" economies 
before to the organization of the empresas lndigenas. 
Much of the problem with Serbin's argument lies in a creeping 
functionalism with teleological undertones. He attempts to deduce 
the ins and outs of concrete state activities from the very broad 
"functional prerequisites" of the peripheral state. This he does 
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by focusing primarily on the legitimacy requirements of the state. 
Despite his attention to concrete Venezuelan parties and regimes he 
tends to conflate levels of analysis and does not clearly 
distinguish the structural from concrete historical conditions 
affecting, and resulting from, the policy process. His analysis is 
also teleological because he deduces from·those policy outcomes 
that he argued occurred, the ''motives" behind the new Indian 
policy. 
Serbin's thesis does not suffer from the over-simplistic 
instrumentalism and conspiratorial overtones of Arvelo-Jimenez' and 
Perozo's. He seems to recognize that part of this process is not 
the result of conscious intervention on the part of homogeneous 
state agents, but happens ''behind the backs" of social actors 
immersed in the day-to-day po l_itical process. He acknowledges, for 
example, that regardless of the intentions of the neo-indigenistas 
or the radical proclamations of the Indian Federations, the outcome 
is the political incorporation he describes. The problem is that, 
as I just argued, while recognizing some structural limits to 
policy formulation and outcomes he ultimately reduces such limits 
to the state's or the whole political system's legitimacy 
requirements. In his view of the Venezuelan state, classes, even 
dominant classes, are largely absent from dominant political and 
economic relations. Being primarily an export economy, the center 
of Venezuela's capitalism lies outside its boundaries and thus the 
state largely displaces market forces as the organizer of social 
relations. When taken to its logical extreme, this line of 
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argument can lead, as Munck (1981) has correctly pointed out, to an 
over-politization of the analysis. Despite its possible validity 
for some concrete historical cases, it cannot be elevated to a 
special structural character defining all "peripheral" Latin 
American formations across time and space. 
In the specific case of Venezuela, an oil-exporting economy 
has engendered a significant process of internal capital 
accumulation and industrialization which increasingly organizes 
class forces and fuels new levels of class struggles. The state is 
definitely a center player in that process and civil society is 
weak relative to fully-industrialized nations. But there are clear 
signs of the increasing economic and political power exercised by 
financial and industrial fractions of domestic capital on state 
activities. The "desarrol l istas" themselves are nothing else than 
one of these fractions acting in a politically organized fashion. 
Similarly, several authors have shown how FEDECAMARA, the 
association of Venezuelan industrialists from which many of the 
desarrollistas came, has served as a major vehicle for imposing 
these classes' interests in state policies. Hence, policy analyses 
must consider the relative weight of there different economic 
classes as well as their political power. 
In conclusion then, the arguments presented by both Arvelo-
Jimenez and Perozo and by Andres Serbin, regarding the genesis and 
evolution of a new Indian policy in the 1970s offers some important 
and highly plausible explanations. But they ultimately suffer from 
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a rather narrow politicism and fail to explore more thoroughly the 
connections between Venezuela's accumulation pattern, the location 
of different classes and groups within it, and their relative 
impact on state activity. 
Before turning to the next section in this chapter, I would 
offer one more possible reason as to why their explanations suffer 
from such shortcomings. Focusing just on the Indian Federations, 
it appears that both of these analyses have been--consciously or 
unconsciously--informed by the more researched situation of the 
state's and specifically the Accion Democratica party's efforts to 
shape the Venezuelan Peasant Federation (FCV) as well as the most 
important labor union in Venezuela, the Federation de Trabajadores 
Venezolanos (FTV). In both of these cases, however, we are dealing 
with fractions of the working class that, especially at the time in 
which these organizations emerged, played a significant role in 
Venezuela's process of accumulation and, relatedly, were key 
constituencies for the ascendancy of Accion Democratica as a 
dominant party--against both the oligarchichal-dictatorial regime 
of Perez Jimenez and the potential competition from the communist 
party (for accounts see ... Powe 11, more recent: LAP and Ad. The 
tactic of co-opting spontaneous popular movements is of course not 
unique to Venezuela or Latin America. Nor unique to non-Indian 
movements of course. Examples from US: labor Unions in the 30s; 
examples from Latin America: Hunck). At this point in the 
analysis, and judging simply by the data they present, a similar 
argument cannot be made about the Indigenous population. 
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C. A View of the Venezuelan State and the Policy-Formulation 
and Implementation Process · 
(1) Different patterns of development impose different 
objective demands on the state with regard to both maintaining an 
adequate environment for accumulation and for doing so without 
threatening its own legitimacy and that of the system as a whole 
(Hirsch, 1974; Offe, 1975; Habermas, 1975, Held and Krieger, 1983). 
During accumulation crises, such demands appear particularly naked. 
The demands, their impact, and proposed solutions from different 
social classes' and groups' point of view, become more frequently 
and more visibly included in the public discourse. 
Venezuela's pattem of accumulation had been characterized 
in the last decades by an oil-exporting economy that sustainep an 
expanding industrialization process. During the late sixties and 
early seventies, there appeared clear signs of an accumulation and 
general socio-economic crisis. Caldera's regime, influenced by 
financial and industrial capital representatives, i.e. by 
desarrollista forces, drafted new plans to re-structure the 
economy, including the relationship between industry and 
agriculture; between the cities and the countryside, including 
portions of Indian territories. 
(2) However, the state, peripherally or otherwise, is not a 
monolithic entity. It is constituted by classes and other interest 
groups hierarchically arranged and balanced in different ways 
during different historical conjunctures (Poulantzas, 1978). State 
policies then, are never the result of a pre-established consensus 
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but their formulation and implementation is a contradictory process 
riddled with conflict. At the end, state policies are the material 
expressions of class and interest group struggles, compromises, and 
accommodations. 
These contradictions are not simply political in nature and 
independent from the class contradictions and relations of 
production consistent with Venezuela's pattern of development. 
Class contradictions are embedded in state and party structures and 
squabbles that take place within and across parties-are not 
divorced of class content and/or of consequences in class terms. 
When examining the formulation of a new Indian policy in Venezuela, 
one must attempt to relate the struggles between the Indigenistas 
and the desarrollistas to the particular balance of forces and the 
form that class conflict was assuming at this particular time in 
Venezuela. In this sense it is not necessarily logical to assume 
that both of these factions at the end represented similar 
interests. But within the state structure's hierarchical 
arrangement of class forces, it seems at least equally probable 
that the objectives and potential consequences (not simply the 
strategies) of the lndigenistas' project, by design or by default, 
and not just initially, but throughout the policy process, 
conflicted with dominant economic interests so clearly represented 
by the desarrol listas. In this vein, one would be closer to an 
understanding of why the program, despite a popular conception to 
the contrary, faced so many obstacles from the beginning, i.e. why 
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"state commitment" was not clearly forthcoming. 
There is no question that the state is an arena of inter- and 
intra-class and competing interest group struggles. It is clear 
that the "state" attempts to mediate in these struggles, often by 
incorporating some measure of subordinated classes and groups' 
demands, despite the opposition of some ciass fractions or elites. 
At the end, state activities responding to such demands cannot 
conflict with the dominant social relations associated with 
Venezuela's pattern of capitalist accumulation if the state is to 
continue to be a capitalist state. But, as I have expressed 
repeatedly, state policies and activities designed to incorporate 
and ultimately subordinate non-capitalist class interests to the 
workings of the state, are not simply the result of clever 
manipulations of state agents with clear political visions and 
motivated by their self-promotion. They emerge out of struggles 
and compromises between competing class and group interests 
(Pou lantzas, 1980; Bowles and Gintis, 1982). 
One does not need to resort to neo-functionalist arguments 
which deduce ''motives" behind specific state actions In the day-to-
day conflictive process of policy formulation and implementation, 
attempts wi 11 be made to "function.al ize", to squeeze these 
activities within the parameters of dominant economic policies and 
political interests. The extent to which these attempts succeed 
also depends, once again, on the balance of forces and the nature 
of class and group conflict within the state. There are no a 
Priori guarantees except in the long range when the capitalist 
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state, short of a revolutionary transformation, is• able to maintain 
its identity as a capitalist state. (Yet that "identity" is not a 
fixed object. And the transformations that may have occurred as a 
result of class struggles are not inconsequential in terms of the 
future of the capitalist state and of the capacity of groups to 
mount new protests). 
(3) Political parties and other political organizations do 
play an important role in the mediation and selective filtering of 
competing class and interest group interests. And as Serbin 
correctly asserts, this is especially so in countries such as 
Venezuela where the state plays a relatively larger role in the 
preservation of the system's legitimacy. Parties become important 
ingredients toward this end because they reproduce themselves 
through the effective incorporation of new constituencies via 
clientelistic arrangements that are supported through state 
resources. But party dynamics are themselves constrained by the 
specific development model and the particular balance of class 
forces found in society. In Venezuela, the relative economic and 
political significance of peasants and workers during the fifties 
and sixties attracted the attention of Accion Democratica which 
made great efforts to incorporate these classes into their parties 
while constraining their independent organizations. In hindsight 
it seems logical to conclude that COPEI in the 1970s, also went 
after the Indian constituency in order to establish a base among 
rural classes which it sorely lacked. However true this may have 
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turned out to be--something that remains to be examined--the 
structural location of the Indian population both in the economy 
and in the political arena, does not fit well with a vision of 
dominant political organizations avidly promoting this process. 
In Venezuela, political parties are also no longer the only 
major vehicles for channeling class demands. At the level of the 
dominant classes we have seen the emergence of movements such as 
that of the desarrollistas (which ultimately supported Caldera), 
and most importantly, of the more permanent organization of 
industrialists, FEDECAMARAS. It stands to reason then, that when 
considering class forces and mobilizational capacities as factors 
influencing state activities, one must go beyond the narrow world 
of party politics. With regard to the political organization of 
popular classes in Venezuela, _there is no question that these 
remain largely subordinated to party politics and still primarily 
under AD. However, this cannot be read as the unilateral triumph 
of these parties or of a populist state. The efforts of these 
parties themselves to mobilize these classes for their own purposes 
has had contradictory consequences in the form of these classes' 
new levels of politization. This point is particularly relevant 
when examining the organization of the Indian Federations. 
D. An Alternative Proposition for Explaining the New Indian 
Policies and Its Constraints 
The question still remains as to why then were the 
Indigenistas successful in introducing an Indian-based program 
within the state when this population was neither politically nor 
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economically very significant. I believe Serbin is on the right 
track when he speaks of the reproduction of legitimacy "for the 
system as a who le" as a major incentive to congress and other 
political actors in supporting the Indigenistas' demands. 
But rather than focusing on the Indian population by itself, I 
suggest that one consider two additional factors. One is that the 
Indian population was, for better or for worse, increasingly and 
instrumentally portrayed as part of the Venezuelan "peasantry.1117 
(This fact is often used by critics of the program to demonstrate 
the intentions of state officials, including IAN indigenistas to 
subordinate Indian economics.) COPEi came to power with a congress 
control led by the opposition party Accion Democratica (AD). 
Through its control of congress AD was mounting a successful 
campaign against the implement~tion of the new Integrated Rural 
Development Programs or PRIDAs. These programs, popular throughout 
Latin America at the time, represented a major turn away from the 
earlier emphasis on the social benefits of the agrarian reform 
programs of the sixties to an emphasis on of economic growth. 
They were also considered key in the strategies for re-structuring 
the economy and addressing the accumulation and socio-economic 
crisis. AD, fearful of COPErs eating away at what had been its 
pet constituency for years, the peasantry, stressed the deletarious 
effects of this new program to the peasantry and stirred up the 
Venezuelan Peasant Federation (Herman, 1980). When the Indian land 
invasions and genocide occurred in Apure, the Peasant Federation, 
independently skeptical of the new programs, but stirred by its 
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party AD, quickly pronounced itself in solidarity with its Indian 
brothers. The AD-controlled Congress jumped on the band wagon and 
legislated the organization of a new Indian Program. This could, 
in fact, have been perceived by some COPEi officials as weakening 
the necessary support required to implement the new rural policies. 
Secondly, COPE! had just experienced a serious conflict within 
the party between a left and a center-right faction. The left, 
formed primarily by young intellectuals, including some of the 
lndigenistas, had denounced the "aristocratic" past -of COPE! and 
sought to make the party more responsible to the popular classes. 
Venezuelan intellectuals played an important role in the genesis of 
the two dominant parties and also tended to gravitate toward the 
more progressive AD. (Herman, 1900). 
I would suggest then, that it is only by examining the nature 
of the association of the Indian rural population with the stronger 
peasant class and both intellectual and party al lies, i.e. the 
specific balance of class forces at this particular juncture, that 
one can begin to explain the genesis of a new Indian policy. 
Indian populations by themselves constituted no major threat or 
offered no major contribution to the preservation of the system's 
legitimacy. However, this is not true of more politicized and 
economically relevant classes. 
Besides political parties, and class-based organizations, 
institutional apparatuses such as church can and in the specific 
case of Indian affairs, do, influence state actions. It will thus 
35 
be helpful to look at the role played by the church during the 
Christian-Democratic regime of Caldera and beyond. While 
traditionally the church has "acted' as an arm of the state in 
controlling the Indian population in Venezuela, its own 
institutional requirements have also at times, placed it at odds 
with state policy. A major tenet of a new Indian program was the 
preservation of Indian territories. This fact, coupled with the 
internal changes the church itself was undergoing, proved to be 
important contributing factors--if not by commission, at least by 
not interfering in the development of the new program. 
With changes in the patterns and requirements of capital 
accumulation, there are often changes in the state structure to 
accommodate the new requirements. In the last decades, Venezuelan 
governments have been increasingly concerned with establishing a 
solid presence in border areas, a fact that goes hand in hand with 
its concern to expand the agricultural and industrial frontier and 
to develop resources found in these regions. The military has 
played an important, and new, role in the development of border 
policies and, as within the other political structures, the policy 
process has not been devoid of internal struggles. While some 
elements in the military, especial_ly earlier on, favored the 
colonization thesis of the desarrollistas, others viewed the notion 
of development of Indian community with particular sympathy. The 
historical evolution of this debate must also be evaluated in all 
its implications. 
Throughout the formulation and implementation of the Indian 
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program, there are also efforts to effect changes in the 
bureaucratic structure in order to accommodate the new Indian 
policy. This adds a new dimension to the conflictive nature of the 
Indian policy process, however, as the responsibility for programs 
is placed with new agencies while old ones are retained--and the 
power of policy implementation reverts back and forth. These 
changes also tend to coincide with changes in political party 
dominance. Parties in power surely attempt to undermine the 
opposition party's policy decisions by endowing new agencies and 
the party's clientele with more leverage. But these decisions are 
often constrained by a lot more than the narrow needs of the party 
and cannot be imposed with impunity. Struggles for the control of 
state programs by different agents are impregnated with class 
content. Attempts of AD to transfer power back to the old office 
for Indigenous affairs, OCAI in 1977, came at a time when the 
entire rural development policy of Carlos Andres Perez was coming 
under fire and new signs of crisis in the economy had appeared. 
This meant that there would once again be a realignment of forces 
in the struggle to re-assign state resources. Bureaucratic changes 
affecting Indian affairs, I would suggest, reflected changes 
occurring at the national political and economic level. Thus it is 
in this relationship with the larger economy, and corollary changes 
in legitimacy requirements, that one should interpret the different 
administrations moves to undermine and empower different state 
agencies. This extends not only to agencies more directly involved 
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with servicing the Indian communities, but also with credit 
agencies and agencies at different levels of government. 
In summary, it should be clear by now that constraints to 
policy development emerge from a multiplicity of factors arranged 
in various "layers of determination" i.e. both structural and 
historical factors constrain policy development. At the broadest 
level, the limits of policy are set by the accumulation and 
legitimacy requirements of a particular society. But the content 
of such policies depends largely on the historical composition, 
struggles, and forms of political representation of the various 
social classes and competing interest groups. In this sense, it is 
not impossible to conceive of certain historical conjunctures in 
which spaces can be created within the state for the representation 
of subordinate groups. But again, such spaces widen and narrow in 
the continuous struggle among antagonistic groups and classes, and 
depend largely on the political and mobilizational capacities of 
each class or interest group--such as ethnic minorities. In 
Venezuela, the capacity of groups to mobilize the support of 
political parties can be especially important--albeit a double-edge 
sword. Although popular organizations tend to fall under the 
control of Venezuelan parties and the state, the evaluation of 
their impact on policy processes should not be totally subsumed to 
party wishes. 
The Indian program was no doubt affected by the fiscal and 
administrative constraints of the Venezuelan state and the level of 
Priority assigned to social and economic demands for state 
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resources coming from various classes, class fractions and 
competing interest groups. These constraints are imposed through 
such means as the re-organization of the state's bureaucracy and/or 
the control of key agencies and budgets by individuals or groups 
representing different interests. But the effectiveness with which 
they accomplish that task over time depends in turn on their fiscal 
and administrative capabi 1 ities. The ''uneven development" of 
bureaucratic structures, and potential inefficiency definitely have 
a place in the analysis of the Indian program's diverse results. 
But such influencing factors must be adequately located within the 
larger composite of factors. In this sense, it only represents 
some of the more concrete influencing factors. 
Policy processes must then be examined as such - as processes. 
In this regard it is particularly important to distinguish between 
two key stages in such processes. The formulation stage and the 
state of implementation. Each is filled with contradictions 
emerging from similar and dissimilar sources. At this point it is 
useful to recall that the two main categories of factors identified 
earlier as determining the genesis and evolution of the Indian 
program, were factors located at the level of the state and at the 
level of the Indian communities. Both are represented at the two 
stages of this process--albeit in different ways and to different 
degrees--and thus their presence is felt both at the national, and 
at the local level of program implementation. In this manner, 
constraints emanating from the state and party structures spring up 
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from national and regional locations, each exerting its own unique 
influence. The earlier chapters concentrate primarily on the 
impact of broader state forces on the formulation of the program 
and Indian policy. The impact of such forces is however noted in 
later chapters dedicated to the individual case studies. In this 
context, the regional and local expression of state activities are 
combined with national-level forces in impacting the policy 
implementation process in each of the two cases. 
Particularly important for this work, is the fact that 
constraints also originate at the level of the individual Indian 
units and communities. And it is in the implementation stage that 
such constraints become most visible, especially since the Indian 
component was rather minimal during the formulation of the policy 
and the organization of the program at the national level. This is 
the type of constraint emphasized by authors such as Arvelo-Jimenez 
and Perozo. But unfortunately they do so at the expense of 
ignoring the other ·constraints. And, in addition, they assume an 
inevitable contradiction, as does Serbin, between Indian economies 
and the internal structure of the empresas Indigenas. Such 
contradictions are largely historical and thus their existence must 
be empirically established. The next section outlines the key 
issues that must be examined when considering the transformation of 
the policy process as it interacts with individual Indian economies 
and societies. 
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III. Indian Communities 
A. Structural and Historical Conditions 
Even the most ardent critics of collectivization projects 
recognize that, at least at the regional and local level, one may 
find variable results because external factors (such as state 
support and market forces) unequally impact individual groups and 
regions. These differences can be more accurately attributed to 
the particular combination of factors (structural or contingent) 
operating at the macro-level of the Venezuelan society. Among the 
factors operating at the regional and local level that are 
generally considered to affect the organization and functioning of 
production cooperatives, are the pre-existing organization of 
production, type of land tenure, available skills and resources, 
political organization and mo~ilization capacity, supporting 
cultural and ideological practices, and the specific form (design) 
assumed by the new economic organizations and its adaptation to 
pre-existing community structures and social processes. 
Within this category of factors, the issue that acquires 
special significance in the context of Indian cooperatives is 
whether pre-existing coDDnunal forms of production and socio-
cultural practices facilitate or impede the transition to more 
complex forms of socialized farming (Gros, 1987; see also Painter, 
1986). The debate goes back to Lenin and the populists who argued 
about the Russian coDDnunes a 11 eged ''backwardness" and conservatism 
as an obstacle to modern socialized production.18 In its modern 
versions, students of collectivization widely believe that pre-
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existing forms of cooperation, collective ideologies, and communal 
ownership of means of production such as land, may be an important 
factor in the transition to higher forms of collectivization 
implied in these modern programs, but few studies have been 
concerned with exploring this connection. 
The acknowledgment of such a connection is also most often 
made in reference to that category of peasants that resulted from 
the fragmentation of precapitalist comm.unities and whose forms of 
cooperation are viewed as isolated relics which today are mixed 
with more "capitalistic" elements. However, the debate over the 
effects of pre-existing communal forms and practices acquires new 
meaning when applied to at least some of the Indian communities 
targeted under the empresa program. At least some of these 
communities are arguably closer to the category of [pre-capitalist 
or re-constituted] cohesive villages, and are characterized by a 
wider and more integrated array of collective socio-economic and 
cultural practices. Even in those cases where drastic 
transformations have occurred in recent years, Indian communities 
constitute an excellent laboratory to explore the limits of pre-
existing communal forms as facilitators in the transition to 
complex collectivization. In other words, the examination of these 
special cases could bear fruit for those concerned with the larger 
issue of linking spontaneous with introduced forms of cooperation. 
Some of the thorniest questions arise when one considers 
contemporary Latin American Indian communities. At issue is what 
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exactly is "communal II within the present communities, and which of 
these forms and levels of spontaneous cooperation are most 
significant for new cooperative arrangements. Two key, and highly 
interconnected, elements often considered in the determination of 
forms and levels of collectivism are land tenure, and the 
socialization of work."19 Most discussions revolve around the 
organization of work in these communities, and specifically whether 
work is exclusively kin-based and confined to the household, or 
whether there exists community-wide mechanisms of production which 
would presumably be more compatible with the cooperatives 
structure (empresas lndigenas in this case). 
In the recent Venezuelan debate between proponents and critics 
of the empress program, the central issue has been whether or not 
failures were due to a "design" which incorrectly assumed that 
Indian production was communally organized, or whether there was a 
problem of implementation--meaning basically a lack of state 
support. 
Proponents of these collectives have spoken in very general 
terms about "co1IDDunal property and exploitation of the land" being 
part of the "lndigeneous cultural world." (Clarac and Valdez, 1974) 
and of how the existence of ''mutual help" and reciprocity networks 
supported collectivization (Heinen, 1981). 
On the other hand, F. Morales and Nelly Arvelo Jimenez (1981), 
two of the staunchest critics of the empresa program, researched 
three different groups of the Carib families,20 and concluded that, 
although land is held communally, the basic unit of consumption and 
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production is the extended family. Therefore, the organization of 
production worked against more extensive forms of collectivization. 
A few points are in order concerning the Venezuelan debate. 
First, proponents of the empresa were too vague about their 
conceptualization of traditional communal arrangements. Much of 
this vagueness was due to the already mentioned dearth of studies, 
a fact which both sides recognized. Unfortunately, in practice, 
researchers often assumed the homogeneous presence of communal 
patterns in Indian communities. On the other hand, Morales and 
Arvelo failed to appreciate the significance of community-wide 
cooperation in the clearing and burning of fields. As Roseberry 
(1986)21 points out, the fact that the household was the main unit 
of production in traditional peasant societies does not mean that 
it was always identical with a residential unit, nor that there 
were no other community-wide relations of production also crucial 
for the overall socio-economic and cultural reproduction of these 
communities. 
What both sides failed to consider is the varied forms of 
socio-economic organization in contemporary Indian communities 
which have resulted from the uneven penetration of capital and 
state agents into Indian areas. Such penetration may have resulted 
in the reduction of production to the minimal level of the family, 
and the concomitant undermining of traditional leadership 
structures (often identified with the authority of the elders). In 
other cases, penetration might have generated new forms of 
44 
cooperation and communal practices. In fact, in the two cases 
considered here, uneven penetration appears to have had these 
divergent effects.22 
An additional concern relative to the transition from simple 
to complex forms of cooperation is whether such a transition is 
attempted in an abrupt, totally top-down, and radical manner (i.e. 
jumping from very minimal forms of mutual assistance to full 
collectivization). One problem is that top-down, abrupt 
collectivization programs (starting with the Russian Kohlkoz) have 
ineffectively handled the tension between family and collective 
production (see Galles, 1973). But as the experiences of Hungary, 
Santo Domingo, and others make clear, this is not an unsolvable 
problem. There is no necessary "ideological" opposition on the 
part of the peasantry (although there may be on the part of the 
analysts of the peasantry) to balance more traditional forms of 
kin-based economic strategies with new forms of collective work. 
The key to whether different categories of rural toilers will 
successfully and willingly collectivize has a lot to do with the 
degree of control they are allowed to exercise over the 
transitional process, and their own evaluation of the benefits 
which will accrue from such a transition (Petras and Haven, 1981; 
Wi 11 iams, 1982). 
The above discussion indicates that both sides in the 
Venezuelan debate on empresas indigenas are inadequate because they 
stress one or another cause of the empresas' problems. The thesis 
maintained here is that problems arise due to a combination of both 
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unequal support from the state throughout the implementation of 
these projects, and the poor adaptation of the collectives design 
to the real conditions of each Indian community. 
B. Long-Term Impact and Sustained Stability of 
Empresas Indigenas 
The long-term survival of these cooperatives and how they 
continue to change and adapt will depend on the ongoing combination 
of broader, politico-economic forces, and the capacity of these 
communities to mobilize their resources and adjust their socio-
economic and cultural patterns of survival to those broader 
changes. In this regard, there are two final points to be made. 
One concerns the lessons we can draw from the literature on the 
peasantry regarding the various "roads" of transition fol lowed by 
peasant production units as a whole. The second is a reminder of 
the specificities of at least the fraction of those Indian 
communities that are relatively self-sufficient and may continue to 
be so through the organization of collective organizations such as 
the empresas lndigenas. 
Regarding the first point, a flurry of new studies on p~asant 
transition and re-interpretation of old data has led scholars to 
widen the "roads" of transformation that can be traveled by 
different categories of peasants. However, most of the discussion 
centers on the issue of independent producer's incorporation into 
the capitalist economy, and thus it does not directly address the 
fate of cooperatives. However, as long as cooperative production 
remains peasant production the discussion has some useful insights 
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to contribute. One key issue to keep in mind is the documented 
capacity of peasant enterprises to achieve sustained levels of 
capitalization and new forms of "relative autonomy" vis a vis the 
larger capitalist economy. 
Complementing this part of the literature is the discussion on 
cooperatives per se. Here, the literature is a bit more empirical 
and it is from specific cases that one can draw 100st of the 
inferences about the possible "roads" that, cooperatives and 
collectivization most generally are likely to fol low in Latin 
America. 
I already painted, through the analytical eyes of several 
authors, a picture of parcelization and abandonment of 
cooperatives, which has been common to Latin America. But I have 
also pointed to cases where cooperatives have been largely 
successful. This bring us to the second point to be raised in this 
fina 1 sect ion. 
Of upmost importance for this study are the cases of Indian 
communities in Colombia and Ecuador whose success in this area iS 
largely due to their unique configuration of internal 
characteristics. These characteristics are similar to those 
exhibited by the Bari of Venezuela and have been mentioned in the 
peasant literature as criteria for relatively autonomous groups 
(see footnote 121). In this type of Indian community, cooperative 
production organizations are but one element in an integrated set 
of communal arrangements and cultural patterns which validate them. 
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Among groups like the Pume, however, the sudden organization of an 
extensive cooperative organization with significant expectations in 




1. This is not to suggest that Indian groups have not before been 
directly or indirectly affected by national agrarian reform 
programs. See for example Stavenhagen (1977) and the article 
by del Pomar (1967). I am referring here to the very special 
cases in which the program is designed specifically for Indian 
communities as opposed to an all-encompassing category of 
peasants. Also, the main category of Indian communities I 
have in mind is that of frontier and more isolated groups 
which have retained some degree of autonomy from the national 
society. As we will see however, one of the cases studies 
here did not quite conform to that definition, and it was in 
essence a deviation from the intended clientele of the 
empresas. 
2. See various issues of IWGIA (International Working Group for 
Indigenous Affairs) Documents; Shelton Dav is (1976). Various 
issues of the Anthropology Resource Center (ARC) Documents and 
Newsletter, and Global Reporter. 
3. See Diaz-Polanco (1982) and other articles in same issue of 
Latin American Perspectives, IX:2. 
4. The term indigenous and Indian, as well as native or ethnic 
groups will be used inte~changeably here. 
5. This is the way in which Young, Sherman, and Rose (1981), 
conceptualize the distinction between cooperatives and 
collectives. 
6. See the Ley de Reforma Agraria of 1960, published in IAN 
(1981). 
7. It is often remarked by students of these Venezuelan Empresas 
campesinas that in most cases collective patterns faded very 
quickly and production at the individual level replaced -
often encouraged by state activity -- collective production. 
8. The first question is often used to refer to the economic 
issue of productivity while the latter refers to the social-
economic situation of the peasantry within the agrarian 
structure. 
9. The term commonly used in Latin America to refer to those 
individuals, usually anthropologists, who became identified 
with the struggle of Indigenous communities. For the various 
ideological positions see Bollinger and Lund,_1982; Diaz 
Polanco (1982). For an analysis of Venezuelan lndigenista 
factions, see Serbin (1983). 
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10. Translation supplied. 
11. Semi-proletarianized peasantry refers to those individual 
producers who due to the reduced side of their holding are no 
longer able to reproduce themselves without also participating 
in wage labor activities. 
12. This is simplified and combined version of several of those 
critics. See for example Morales and Arvelo-Jimenez (1981); 
Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo (1983); Serb in (1986). 
13. See for example Clay (1987). 
14. In a different article, Arvelo-Jimenez Cl 984) alludes to the 
personal and career interest of the Indigenstas as an 
underlying force in their decision. 
15. This tendency is prevalent among other students of Venezuelan 
political structures, for example Martz and Myers (1986), and 
Kauffman Cl 977). 
16. The argument here is similar to that of other political 
scientists such as Kauffman who have emphasized the 
clientelistic nature of Venezuelan politics. They also 
suggest a corporatist element as not inconsistent with such 
practices. The state's control over popular organizations, 
peasant and labor unions etc., facilitates the distribution of 
ob 1 igations between "c 1 ients". 
17. See Shanin (1987a); and Goodman and Redclift (1981). 
18. Gal leski in particular Cl 973) elaborates this point more 
fully. He points to the logical connection between communal 
land tenure and socialized work. However, he also notes that 
degrees of socialized work will vary significantly between 
different cases. 
19. The three groups considered were the Pemon, the Ye'Kuanas and 
the Karinas in Venezuela. However, the authors did not 
conduct a parallel study of the empress, only of the 
traditional forms of production and as far as 1 can determine 
at least some of the data was based on studies conducted as 
early as the 1970s. 
20. Roseberry's argument is made in the context of a renewed 
debate in the peasant literature about the importance of 
family economy and its equivalence with peasantry or simple 
commodity production. 
21. In the theoretical and empirical literature on cooperatives, 
the issue of appropriate conceptualization of peasant/Indian 
50 
communities is also considered one of the "internal" factors 
that will affect the particular rate of success enjoyed by 
different cooperatives. A reasonable consensus regarding the 
conceptualization of frontier Indian communities in 
contemporary Latin America, and Venezuela in particular, has 
been blocked by a theoretical and methodological impasse which 
confronted researchers during the early 1960s. At this time, 
it had become increasingly clear that the number of 
communities that could legitimately be identified as "tribal" 
(the "stuff" of which traditional ethnographies were made) had 
severely dwindled. Instead, as the articulation of 
independent producers with capitalist development become more 
and more apparent, the question of the "peasantry" had become 
most salient. Social scientists consequently switched their 
research focus from the former to the latter. One of the most 
important consequences of this switch was a sort of 
methodo logica 1 and conceptual "freezing" in time of those 
counnunities that remained relatively autonomous from the 
larger society. This meant, in many cases, that change 
resulting from their (however minimal) relationships with 
outside agents was either ignored or considered external to 
the "ideal" model of these isolated counnunities (Gros, 1987; 
Si 1 verman, 1987; Alavi, 1973). Similarly, the distinctions 
between "peasants" and Indian groups have been often 
exaggerated and overly-dychotomizing. On the other hand, 
those concerned primarily with the study of peasant economies 
might have, at times, succumbed to the opposite tendency of 
ignoring important speciflcities within the complex category 
of rural toilers. 
With the possible exception of those groups situated the 
river heads, Indian communities in today's Venezuela, and much 
of Latin America, cannot be adequately conceptualized as 
totally independent social systems--much less through a vague 
category such as "traditional societies." The uneven 
penetration of capital and state agents into their territories 
has produced various degrees of transformation in the internal 
socio-economic organization of these counnunities (Diaz 
Polanco, 1982; de Janvry, 1981; Heinen, 1981; and Heinen and 
Coppens, 1986). 
This means that we can no longer rely on traditional 
kinship analysis and ethnographies to tell us the whole story 
of these communities. Rather, such community-centered studies 
must be re-examined in light of the contemporary context of 
socio-economic external relations these communities have 
established to various degrees. It is at this juncture that 
the literature on the peasantry is especially illuminating. 
Particularly the discussions on the conceptualization of 
peasant vs. capitalist forms of production, agrarian 
transition and the transformation of the peasantry through the 
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advancement of capitalism. Non-capitalist peasant production 
units, may remain relatively autonomous, become subordinated 
to various capitalist elements, or become totally integrated 
(or subsumed) into the capitalist system (LLanvi, 1981, 
Zamosc, n.d.) A conceptual and methodological marriage of 
anthropological studies on native communities and, 
sociological (and anthropological) studies on the peasantry 
can thus enrich studies such as this one. 
From this perspective, the dychotomizing distinctions 
between peasants and Indians give way to a view of these 
differences as placed in a continuum from more to less 
autonomous--without implying a unilinear evolution. Today, 
Indian communities will tend toward one or another pole of 
such a continuum. Those closer to lesser autonomous can be 
said to have suffered new levels of "peasantization.11 In the 
analysis of my two cases, the Bari and the Pume can be placed 
at opposite ends of the continuum. 
However, to remain relatively autonomous means that 
certain cultural and ideological specificities can also 
separate this category from other elements of the peasantry. 
This can be seen, for example, in the particular value 
attached to the land and to integrity of territory by those 
communities that have not lost total control over their 
ancestral land. Similarly, patterns of work organization and 
distribution among depend~nt producers wil 1 likely be guided 
by different cultural proscriptions from those guiding 
independent peasant producers. In this sense, authors like 
Shanin Cl 987) leave such ''uncaptured peasants" right outside 
the frontiers of his typology of peasants and peasant 
societies. I, too, recognize the importance of such 
specificities, and it is often those specificities that 
introduce the major differences in the analysis between the 
Pume and the Bari and their particular empresas' performance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES: 
STRUCTURAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO THE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN PROGRAM 
It is widely accepted among students of Venezuelan Indian 
policy that 1969, the year COPEi came to power for the first time, 
also marked a new and radical shift in the Venezuelan state's 
policy orientation toward the integration of Indian communities 
into the national society. This shift is best summarized as an 
emphasis away from asistencialista or relief-type programs and 
toward more coherent programs of economic development. The change 
was not only qualitative but quantitative as both agencies and 
fiscal resources allocated to Indian programs grew considerably 
after 196 9.1 The most salient component of the policy and 
programmatic changes during the COPEi administration of Rafael 
Caldera was the organization of an Indian Development Program 
within The National Agrarian Institute (IAN). Most important of 
a 11 was, the establishment within this program of collective 
economic organizations known as Empresas lndigenas. 
Thie chapter examines the changes taking place at the state 2 
level and their relationship to broader socio-economic conditions 
which set the stage for a new direction in Indian policy at the 
beginning of the l 970's. There conditions constituted fertile 
ground for a change in policy direction but also set new 
constraints. As established in the introductory chapter, the 
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Venezuelan state has played a major role in the organization and 
development of rural development programs. Such a role acquires a 
special significance with regard to the transformation of Indian 
communities' economies. The analysis of the state's role is, 
however, complicated by the plethora of competing actors and 
agencies that have had a direct or indirect impact on Indian 
policy. One of the main objectives of this chapter is to clarify 
the roles of these different actors and agencies and to uncover the 
intended and unintended consequences of their actions. 
I. Changes in Economic Conditions and the Political Scenario 
State intervention can appear in the form of corrective 
actions taken during crises of accumulation and/or legitimacy. 
Although in reality these two types of crises tend to occur 
simultaneously, it is possible to trace the separate developments 
or symptoms of each. Similarly, it is possible, in most cases, to 
discern whether state actions emerge primarily out of a concern 
with economic or political trouble signs. By the end of the AD 
(Accion Democratica) administration of Raul Leoni in 1969, the 
limitations of "import substitution" as an industrialization 
strategy had become apparent. Warning signs of economic decline 
were noted by public institutions such as the Venezuelan Central 
Bank as well as by the powerful association representing the 
Venezuelan bourgeoisie, FEDECAMARAS.3 As has been the case with 
other Latin American countries, the domestic market soon proved too 
smal 1 to absorb additional expansion of industrial production. 
Petroleum production had slowed because of to the expanded sales 
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from the Middle East. In addition, there were renewed problems of 
land concentration combined with a growing percentage of small, 
unproductive landholdings. Unemployment and underemployment in the 
rural sector had also continued to rise despite efforts at agrarian 
reform.4 Martz (1986) cites a u.s-A.I.D. survey that concluded 
that "79% of all cultivated land was in the hands of fewer than 2% 
of a 11 proprietors." The same survey indicated that only one-
fourth of those listed as farmers or farmworkers owned any land at 
all. 
As was the case in much of Latin America, excitement about 
agrarian reform in Venezuela was beginning to fade. A new wave of 
discontent emerged from the peasantry, including peasants within 
the reform sector who continued to lack basic necessities and 
credit needed to compete with an increasingly industrialized 
agricultural sector. An increase in imports of foodstuffs while 
oil revenues declined and food shortages occurred were equally 
worrisome. In addition, unemployment had begun to climb in urban 
areas reaching levels approximating those occurring during the 
Perez Jimenez' dictatorship. This happened despite downward swings 
in selective quarters.5 
These new negative trends in the economy,6 combined with a 
serious split within AD that resulted in the exodus of that party's 
leftist faction, gave the Christian democratic Party COPEI the 
opportunity to capture the government for the first time in 
Venezuelan history. 
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Two important elements within COPErs administration serve to 
frame the political and economic environment within which changes 
in Indian policy were to take place. One was the various pressure 
groups, representing different class interests, that had played a 
significant role in COPEI's electoral triumph and who became key 
elements in the evolution of Indian policy~ The second was a 
specific set of economic and geopolitical campaign programs and 
policies that responded, in part, to the demands of those pressure 
groups reacting to changes in the larger socio-economic 
environment. 
II. Classes, Pressure Groups, and Political Parties 
A. COPE!, AD, and the Peasantry 
Until very recently, COPEI was widely regarded as a party that 
had been traditionally allied with wealthy landowners and other 
important factions of the Venezuelan oligarchy, including the 
church and the military. This party has taken great pains to 
disavow that image, but the evidence suggests that, at least during 
its earlier years, COPEI, more than the other political parties, 
enjoyed considerable support from these pressure groups. 
The party's roots are with a Catholic youth movement founded 
under Rafael Caldera's leadership. The group professed an ardent 
anti-communist ideology and defended the parochial school system 
against proposals by some AD members to abolish it. When Caldera 
and his followers founded Accion Nacional (the immediate precursor 
of the COPE! party) and later COPE! itself, they called each 
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organization the party of Venezuelan Catholics and vowed to defend 
the church (Herman, 1980). The party's electoral strength during 
the elections of 1947, 1958, and, to a lesser extent, 1963 was 
concentrated in the Andean states of Merida, Tachira, and Trujillo, 
home of the wealthy coffee-landowners and the oligarchical 
caudillos who ruled Venezuela until the 1940s. The party also had 
been, until Caldera's triumph, highly unsuccessful in gathering 
any support from either the peasantry or the urban poor, yet it 
fared better with the urban professional and business sectors. 
Adding to COPErs reputation as a conservative organization is 
evidence suggesting the party's close relationship with the 
military during both the "trienio" years7 and the early years of 
Perez Jimenez's dictatorship, a period when the military's main 
base of recruitment continued .to be in the Andes (Herman, 1980). 
After the fall of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship, COPEI sought to 
control the rise of the more reformist and nationalist AD and as 
Karl Cl 987) points out, became the de facto ally of the 
"entrepreneurs, the oil companies, the U.S. government, the church, 
and the military." (1987:82) 
Under Caldera, COPEl's cultivation of the support of these 
groups was imbued with a new sense of political pragmatism not 
different from that exercised by AD in its efforts to arrive at 
"pacts" with these different elites which were seen as 
indispensable to the survival of the new and fragile democratic 
process. In this sense it would be inaccurate to characterize 
classes and pressure groups as exclusively supporting either of 
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these two major parties. The Venezuelan class structure and the 
amount of power commanded by traditional elites such as the 
military, the landlords, and the church had undergone major 
transformations linked to the development of the oil-exporting 
economy; so had the political parties representing their interests. 
The society was clearly moving toward consolidation of a capitalist 
economy and its corresponding class structure. This had brought 
about, among other things, the growing politicization of the non-
capitalist classes such the peasantry. Mobilization of these 
subordinate classes had been actively encouraged by the emerging 
political parties, and AD in particular, which opposed the 
interests of the old rural-based elites. 8 
By the late 1960s, COPEi was beginning to understand the need 
to cultivate the support of groups that had traditionally 
gravitated toward AD and COPEt's chances had, in fact, improved 
with Arts retreat from its more populist and reformist stands. 
This retreat was illustrated by, among other things, A.D:s 
efforts to restrict the very mobilization of the peasantry that it 
had initially promoted (Hellinger, 1984). COPEt's new political 
requirements were also shaped by divisions within its own party. 
Its youth organization had experienced a serious three-way split 
among what could be summarized as conservative, liberal and leftist 
factions. Members of the latter faction still saw themselves 
within the social-Christian movement but argued for a dialog with 
Marxists (Calvani, 1976). Many of the individuals who were 
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directly or indirectly associated with this latter faction went on 
to embrace the Indian cause and to later participate in the 
development of the Indian development program. 
However, just as new political organizations and pressure 
groups such as the peasant and labor federations were beginning to 
be taken seriously by all parties aspiring to national prominence, 
organizations representing traditional interests continued to some 
extent to rally behind, or at least be identified with, one party 
or the other. In any case, it is important to trace the role 
played by those traditional elites, such as the church and the 
military, as well as emerging pressure groups such as the 
"desarro 11 is ta s" (deve 1 opmenta 1 is t entrepreneurs) during the 
election and administration of Rafael Caldera in 1969. The policy 
positions and actions impleme~ted within specific state agencies, 
as well as the historically structured--albeit transformed-
position of power now occupied by these three groups or elites, 
catalyzed the changes that occurred during the Caldera government 
regarding the state's relationship with Indian communities. 
B. The Military and the National Border Council 
By 1969 fears about military coups had greatly subsided in 
previously coup-plagued Venezuela. A "pact" between the military, 
a weakened elite group, and the main political powers and 
entrepreneurial forces emerged after Perez Jimenez's fall. The 
army was increasingly professionalized and its officers kept 
comfortable through generous material incentives • . Its role shifted 
from that of repression to such functions as border security and 
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immigration control (Ewell, 1984). These new functions fit with 
Venezuela's new accumulation requirements and the interests of a 
growing industrial class. The oil economy had by this time 
generated a relatively significant industrialization process and 
instigated the search for new areas of investment. This, in turn, 
heightened the state's and private capital's interest in developing 
the countryside and, hence, in asserting control over land, 
minerals, and labor supplies in remote areas. 9 
In this role the army actively participated in drafting 
geopolitical strategies and policies, a role that grew 
significantly during and after the period when border disputes with 
Colombia and Guyana were renewed due, in great part, to the 
important oil and other strategic mineral-reserves located in both 
of these border areas as well as on the border with Brazil. During 
Caldera's presidency, there was a noticeable elaboration of the 
philosophical underpinnings and multiple dimensions of the border 
policy beyond a simple concern with territorial limits. This 
concern was correlated with the state's broader interests in 
formulating new economic policies to expand investment 
opportunities and avert a serious economic crisis. 
To accommodate these new concerns, Caldera's government 
reorganized the old Frontiers Office or Direccion de Fronteras, 
and, in 1970, added to the office a new policy-making, inter-
ministerial body called the National Border Council. This body 
began the elaboration of a more cohesive and comprehensive border 
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policy which went far beyond the issue of territorial limits and 
addressed the problems of "integrating the margina 1 frontier zone 
to the rest of the country through an active policy of populating 
the frontier and of integral development, with special emphasis on 
agricultural development." As a middle range goal the council was 
concerned with "irradiating the Venezuelan presence in these 
areas .10 
Authors such as Heinen and Coppens (1986) have argued that the 
council was "a direct response to the Guyana uprisings of 1968 and 
196 9, which involved predominantly Indian populations and caused a 
large influx of indigenous refugees into Venezuela." (1984:369). 
In any case, the council, adopting a nationalist posture, expressed 
its support for a border-protection policy based on the 
consolidation of the "authocthonous" Indian communities occupying 
frontier territories.(8Min.) As Serbin 0983) correctly points out 
in his analysis of the National Broader Council's connection with 
Indian policy development, this organization--or at least certain 
individuals within it-evolved from a rather "developmentalist 
position placing great emphasis on colonization of the frontiers 
and the establishment of a conspicuous state presence in these 
areas, to a greater concern with the development of local Indian 
communities as a major vehicle for the protection of the frontiers. 
Many of the individuals who participated in the council were 
increasingly exposed to the Indigenista's ideological position and 
its so-called "inter-culturalist thesis.1111 For example, by 1978, 
a paragraph of the Border Council's declaration read, "A national 
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unity that encompasses the plurality of its diverse national 
communities, constitutes, against any uniformity, the best lesson 
of a healthy Nation." (Ministerio de la Defensa, 1976). 
Other paragraphs of this document, however, stil 1 revealed 
that council representatives were equally concerned with the 
ultimately contradictory process of the indigenous groups 
absorption of "Venezuelan national" values.12 As authors such as 
Stavenhaggen (1977) and Bo 11 inger and Lund (1982) have said, the 
promotion of an "indigenista" ideology, consisting_ of romanticized 
notions of the Indian past, has often accompanied modern Latin 
American states efforts at national integration and forging of a 
national identity. Such "official" indigenismo, however, has 
generally remained couched in ''modernist" views, and regards the 
integration of Indians in this· project of nation-building as the 
Indians' increased capacity to assimilate national, ''modern" 
values. In spite of the council's contradictory statements in this 
regard, its pronouncements in favor of the consolidation of Indian 
communities became important ammunition for Venezuelan Indigenistas 
and their arguments for economic and political development programs 
in this sector of the population. Conversely, and as I just 
stated, the arguments of the lndigenistas found their way more and 
more into the various policy statements made by the council. 
C. The Catholic Church: Missions in Indian Areas and 
Ideological Splits 
The Catholic Church constitutes the second pressure group 
linked to COPEI and is one with a long-established history of 
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intervention in Indian affairs in Venezuela. Like the military, 
the church came out of the dictatorship years with a tarnished 
image and, like the military, the church had arrived at a new 
''modus viyendi" with the new democratic forces. It worked to 
maintain an image of independence from COPEI, its traditional ally 
such a posture· could benefit both the party and the church. In 
exchange, the institutional survival of the church, guaranteed 
initially by AJfs previous administration, continued to be 
strengthened by the Caldera administration (Levine, 1977). 
Caldera, for example, left the Law of Missions untouched, despite 
his alleged interest in abolishing it and transferring all rights 
concerning the conduct of Indian policy policy from the church to 
the state (Heinen and Coppens, 1986). 
The cornerstone of church involvement continued to be in 
education, not only in Indian areas but in the nation as a whole. 
During the Caldera government, most state legislatures continued to 
make important budget contributions to the parochial educational 
system that included schools in Indian areas.13 However, as a side 
effect of the continuous efforts to complete the administrative 
regionalization of the country, which included the formal 
incorporation of frontier areas into a special educational region, 
the state reasserted its rights over Indian education during this 
period. Still, missionaries were increasingly hired as teachers by 
the Ministry of Education. The compromise was necessitated by a 
still relatively weak state that was unable to assume the totality 
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of important ideological and economic functions through formal 
education, and which are necessary components of the bourgeois 
project of national integration.14 
But as with the other political and ideological apparatuses, 
the Catholic church was experiencing internal transformations more 
in keeping with the political mobilization of subordinate classes 
and their allies and with the calls for social Justice made by 
church members since Pope Pio XII. Ideas borrowed from the 
intellectual current of modernization were, however, comfortably 
integrated into the Catholic Church's doctrine of social justice 
and were prominently articulated by those associated with the 
Christian Democratic parties such as COPEi (Ewell, 1984). Out of 
this came the so-cal led "theory of marginality" elaborated by a 
group of Jesuit scholars lead by sociologist Roger Bekemans. The 
theory "envisioned Latin American society as composed of two broad 
segments ••• ," one modern and one backward, "representing the 
contemporary reflection of 'traditional, pre-Columbian' situations. 
This duality was attributed, in part, to the neglect of the poor by 
the dominant classes, but, more importantly, to the absence of 
appropriate socialization into modern skills and values (Portes and 
Canak, 1981:237). 
Clearly, then, like the nationalism of official indigenismo, 
the social justice doctrine of the Catholic Church was not totally 
able to break with the evolutionism of bourgeois modernization 
theories. Yet this constituted an important improvement over the 
raw neo-colonialism and paternalism of the previous era by shifting 
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the line of action from relief assistance and religious conversion 
to development of skills and secular education. 
In Venezuela, Catholics became actively involved in 
ideological debates over the desirability of a more activist role 
for the church in improving the conditions of the urban and rural 
poor. The split within COPEl's youth organization mentioned above 
was very much nurtured by these debates. Some Catholics went so 
far as to found participatory projects such as cooperatives and 
other community-based economic and political organizations. 
Priests, primarily from abroad, began participating in community 
work among the poor in Caracas' slums. At times, such 
participation was punished. In one case, the Caldera government 
ousted a Polish priest for engaging in "illegal" political 
demonstrations in support of the inhabitants of the barrio where he 
worked (Levine, 1977). Conservative church members also came under 
serious criticism from the well-educated Jesuit group that ran the 
Venezuelan Jesuit research center (the Centro Gumilla). This 
Jesuit group openly promoted dialogues with the Venezuelan left, 
praised elements of Marxist analysis of capitalism, and directed 
poignant criticisms, through its prestigious journal SIC, against 
powerfu 1 business interests. 
It is difficult to trace a direct connection between these new 
strains in Catholic thought and COPEI's position on the state's 
responsibilities to Indian communities. However, it is clear that 
the new church doctrine had an impact on middle class intellectuals 
65 
and the youth movement in particular. This was best evidenced 
through the increase in written pronouncements from the missionary 
sector supporting a change in government policylS At the local 
level of church missions, the splits between the conservative and 
progressive elements of the church were more evident, and the 
church's support for new forms of government intervention and its 
particular relationship with the military, varied from mission to 
mission. 
In addition to ideological changes within the church, there 
were other important reasons why it would generally support new 
forms of state intervention in Indian communities. The church's 
institutional survival was intimately tied to the preservation of 
the missions which in turn were tied to the very preservation of 
Indian territories and identifiable, permanent Indian communities. 
All along, the church had fought planned and unplanned colonization 
of Indian areas and the exodus of Indians from their communities in 
search of better forms of subsistence. Undoubtedly, all of these 
factors contributed to a favorable disposition of the church toward 
new government programs that would, in fact, assist it in halting 
the disintegration of remaining Indian communities--even if this 
carried the cost of sharing more control over Indian areas with the 
state. 
D. The Desarrollistas and COPEI 
The desarrollistas made up an organized political group 
representing the industrial and financial bourgeoisie who appeared 
on the national scene around 1965. Their most prominent leader was 
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Pedro Tinoco, an influential member of FEDECAMARAS, who was linked· 
to national and international banking interests including Chase 
Manhattan Bank (Herman, 1900). The conservative Movimiento 
Desarrollista was formed to support the presidency of Rafael 
Caldera and to elect its own representatives to congress and the 
state legislatures. Pedro Tinoco was eventually named to the key 
position of Minister of Finance, and other desarrollistas were also 
elected or appointed to different posts in the Caldera 
administration.16 The desarrol listas' proposal fo_r injecting new 
1 if e in to the t roub 1 ed Venezuelan economic model was to promote the 
expansion of capital- and technology-intensive industries as well 
as to promote large-scale development projects, many in Indian 
areas. This plan entailed significant increases in state 
expenditures and "rationalization" of the public administration in 
accordance with the new economic development goals. The latter was 
to be accomplished by, among other mechanisms, the regionalization 
of the country into "development poles," an action that would also 
affect the political, economic, and juridical status of many Indian 
communities and their territories.I 7 
One area where the desarrollista orientation was to be put in 
practice was agriculture. During his campaign, Caldera had adopted 
as one of his themes the improvement of agricultural production by 
moving away from what he said was the bankrupt "socially-oriented 
model of agrarian reform." Instead, he concurred with the 
desarrollistas' inclination toward rural development through the 
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integrated rural development programs, generally known as IRDPs in 
Latin America and FRIDA in Venezuela. It is necessary to have a 
clear image of what these programs were about and what their 
overall accomplishments were in order to understand their 
connections and contradictions with IAN's Indian development 
program, which was, in fact, initiated under PRIDA. 
III. Agrarian Crisis, Geopolitical Requirements: Corrective 
Policies and State Agencies 
In the 1970s, in the aftermath of the wave of agrarian reform 
programs and experiments with the green revolution, came a new 
realization that neither the agrarian crisis nor rural poverty had 
been solved. Various authors believe that the agrarian reform 
programs of the 1960s were designed not so much to benefit the 
peasantry but to dis so 1 ve the pre-capitalist "latifundia" 
(combination of large estates and small peasant holdings) system 
and expand the commercialization and capitalization of agricultural 
production. The programs also had the separate political goal of 
"pacifying" the peasant sector (De Janvry, 1981). Many also 
believe, and I agree, that the IRDPs of the 1970s were aimed at 
reconciling political and economic demands within the agricultural 
sector. They were established to_ 1) preserve a semi-proletariat 
labor force needed in the transformed agricultural sector, while 
reducing the upward pressure on wages; 2) stem the exodus of 
peasants to urban areas; and, 3) maintain the middle and upper 
peasantry, re-creating a type of "petty bourgeoisie" that would 
Preserve the state's legitimacy among the politicized peasantry 
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while guaranteeing the continued production of cheap wage foods.18 
These programs were heavily funded and promoted by international 
organizations such as the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). 
A. PRIDA and the National Agrarian Institute 
The Venezuelan PRIDA program explicitly emphasized economic 
goals, and most specifically addressed the problem of food scarcity 
and increasing food imports. However, the program's content and 
the fight between A.D. and COPEI that ensued over its 
implementation show that political and social goals similar to 
those cited above--e.g., stemming new peasant mobilizations and the 
rural-to-urban exodus were at least of some importance to state 
officials promoting this program. Specifically, funds for PRIDA, 
coming from both the IDB and the Venezuelan government, were to be 
used to transform agrarian reform "from a socia 1 process of 
distributing the land, to an economic process that would increase 
production-credits, housing, electricity, water, roads, 
warehouses." (cited in Herman, 1900). 
The program in Venezuela followed the generic recommendations 
of the IDB which proposed consolidating those peasant units that 
constituted "the best bet" (Gusti, 1984) by providing them with 
renewed mechanisms of credit, commercialization, and 
infrastructural assistance. Also, keeping in mind the growing 
social problem of unemployment and underemployment in the 
. 'd II 't' II h countryside, the program sought to prov1 e amen1 1es sue as 
water and health care for those peasants on the verge of total 
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proletarianization and thus ready to migrate to urban areas. 
Unfortunately, as far as I could determine, there are no studies 
focusing specifically on Venezuela's PRIDA programs. Most of the 
conclusions drawn about this program were therefore pieced together 
through a number of general analyses of agrarian policies during 
Caldera's administration and in Latin America as a whole. A 
Central Bank publication of 1977, (Gimenez Landinez, 1977) for 
example, noted regrettably, that the program became a substitute 
for, rather than a complement to existing agrarian development 
programs. Others note that the program failed to avert the serious 
food crisis of 1972-1973 -- which was a clear signal to the next 
administration that a yet more radical program of agrarian 
development had to be undertaken.19 
PRIDA was housed within the National Agrarian Institute (IAN) 
which was strongly identified with the earlier phase of agrarian 
reform. This facilitated the blurring of the agrarian reform and 
integrated rural development goals noted above. 
The fact that Venezuela's peasantry was highly politicized and 
well-organized meant, however, that whatever Tinoco's plans may 
have been, a share of the nation's petro-dollars had to flow toward 
the peasant sector--even if the desarrollistas' own notions of 
economic development significantly determined how the money was to 
be spent. For COPEI this latter consideration carried a 
significant weight in 1 ight of its new efforts to gain a political 
base among the rural classes. Aware of the potential inroads that 
COPEI could make in the traditionally AD constitutency of the 
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peasantry, the latter strongly opposed PRIDA until a compromise was 
fins 1 ly reached in 1 91120 
Initially, PRIDA, with its strong desarrollista bent was seen 
as not only promoting more capital-and technology-intensive rural 
projects, but also as employing a strategy based on colonization 
rather than development of local, particularly Indian, 
peasantry.21 It was a strategy for promoting "the best bet," and 
Indian peasants were traditionally considered too unskilled and too 
removed from commercialized farming to be considered seriously as 
beneficiaries of such programs. In addition, none of the areas 
that fe 11 within the project's scope had significant Indian 
populations. Once again the Indian communities were left on the 
sidelines of Venezuelan agrarian reform. 
PRIDA did not therefore contribute, as had the other factors 
examined thus far, to a change in the formulation of Indian policy. 
However, it will soon become clear that as part of COPErs actions 
to maintain a favorable capital accumulation environment, the 
program had unintended consequences and set off demands for the 
inclusion of Indian populations in this new phase of rural 
development programs. 
B. Conquest of the South and CODESUR 
The second program espoused by the desarrollistas--and which, 
like PRIDA, was to play a significant role in the events leading to 
and helping form IAN's Indian program--was the "Conquest of the 
South." This grandiose idea was conceived by Caldera's 
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administration to facilitate access to the yet-untapped mineral 
resources of Venezuela's southern frontier. The latter included 
the large Cedeno District of the Boliva State and the Venezuelan 
Amazonia Territory. Together they constituted 26.5% of the national 
territory. It is here that the majority of the Venezuelan Indian 
population resides, constituting 60% of the southern region's total 
population. This project must be understood within the context of 
perceived stagnation within the Venezuelan capitalist and state 
sectors, of the industrialization process and the general crisis of 
capital accumulation. Proposed solutions to this crisis consisted 
partially in locating new sources of exports and intensifying the 
integration of marginal, unincorporated areas and populations into 
the national development plans. The Conquest of the South was 
created for this purpose, and CODESUR (Comision para El Desar_ro llo 
de Sur) was charged with its implementation. 
The program's economic tone fit the desarrollista perspective 
and thus emphasized capital-intensive projects with heavy 
participation of the state in matters of finance, infra-structure 
development, research, and mineral exploration. The Conquest of 
the South carried implicit political goals as well, as did PRIDA. 
Framed by a crass version of the theory of marginality, it 
contemplated providing social "amenities" to improve the health, 
educational, and, to a lesser extent, the economic status of the 
local Indian 'marginal' and non-Indian population--again to avoid 
an undue exodus of the local population and potential labor force. 
Yet the primary emphasis of CODESUR was initially placed on 
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colonization schemes. As Coppens (1972), an outspoken Venezuelan 
anthropologist, remarked at the time, the Conquest of the South was 
limited to "opening new economic spaces without any kind of minimal 
protection for the Indian communities against the 'colonizing' 
plunder of their ancestral habitat" (197~:383). In many ways, it 
complemented PRIDA's goals of capitalist development in rural 
areas. 
CODESUR was equally instrumental in fulfil ling ideological 
requirements of the state--especially regarding national 
integration--and it sought to promote, through formal education and 
special propagandistic campaigns, the rise of nationalistic 
feelings among these frontier populations22. Thus, in its 
beginnings, CODESUR exhibited an ideological position that was far 
removed from the cultural "interculturalist" thesis of the radical 
indigenistas. As one of its "sub-objectives," it contemplated 
"informs 1 education tending toward the transcul turation and gradua 1 
and voluntary incorporation of the jungle Indian population ••• " 
(Ministerio de Obras Publ icas, 1974). Finally, CODESUR also 
contributed to the Venezuelan state function of maintaining order 
and contra 1 over these frontier areas and their "citizens" through 
the organization of several military-civilian centers in the 
region.23 
Clearly, the goals of these two programs were, not 
coincidentally, coherent with the policy changes that were 
occurring at the level of the National Border Council. Like PRIDA, 
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the Conquest of the South was going to provoke a series of 
unintended consequences which fueled the call for a new Indian 
policy. In addition, the non-monolithic character of these state 
agencies meant that, as with the National Border Council, there 
were individuals who favored an Indian-specific program and who 
were to take advantage of the political opening generated by the 
forces and changes in the general socio-economic environment 
analyzed above. The rest of this chapter deals with the intended 
and unintended responses to COPEI's policies and the emergence of 
the Indigenistas as a new pressure group during Caldera's 
administration. 
IV. Problems of State Legitimacy: The lndigenistas 
and Responses 1.Q. COPEI's Policies 
Almost no time had passed_ often the Conquest of the South was 
proclaimed until the Ye'cuanas, the second largest Venezuelan 
Indian group residing in the Amazonian territory, were faced with 
an invasion of private speculators searching for the mineral riches 
of the area and claiming to be promoting tourist ventures. The 
invasions provoked a wave of denunciations from a few Indian 
leaders and provided a cause for indigenist anthropologists. 
The ominous consequences of the Conquest of the South, 
compounded with PRIDA's general neglect of the Indian population--
constructed--became the arena within which the desarrollista and 
new indigenista debate over the future of Indian communities in 
Venezuela was to be played out. The desarrollista position was 
most crudely expressed by a Venezuelan historian, a member of the 
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Movimiento Desarrol lista, who said "it does not seem possible to 
develop the Indian, to civilize him ... one must have hope that in 
the very near future--when the jungle has been conquered and when 
all its soil has been covered with towns and cities, not a single 
group would remain that speaks Caribe or any other aboriginal 
tongue" (Cited in Arvelo, 1972:145). The impact that this mindset 
was having on those interested in benefiting from the Conquest of 
the South was illustrated by the candid words of one colonist who 
dee lared to a nations 1 newspaper that the "development of the South 
could not be slowed by a handful of Indians" (cited in Coppens, 
1972). 
The response to the desarrollista orientation toward these 
development programs came from those individuals associated with 
the ''new indigenismo"--a current that sought to oppose the 
integrationist policies and attitudes of the "Patzcuaro" period.24 
These individuals were found not only in intellectual settings but 
within COPEI, the Catholic church and the National Border Council, 
(Valdez, 1900). But those who offered the most organized response 
opposing the desarrollista attitude were social scientists, 
primarily anthropologists, working in Venezuelan universities, 
research institutes, and even the state bureaucracy. In 1968, 
these social scientists had formed the Venezuelan Society of 
Applied Anthropology (SOVAAP), the organization that facilitated 
the ascendancy of lndigenistas as pressure group. 
Before examining the specific responses to COPEI's policies 
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and the final content of the Indian Development Program, it is 
important to review the ideologies informing the responses of new 
Indian leaders and, most importantly, of the progressive 
intellectuals who carried their cause into the national political 
arena. 
A. Ideological Foundations of Venezuelan "Indigenismo" 
What some have labeled as Venezuelan neo-indigenismo was not a 
phenomenon unique to this country. Its roots, as well as its 
internal contradictions and sometimes conflictive ideological 
positions, must then be traced to a larger Latin American pro-
Indian movement. The split in the movement became most defined in 
the course of the organization of the empresas Indigenas and the 
new Indian development program. 
Bollinger and Lund (1982) have traced the development of Latin 
American indigenismo and its various expressions throughout the 
continent. Indigenismo, as they note, has been a sort of catch-all 
term applied to official and non-official actions and positions 
identified with the plight of Indian peoples. It encompasses a 
long history and a wide range of philosophical currents and policy 
objectives which intersect somewhat with class positions but do not 
perfectly correspond to class divisions. What Bollinger and Lund 
call "officialist" (or integrationist) indigenismo has at one point 
or another been embraced by different Latin American governments 
with large Indian populations. This is the kind of Indigenismo 
found in Venezuela during the populist, nationalist administrations 
of AD which preceded and immediately followed Perez Jimenez's 
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dictatorship. Its essence has been the expedient exhaltation of 
Indian cultures as a justification for the consolidation of Latin 
American nation states. At times stressing separation, at times 
integration and ''mestizaje," this form of indigenismo acquired its 
most clear expression in 1940 during the Patzcuaro lnteramerican 
Congress and the organization of the Inter-American Institute of 
the Indian. At the time, the congress made the most explicit 
recommendations yet to Latin American states, urging them to form 
Indian affairs agencies or institutes and develop Rolicies of 
Indian integration based on respect for Indian cultures. Following 
those recommendations, the short-lived government of Accion 
Democratica organized the "Comision Indigenista Nacional" or Indian 
Commission in 1947. 
In opposition to the integrationist and assimilationist 
underpinnings of officialist or ''bourgeois" indigenismo there 
emerged a counter-current that Bollinger and Lund label "radical 
indigenismo." This is essentially a mirror image of bourgeois 
indigenismo. It sees industrial society as a decaying system, and 
in the Indian societal models, an alternative. It contrasts the 
superior value systems and notions of collectivity and spirituality 
of Indian societies to the materialism and individualism of the 
industrial West. The rejection of western values and ideologies 
extended to Marxism as well. This particular current re-emerged in 
the 1960s and gave those leaders fueled the emergence of an 
international Indian leadership and intellectual allies. The 
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Barbados meetings of 1971 and 1977 were unique in the almost 
unprecedented participation of Indian leaders as major 
representatives. 
However, social scientists, and especially anthropologists 
working in Indian areas, also embraced this new form of radical 
indigenismo and continue to be a major force in the policy process 
affecting the Latin American Indian population. But this is a not 
a homogeneous movement and internal divisions have emerged which 
place the individuals associated with the Patzcuaro movement in 
somewhat of a continuum between more or less orthodox views 
regarding Indian culture and separation from or connection to other 
class and ethnic groups in the course of their socio-political 
development. 
It is with this new tradi~ion, and particularly with the 
precepts set forth by the Patzcuaro Congress, that Venezuelan 
indigenistas identify and which have also influenced the new 
rhetoric of official indigenismo in this country. The internal 
cleavages within the Venezuelan indigenista are also reflective of 
the internal contradictory positions found within the Barbados' 
group. For one thing, Barbados retained much of the romanticism or 
"populism," and even anti-Marxism of the time--the latter often 
understandably, given the evolutionism that prevailed among 
orthodox Marxists. It continued to hold a fundamentally redemptive 
vision of Indian communities and it remained profoundly historical 
and dichotomizing in its vision of the Indian communities' relation 
to the national societies that engulfed them. It continued to 
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explain the internal logic of Indian communities by mere opposition 
to ''western industrial society," and it suggested a future when 
Indian communities, liberated from oppressive western influences, 
would resume their authocthonous development.24 Change, and the 
various modes of articulation with external agents, were often 
ignored in analyses informed by this perspective, or were treated 
as mere appendages outside of the "ideal" model of Indian 
communities. 25 
The "Declaration of Barbados I," however, included a series of 
important, progressive policy recommendations upon which SOVAAP-s 
own recommendations were based. Both SOVAPP-s concrete 
recommendations for the Venezuelan situation and the Barbados 
guidelines constituted the ideological foundation of IAN's Indian 
development program later on. The document denounced the common 
situation of colonialism, despoilment, and disintegration faced by 
Indians all over Latin America. It also marked a new orientation 
toward Indian affairs that promoted authocthonous ethnic 
development, self-management, and the consolidation of "communal 
power." It rejected the Patzcuaro principles of benevolent 
assimilationism that had been based on the thesis of cultural 
relativism which saw Indians integrated into national society as 
"full citizens" rather than as independent cultures and 
societies.26 The indigenistas of Barbados maintained instead that 
integration should be accomplished not at the individual level but 
through projects modeled after, and supportive of, the holistic 
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sociocultural organizational principles of Indian communities. 
This recommendation was obviously based on the already expressed 
belief that Indian communal modes of socioeconomic organization 
offered distinct advantages over the stratifying tendencies of 
capitalist-inspired models of development, as well as on the 
principle of respect for all cultures. They deserved, according 
to radical indigenista views, to be treated as societal models that 
could offer an alternative to a decaying capitalist system. In 
addition, Barbados I called on social scientists to serve as 
advisers to the organization of a genuine Indian movement and in 
the Indian struggle for self-development.27 
In Venezuela, the philosophical underpinnings of this new 
indigenismo was most explicitly defined by the anthropologist 
Esteban Emilio Mosonyi, who e~entually played an advisory role in 
the development of IAtfs development program. He defined this new 
philosophical approach as an "intellectual current which, through a 
series of publications, details a totally new lndigenist policy, 
based on the consideration of Indian groups as ethnic minorities"--
suggesting for the first time a relationship of unequal power as 
opposed to simply dissimilar cultures and epochs--11with the right 
to develop their own sociocultural identity, without having to 
remain in a total state of tribal isolation." (Mosonyi, 1975:27)28 
Mosonyi continued, ''The interculturalist position ••• advocates a 
pluricul tural solution, within which every culture would develop 
its own dynamic ... " (Mosonyi, 1972:45). Anthropologists like 
Gerald Clarac, who had been working with the government's Apure 
80 
lndigenista Center, also spoke of a new indigenismo of "liberation" 
as opposed to the official and missionary indigenismo of 
"domination" that had prevailed in Venezuela until the late 1960's 
(Clarac, 1974). Similarly, Valdez, a COPEi party member and lawyer 
who had a long record of working on Indian land rights issues, 
published articles on that topic attacking the 'economic 
liberalism' that had continued to shape official indigenismo's land 
distribution policies favoring individual over communal property 
rights. Both of these individuals became major players in the 
development of the program and the establishment of new economic 
organizations or empresas indigenas. Clarac was initially the in-
house anthropologist of the program, essentially the main position 
at that time. Later in 1974, when the program became independent 
from PRIDA, he was named program coordinator. Valdez supplied his 
legal skills in the elaboration of an economic model of development 
and land entitlement that would be guaranteed by existing 
Venezuelan laws, particularly the articles of the agrarian reform. 
He went on to head the office of Indian land grants created within 
the National Agrarian Institute parallel to the Indian development 
program. He also worked at CODESUR and there, together with other 
indigenista anthropologists, helped develop inter-agency agreements 
with IAN to support the organization of empresas indigenas and 
Indian federations.2 9 
In this manner, there developed a clear connection of 
Barbados' new indigenista orientation and official indigenismo. 
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This connection often met with harsh criticisms from other 
indigenistas who adhered to a more radical (not leftist) 
interpretation of Indian 1 iberation. 
These indigenistas, also associated with Barbados' principles 
and Venezuela's SOVAAP, stretched the implications of the 
interculturalist position and emphasized the 'superior' societal 
models of Indian ethnic groups, as opposed to 'western, industrial 
society' (Arvelo, 1974). In their view, the application of the 
principles of a new indigenismo to the organization of a state-
promoted program amounted to a distortion of the pr.inciples and 
their use merely a new ideological justification of integrationist 
programs. As the analysis progresses, one can see the development 
of these antagonistic positions affecting the very development of 
IAN' s program. 
B. lndigenistas and the Policy Shift: From Welfare to 
Economic Development 
By 1970 criticisms of government inactivity regarding the 
deteriorating situation of Indians had become significantly vocal. 
A documented act of genocide (known as "the Rubiera Case) against 
17 Guahibo Indians from Apure, including women and children, 
provided the catalyst for a congressional investigation of the 
situation of Venezuelan indigenous groups. The social scientists 
associated with SOVAAP testified against government and religious 
organizations' actions or lack of action in Indian communities, 
focusing their complaints on the desarrollista-style programs and 
their disregard for the future of Indians living in areas targeted 
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for development. 
As a result of this parliamentary action, the congress 
approved an Indian development program to be housed in the 
institute in charge of agrarian reform (IAN). The program was to 
function under PRIDA and thus be subject to the agrarian reform 
guidelines, but supposedly with the possibility of adapting such 
guidelines to indigenista principles. Some of the same social 
scientists who had participated with SOVAAP were hired as the 
program's staff. 
The successful culmination of neo-indigenista actions in the 
IAN development program represented an apparent blow to the 
desarrollistas who had dominated the conduct of rural development 
through programs such as PRIDA and the Conquest of the South. This 
apparent triumph of the lndigenistas, however, was aided by a few 
conjunctural events that occurred by the early 1970s. By this 
time, the general influence of the desarollistas within COPE! had 
begun to dwindle although it had by no means disappeared. There 
were several reasons for this. A very important one had to do with 
the growing dissatisfaction of some members of the bourgeoisie and 
influential political figures with the policies of the minister of 
finance •••• 30 Simultaneously, the damaging campaign that 
influential intellectuals were conducting through the national and 
international press--criticizing the government's as handling of 
Indian affairs--threatened to weaken the party's and in fact the 
Venezuelan state's legitimacy among the subordinate classes and 
their allies. COPEI was confronting a particularly turbulent 
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situation on university campuses and was also attempting to be 
recognized as a party sensitive to peasants and workers. Finally, 
and as I mentioned before, COPEI had experienced a serious split in 
its youth organization and was clearly interested in resolving the 
conflict between these conservative and progressive factions. 
Conditions for a compromise between the two factions in COPEI, the 
desarrollistas and those representing the indigenista perspective 
were essential. 
C. State Agencies as Locus of Control of Indian Policy: from the 
Central Office of Indian Affairs to 
The National Agrarian Institute 
The shift from a welfare to a development orientation to 
Indian policy at the beginning of the 1970s also brought about the 
emergence of the National Agrarian Institute as the agency 
dictating the thrust of Indian policy. Up to this time, the 
responsibility for state programs in Indian areas and by extension, 
of general policy directions in this field, had fallen to the 
Oficina Central de Asuntos Indigenas (OCAI). This office was 
organized during the AD administration of Raul Leoni as an 
extension of the Indian Comission Technical Corps that was created 
during the AD administration of Romulo Betancourt. 
Under the Indian Comision and OCAI, there had been established 
several Indian regional centers through which national funds were 
disbursed for various programs providing minimal technical and 
welfare assistance to Indian groups. The establishment of the 
centers and expansion of the Indian Comision to OCAI had alarmed 
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the more conservative members of the Catholic Church who saw this 
move by the historically anti-clerical AD as a strategy of the 
government to curtail the church's control over Indian affairs. 
However, for a long period of time, OCAI's funding was rather 
limited and the Catholic Church continued to -obtain about 50% of 
the Indian Commission's budget for its educational and social 
programs throughout the 1960s.31 The regional centers during the 
early sixties, influenced by the ethnic movements of the time, had 
made some efforts at organizing self-managing cooperatives and 
other grassroots economic programs. However, by the latter part of 
the 1960s OCAI's regional centers concentrated their efforts in 
facilitating temporary employment and providing isolated social 
services to the portion of the Indian population that exhibited the 
worst symptoms of social disenfranchisement and poverty.32 
It was partly as a response to the paternalistic orientation 
to Indian policy which was most easily identified with OCAI's 
activities that SOVAPl's indigenistas made their demands. The 
decision of the Venezuelan government to authorize an Indian 
program within the Agrarian Institute at the start of COPEI's first 
administration sent a clear message to AD-organized OCAI that this 
agency would not occupy a major role in Indian affairs. 
From this moment there developed an inter-agency competition 
for the scarce resources as well as bureaucratic jobs within the 
area of Indian policy. Such competition was often manipulated by 
party and administration officials and becomes yet one more factor 
influencing the evolution of the Indian development program.33 
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The next chapter explores the final accommodation (compromise) 
between the various state fractions and agencies which culminated 
in some modest changes in the apparent policy shift toward economic 
development and in the design and implementation of existing rural 
development models. The chapter then reviews the content and 
overall performance of the program at the national level. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. For a general historical review of these changes see Heinen 
and Coppens (1986). Up to this time, Indian policy objectives 
were heavily influenced by the Catholic Church's missionary 
interests in Indian areas, and heavily conditioned by the 
state's inability to extend its administrative functions into 
these frontier territories. In 1915, the Venezuelan state, 
still too weak to assert its control over the whole of 
Venezuela's territory, passed the "ley de Misiones" (Law of 
Missions) whereby it gave the Catholic Church extraterritorial 
rights over Indian areas with missionary outposts and the 
right to control freedom of movement over such territories. 
The law is still active today and invoked occasionally when it 
is politically expedient, to do so. In the 1950s, the growth 
of Venezuela's army al lowed the state to increase its direct 
control over Indian territory and the dictator- Perez Jimenez 
signed Decree No. 283 which requires that all individuals 
wishing to travel to such areas obtain a permit from the 
Venezuelan government, See Ministerio de Educacion (197 9). 
2. The term "state" refers to the analytical category of 
institutional ensemble which constitute the Venezuelan 
capitals and state apparatus. It is distinguished from the 
historical category of political regimes or specific 
administrations of governments. 
3. See Cendes (1981). 
4. Although this varies from region to region. Gutman and Van 
Kesteren (197 8), Martz and Myers (1977), Hassan Cl 975) Herman 
Cl 977), Aranda (1984). 
5. Hassan (1975) Quarterly Economic Reports for Venezuela (QER) 
(1 96 8), (1 96 9), (1 97 0). 
6. Specific indicators of this downtrend included disappointing 
growth in GNP since 1967; slow rise in fixed capital 
formation; and falling levels of oil production. QER 
(1 96 8: 1 , 3 ) , (1 96 9: 2 ) , (1 97 0 : 1 ) • 
7. ''Trienio" is the name commonly given to the democratic 
interlude of 1945-1948 in which Accion Democratica (AD) 
briefly took control of the government only to be overthrown 
by a military coup that placed Perez Jimenez in power. 
8. See Cendes (1981 ), for a broad outline of Venezuela's class re-
alignments at various key moments in its history. See Ewell 
Cl 984) and Martz (1980) for an outline of COPEI's ideological 
base and pol icy orientations. 
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9. See Aranda (1983) and Cendes (1981), for reviews and analyses 
of these developments in the Venezuelan economic and political 
structure. See Enloe (1981) for a brief historical analysis 
of the role of the military in state building and its impact 
on ethnic groups. See Carnoy--especially the essay on 
Poulantzas--for a more theoretical analysis of the state's 
task (--using instruments such as the army)--to establish 
national unity and delineate the boundaries ''within which 
capital reproduction is to take place." · 
10. Calvani Cl 97 9) Trans lat ion supplied and emphasis added. 
11. See Ministerio de la Defensa/Autogestion Indigena, (1977) and 
Arvelo-Jimenez (1984), for two different versions of the 
significance of the Border Council in shaping the.new 
orientation toward Indian policy. 
12. Article 1.4.6 of the frontier policy guidelines 
(Venezuela: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 197 8) reads: 
"The participatory promotion and consolidation of Indian and 
[other] frontier communities must take place in settlements 
[poblamiento] harmonious with the triple equilibrium: human; 
socioeconomic and politico-administrative." The next paragraph 
is even more revealing of the state's integrationist 
objectives, softened by the interculturalist perspective 
within which it is phrased:" ••• such a process must be one of 
selective integration, that is to say, that on the one hand 
the nation incorporate all the human, cultural, and spiritual 
values of the frontier populations, but on the other, that 
process must achieve, among those populations, the gradual 
assimilation of the institutions and the most genuine values 
of the Venezuelan nationality." 
13. See the Memorias of the Ministerio de Justicia and Ministerio 
de Education for budgets allocated for these purposes. 
14. Several theorists of the state have examined the increasing 
importance of formal education with the advancement of 
capitalist relations. Althusser notes, for example, that 
training of the existing and potential labor force tends to be 
provided more and more outside production and within a formal 
educational system. Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1974) 
also note the function of the educational apparatus of 
socialization of individuals into hegemonic norms and mores 
while inhibiting alternative cultural systems of adaptation to 
material circumstances. Formal education becomes a vehicle, 
for example, to transform the individual's concept of time in 
accordance with 'the requirements of capitalist production. 
The presence of the missionaries in Indian communities have, 
intentionally or unintentionally, contributed to the 
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fulfillment of these functions. They have contributed to what 
0ffe (1984) calls "passive" proletarianization, which is 
essentially the creation and maintenance of those sectors of 
the labor force that for different reasons are not at the time 
actively participating in production. However, the capitalist 
state constantly strives to gain control of these 'ideological 
apparatuses' and wrestle control from institutions such as the 
church which ultimately have competing interests and survival 
exigencies. The struggle between ruling political parties 
and the Venezuelan Catholic church, as well as the progressive 
invo 1 vement of the state in the native communities' education, 
provides supporting evidence for these arguments. For an 
essay on the socialization functions fulfilled by missionaries 
see Miller Cl 974). 
15. See Venezuela Misionera, various issues. 
16. A formal and reputable A.D. party leader, Prieto Figueroa, 
made the most explicit charges against the desarrollista-C0PEI 
alliance and its support for big business and international 
banking interests. See Herman, Cl 900). For a description ~f 
the Movimiento Desarrollista and its right wing ideology (as 
espoused by Pedro Tinoco) see Martz and Ba loyra (197 3). 
17. Regionalization is considered an important step in the 
advancement of capitalist states' bureaucratic consolidation. 
See Blank (1980) for a review of Venezuela's regionalization 
process. See Heinen and Coppens, (1986) for the effect of 
this process on the fragmentation of Indian territories and 
the Indian's loss of control over such territories. 
18. These goals are generally accepted as standard, "implicit" 
goals of rural development by critical writers such as Gusti 
0984), De Janvry (1984), Grindle (1986) and Galli (1981). 
19. According to de Janvry (1981; 1984), the accomplishment of 
both goals preserved what he calls the "functional dualism" 
between peasant production and the capitalist sector typical 
of Latin American "disarticulated economies." Authors such as 
de Janvry (1981) and Samir Amin (1977) argue that in these 
export-oriented (disarticulated) economies, labor is only a 
cost factor because the demand function remains outside the 
system. These economies are thus socially and sectionially 
disarticulated, as there are no real linkages between the 
different sectors of the economy and thus no internal 
multiplier effects to speak of. The internal market, 
according to this logic, is basically insignificant for 
capital accumulation. Maintaining low wages is required not 
only by individual capitalists but by the system as a whole. 
One important way to accomplish this is to maintain a semi-
proletarianized labor force that can, through its subsistence 
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production, maintain low wages. In addition, because 
capitalist production is so slow to enter agriculture and 
because in Latin America this has tended to occur primarily 
within the more profitable export sector, it is important to 
preserve middle and upper peasantry who, by exploiting their 
own family labor and having lower requirements for capital 
accumulation, can afford to produce wage foods to a degree not 
possible for capitalist firms. This analysis is historically 
correct in many cases, but it becomes highly functionalistic 
when it is elevated to a structural argument concerning the 
''blocked transition" of peasant economies, and, especially in 
the case of Amin, of dependent capitalism. As mentioned in 
the introduction, new peasant studies have successfully 
questioned this "Chinese wal 111 faced by the peasant sector and 
third world capitalist economies. Accordingly, these studies 
show that peasant roads of transition are not limited to the 
dissolution-permanence dichotomy; in fact, capitalized family 
farms, for example, emerge as a much more important sector of 
the peasantry than de Janvry and others sharing the world 
system perspective allowed for. In addition, the argument of 
a non-existent internal market must also be considered as a 
historical contingent rather than a structural necessity of 
Latin American economies. In fact, in countries like 
Venezuela, the internal labor market has become quite 
significant in some areas. Even in agriculture, national 
agribusiness has begun to link up the various sectors of 
production, marketing and processing. For a recent critique 
of this particular aspect see Wise (1987). 
20. See Republics de Venezuela, IV Plan de La Nacion (1971), and 
the Memorias of Minisierio de Agricul tura y Cria (1971 ). 
21. See Clarac (1974; 1975), and Serbin (1983). 
22. See the Memorias of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) (1971; 
1972). 
23. See Coppens (1973), Ministerio de 0bras Publicas. Comision para 
el Desarrollo del Sur 0974), Arvelo-Jimenez (1974). 
24. This refers to the period which immediately preceded and 
followed the 1940 Inter-American lndigenista Congress which 
convened in Patzcuaro, Mexico. At that time, most analysts 
agree, there emerged a new orientation toward the 
incorporation of Indians into the state system. Such 
integration was still the main goal but it was to take place 
in the context of respect for Indian values and cultures. It 
initially embraced the principles of "cultural relativism," 
but as Diaz Polanco (1982) notes, such principles were soon 
abandoned in light of the contradictory emphasis on 
assimilation and acculturation. 
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25. See Bollinger and Lund 0982), and Diaz Polanco (1982). 
26. This view of the new indigenismo was subject to the same 
shortcomings associated with dependency theory and the related 
thesis of internal colonialism. One of the most common 
criticisms of dependency theory is related to its tendency to 
explain third world underdevelopment by turning modernization 
theory upside down--i.e., as a consequence of imperialism--
thus leaving much of the internal logic of these societies 
unexplained. These shortcomings of ind.igenismo and dependency 
are probably the result of the ideological and political 
motivations that characterized them. In both cases, a 
"liberation thesis" from a foreign or a national oppressor 
informed the scientific analysis. There was thus a 
progressive element in indigenismo and its critique of 
capitalism; but unlike dependency, as well as the orthodox 
Marxism that it opposed, it was forced to maintain its 
rejection of current Marxist analysis--or, for that matter, 
even recent liberal analyses grounded on material, 
historically structured conditions--given its main thesis that 
Indian thought and social systems constituted a redemptive 
alternative to western thought and social systems. In this 
manner it strangled its chances to overcome its conceptual 
shortcomings and became reduced to pure ideology. As an 
ideology it mainly applied itself to highlighting the 
structural or institutional differences that existed among 
Indian communities and not only westernized national societies 
but also other urban and rural classes --without, as I 
suggested in the introduction, rigorously dissecting the 
meanings of these assertions. Unfortunately, the political 
consequences of such ideological stands have been, in my view, 
very negative. Among them has been a notable resistance to 
participation in common actions with these "part-societies," 
thus succumbing to the divisive strategies of the dominant 
classes. As Foster Carter once said of dependency theory's 
influences on the political events of the sixties and their 
emphasis on "foquismo, 11 ''Bad theory, 1 ike bad medicine can 
ki 11 you." Cl 97 8). 
27. Bonfil et al.,0972), Mosonyi (1975). 
28. Translation supplied and emphasis added. 
29. Interviews with Clarac, Venezuelan anthropologist and first 
Director of the Program (1985, 1987). 
30. See Quarterly Economic Reports for this year, and Herman 
0980). 
31. For data concerning ocArs budget during the early sixties see 
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corresponding issues of the Boletin lndigenista Venezolano and 
the Ministry of Justice's Memorias for various years. 
32. For various analysis see Arvelo-Jimenez (1984), and Heinen and 
Coppens (1986). For OCAI's program of activities see selected 
years of the Boletin lndigenista Venezolano). 
33. See Chapter 1 for a brief theoretical interpretations of this 
sort of inter-agency competition. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EVOLUTION AND AGGREGATE OUTCOMES OF 
THE INDIAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
In 1971 the Indian development program was formally organized. 
The indigenistas hired to run the program drafted as its main 
objectives the promotion of Indian cultural identity. More 
concretely, the program was to seek the promotion of socioeconomic 
and political organizations in which Indians would participate, not 
simply as objects of governmental benefits, but as active subjects 
in pursuit of democratic rights of self-determination--the "sacred 
right of al 1 ethnic autonomous minorities" (Clarac, 1974). Four 
program areas corresponded with these early objectives: land 
titling, research to support the organization of culturally 
appropriate cotmnunal economic organizations (what came to be the 
empresas Indigenas), cultural development, and integral rural 
projects (PRIDA). 
Despite having won an apparent battle in the organization of 
an unprecedented development program in Indian areas, IAN 
indigenistas soon faced a series of obstacles in their efforts to 
implement the goals articulated above and modified over time. 
This chapter begins with a review of the initial limitations and 
eventual compromise between the various state and Indian 
representatives which shaped the initial configuration and scope of 
the program. After this review, the chapter focuses more 
specifically on the program's early goals, subsequent performance 
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and those contingent factors that both opened new possibilities and 
established new limits in its evolution. The last section is a 
discussion of the entire evolution of the program as examined in 
the last two chapters. It re-inserts some of the broader 
historical and theoretical questions which have guided this 
examination. Its major purpose is to highlight the complexity of 
factors that continued to influence the implementation of the 
program and dismiss mono-causal explanations of the successes and 
failures exhibited by the program. 
The programs history can be divided into two distinct phases, 
one from 1970 to 1977, and the other from 1979 to the present. In 
between, from 1977 to 1979, the program operated at a minimal 
level. This chapter will concentrate primarily on the first phase 
of the program. Because not all stages of the various processes 
generated by the program neatly correspond to these chronological 
divisions, the chapter will sometimes go beyond 1977. The next 
chapter, chapter 4, focuses on the changes in the program after 
1977, and the broad economic and political forces that determined 
such changes. This latter period is of special importance to the 
analysis of the two empresa cases because it was after 1977 that 
both empresas were organized. 
I. Structural Limitations to Alternative Models 
for Indian Development 
From the beginning, the efforts to articulate an alternative 
model for Indian development within the confines of the state 
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bureaucracy, faced serious obstacles. The Indian Program was 
subsumed under the PRIDA projects which operated out of IAN. This 
meant, among other things, that the program had no independent 
budget line and was composed of a small staff of a sociologist, an 
anthropologist, and a research assistant. In 1972 an office for 
titling Indian lands was created.! Working under PRIDA, and the 
established agrarian reform guidelines also meant that most of the 
staff's energy was spent struggling to modify the desarrollista 
orientation toward rural development projects that had no 
provisions for the special needs and characteristics of Indian 
groups. 
One particular limitation was the fact that PRIDA programs 
were primarily seen as colonization projects of rural development 
with emphasis on large capital. and technological investments. The 
Indian population remained on the sidelines of such projects. 
Second, IAN had traditionally favored individual titles over the 
communal titles sought by the program staff and guaranteed to the 
Indians by the Venezuelan Constitution and the agrarian reform law. 
Most importantly, agrarian reform law allowed only a small number 
of economic organizational models to be used in rural development 
projects. Up to the early 1970s, credit unions (uniones de 
prestatarios) were favored over collective peasant enterprises 
(empresas campesinas). Finally, credit institutions had steadily 
resisted dealing with communal organizations. 
The Indian program staff and advising anthropologists believed 
that the collective format of the empresas was better suited to the 
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traditional economies of Indiari groups in Venezuela and came 
closest to the spirit of the ''Barbados II" guidelines (Bonfil 
Batalla, 1978; Grupo de Barbados, 1979). But even the format of the 
empresas campesinas was problematic because it presupposed a set of 
statutes that were identical for all empres~s. These statutes 
prescribed a basic administrative structure based on the western 
bureaucratic model of president, vice president, treasurer, and 
secretary. This structure was thought to contradict the internal 
decision-making mechanisms of most Indian communities, which to a 
great extent continued to include traditional.leaders in the 
decision-making process--albeit in varying degrees.2 
The IAN indigenistas believed then, as did other indigenistas, 
that much effort had to be focused on research activities designed 
to suggest ways of adapting the existing empress formats, and the 
interpretations of the agrarian reform law in general, to the 
concrete situations of different Indian groups.3 
A. The Compromise with the Desarrollistas 
In late 1971 and early 1972, the IAN staff conducted a series 
of meetings with Indian participants on leadership development. 
The meetings were part of a conscious effort to mobilize support 
for new forms of economic organizations among the Indian population 
and to create, de facto, an organized Indian leadership. This 
followed the recommendation of the Barbados meetings4 to designate 
"Indian promoters" who would actively participate with IAN program 
staff within both the state and Indian communities. In these 
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meetings, community representatives were given information about 
Venezuela's agrarian reform and their rights to benefits under the 
agrarian reform law. Indian representatives in turn had a chance 
for the first time to air their complaints regarding their current 
social and economic conditions as well as to express their views on 
IAN's proposals. 
Addressing charges of a new "paternalism" formerly attributed 
to OCAI,5 Clarac defended IAN's program by alleging that, in fact, 
the indigenous populations, often through these meetings, had 
explicitly demanded state support comparable to that received by 
other rural groups. "There were orientations, demands, and 
concrete pressures on the state on the part of the Indians," Clarac 
said. In these meetings he said, "there emerged concrete concerns 
on their part, such as security over their land and the need to 
have economic organizations that would make them eligible for state 
support, as well as interest in some form of political (advocacy) 
organization. 116 
These IAN field visits, together with the one applied research 
project in a Warao Indian community conducted through an agreement 
with the La Sal le Foundation, provided the fundamental guidelines 
for the design of the empresas indigenas and also of the Indigenous 
Federations that were subsequently organized. No comprehensive 
research projects were ever funded. 
In April 1972, IAN organized a working meeting in Caracas and 
brought in those Indian leaders selected during the field visits. 
In addition, IAN requested the participation of regional chiefs of 
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PRIDA projects being conducted in areas with large Indian 
populations, as wel 1 as of SOVAAP and missionary representatives 
who supported a new orientation toward indigenist action (Clarac 
and Valdez, 1976). I1JDDediately after this meeting the Second 
Congress of Indians of Venezuela took pl~ce, and IAN encouraged all 
participants of the working session to attend. What transpired was 
without precedent in Venezuelan indigenismo. Its significance must 
not be minimized. The overwhelming participation of Indian leaders 
was in sharp contrast to the experience of the first Congress in 
1970, when most participants were state personnel and social 
scientists. Additionally, and most importantly, two major 
resolutions came out of the second Congress: to organize, for the 
first time, regional Indian Federations and a National Indian 
Confederation, and to pressure PRIDA to modify its desarrollista 
policy of colonization and to cooperate with the Indian program in 
its efforts to form Indian collective organizations.7 
During 1972 and 1973, six regional Indigenous Federations and 
the nationwide Indigenous Confederation of Venezuela were founded. 
These organizations came to be known as the organized Indian 
movement. There is no question that the logistical and material 
support contributed by IAN and other affiliated state agencies, 
including CODESUR which housed a few sympathetic indigenistas, was 
of paramount importance in creating the conditions that allowed 
such a movement. In the 1973 "Conquest of the South" national 
meetings, the indigenous confederation presented its most organized 
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opposition to the desarrollista approach to development on the 
southern frontier. This opposition received wide media coverage 
and became the catalyst for the final compromise between the neo-
indigenista perspective of IAN staff and the desarrollista-type 
programs of PRIDA and CODESUR. From then on there would be a 
relatively higher degree of receptivity toward the Indian program's 
proposal, and toward IAN"s arguments that Indian communities were a 
legitimate constituency of the agrarian reform movement. 
In summary, changes in state policies designed to deal with an 
accumulation crisis generated unexpected political problems for 
Caldera's administration. The embarrassing events surrounding the 
treatment of Venezuelan Indians brought into question COPEI's 
claims of a new commitment to the subordinate classes. This was 
also occurring at a time when caldera was attempting to effect a 
final truce with the leftist guerrilla movement of the 1960s and 
thus establish once and for all the legitimacy of Venezuela's new 
liberal democratic state. The limitations placed on the program in 
its early stages already confirm the primacy of political 
objectives on the part of congressional and party leaders who 
supported the idea of a development program among Indian groups. 
Caldera was also facing an AD-controlled congress which could 
further jeopardize the former's efforts to expand its constituency 
among rural groups and classes. AD, as I previously said, had a 
strong hold over the Venezuelan peasantry and its federation. 
The desarrol lista agenda of frontier development clearly 
revealed that in the process of capitalist expansion, it was Indian 
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land rather than Indian labor that was of interest to agencies such 
as PRIDA, CODESUR, and even the National Border Council--especially 
in the earlier formulations of such development policies. 8 This 
assertion does not conflict with program critics' views that 
COPErs introduction of a development program among Indian peoples 
did not necessarily contradict these broader national development 
goals while possibly preventing more serious confrontations between 
criollo colonists and Indians (Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo, 1983). 
However, the triumph of IAN indigenistas in this regard cannot 
be automatically interpreted as the successful maneuvering of what 
were for the most part COPEI sympathizers (the IAN and CODESUR 
indigenistas) to "control" the political mobilization of Indian 
groups, and, by extension, their independent demands for self-
development. This is matter that must be empirically investigated. 
It remains to be seen then, whether economic and political 
interests of different social actors within and outside the state 
actually coincided. And, more generally, it remains to be seen, 
the extent to which national development or political objectives 
truly coincided with those of IAN indigenistas and their program as 
reflected in funding levels and other forms of support; as well as 
continued struggles and accommodations that occurred among 
different actors, agencies, and political parties in the course of 
the program's implementation. 
II. The Program's Performance and New Limitations 
This section reviews the content and overall performance of 
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the Indian program at the national level. The evaluation fol lows 
the four basic goals and program areas that were most clearly 
delineated during the years 1974-1975, following the most intensive 
period of negotiations with the desarrollista faction. These 
programs areas were listed in a comprehe~sive program report as: 
1) "Research, promotion, and constitution of Indigenous collective 
economic organizations which were faithful to, and further 
consolidated, the traditional socio-economic structures of each 
ethnic group." 2) ''Land grants with collective (communal) titles 
sufficiently extensive to allow for the integral development of the 
Indian communities." 3) "Support for and promotion of the organized 
Indian movement, in order to energize and channel the ethnic 
potentialities toward the conquest of their basic rights, as 
Venezue lane, and as authocthonous ethnic minorities." and 4) 
Respect, promotion and fortification of the authocthonous ethnic 
cultures, as a necessary condition for the Indian's participation 
in the country's socioeconomic process".9 
A. Collective Economic Organizations or the 
"Empresas Indigenas" 
Beginning with the new economic organizations, program 
documents reveal that 51 empresas.were formed between 1971 and 
197 8. Of these, six were "inter-communitary" i.e., included 
several communities; and 45 were "communitary" or single-community 
empresas. These empresas encompassed 68 Indian communities and 
more than 1,500 fami 1 ies (IAN, 1983). 
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1. The Articulation of fill Organizational Design for the 
New Empresas lndigenas 
The development of a design for economic organizations that 
would be sensitive to the needs and characteristics of Indian 
communities must be examined in some detail. I already mentioned 
the fact that in the absence of formal research, IAN staff and IAN 
consultants conducted a series of "diagnostic" field visits in 
order to gain firsthand understanding of the situation of Indian 
communities, to promote the notion of Indians' participation in the 
agrarian reform, and to elicit reactions to the idea of indigenous 
economic organizations and political federations.IO In addition, 
in June of 1972, through an agreement with La Salle Foundation, a 
more complete diagnostic research project was conducted and a pilot 
"empress indigena-campesina" was subsequently organized in a Warao 
community if the Orinoco delta.I! Both experiences reaffirmed the 
conviction of indigenistas involved with the project that the 
empress format of agrarian reform allowed the greatest flexibility 
for adapting these economic organizations to the specific 
conditions of Indian communities. 
The general propositions and underlying rationale for what the 
indigenistas from then on called the empresas indigenas, to 
differentiate them from the empresas campesinas, were expressed in 
a several papers and documents produced by IAN and CODESUR12 
Among the positive traits allegedly provided by the semi-
collective empress structure as opposed to, for example, the more 
traditional cooperative were: a high degree of community autonomy 
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in the decision-making process, or "autogestion"; the possibility 
of engaging in new economic activities without compromising the 
subsistence economy; and a "non-variable labor input," given the 
expected relationship of equivalence between the empress and the 
community (IAN, 197 5). 
Clarac and Valdez (1976), maintained that an economic 
organization such as the empress allowed for the practical 
reconciliation between the communal features inherent in Indian 
production and the "liberal economy's" requirement of production 
for the market. This statement was made in recognition of the fact 
that state support would likely not be forthcoming unless the 
Indian communities agreed to go beyond subsistence production and 
integrate themselves into the larger market structure. The whole 
orientation of rural development policy, especially as dictated 
within the new conception of PRIDA, was naturally oriented to 
resolving production and productivity problems in the countryside. 
These were not social programs. Credit mechanisms were designed to 
benefit individual as opposed to collective units of production, 
and they exercised significant control over all production 
decisions.13 The emphasis of the indigenistas, however, and of the 
Indians who agreed to form the empresas, was on the empress's 
capacity to provide these communities with the minimum cash 
required for their acquired needs for industrially produced goods, 
as well as for education and health services outside the community. 
The introduction of marketable commodities such as cattle was also 
necessary to secure government credit and other forms of financial 
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assistance targeted for rural development projects (Clarac and 
Valdez, 1976). Dieter Heinen (1981a), a consultant for the 
program, also explained that a major consideration in the empresa 
design had to be the "control of imports" by consensual agreement 
on the part of empresa members. Examples we_re the machetes, salt, 
and hatchets that Indians now use routinely in their subsistence 
activities. Again, the emphasis was on small-scale production for 
both subsistence and the market. 
Clearly no large-scale production was envisioned within these 
plans. Yet in order to receive the desired government support and 
protection from eviction under the agrarian reform law, more 
compelling reasons than basically maintaining a subsistence economy 
with small-scale production for the market had to be given to 
those who controlled IAN's, and most importantly, credit agencies' 
budgetary decisions. One of the anthropologists who has served as 
an adviser to the program and to Indian communities strongly 
disagrees with the notion that the empresas indigenas had been a 
well-thought out tool to control political mobilization or Indian 
production: "the empresas indigenas was a disparate concept; it did 
not even include other self-management projects that were 
autonomous from the state. In reality what existed were goals" (as 
opposed to the 'real empresas' defined on paper for primarily 
bureaucratic reasons). He adds .. we realized that the empresas and 
not the other associations would grant the indigenas the best 
protection •• it was an ad hoc decision.1114 In their view, these 
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economic organization provided the quickest and best-available 
means to prevent a further deterioration of Indian territory and 
socio-economic surviva1.15 
2. Organizing fill Indian Leadership at the Local Level: 
The New Empress Managers 
By 1975, but mainly during 1976, already within a new AD 
administration, the general methodological propositions and ideas 
that IAN indigenistas arrived at regarding a new form of economic 
organization became the subject of another series of workshops and 
meetings with Indian communities. Such meetings also took place 
with significant logistic and even instructional support from 
agencies such as CODESUR.16 The courses covered the operational 
requirements of organizing and running an empress indigena as well 
as planning for the development of secondary and tertiary agrarian 
organizations, i.e., organizations in charge of processing, 
transportation, and commercialization, and are normally considered 
integral components of self-development collective projects 
(Galleski, 1975). Also, the important issue of land titles, as 
well as other IAN_program areas such as the organization of artisan 
production and leadership development, were again addressed, now as 
necessary subcomponents of the empress structures. 
The communities selected for this new round of empresa 
promotion15 were selected according to criteria adapted from the 
integral rural development projects. The IAN indigenistas were 
sufficiently realistic to understand that not all Indian 
communities did not have the necessary ingredients to initiate a 
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process of complex cooperative development.17 These criteria 
included the number of people who would benefit, the presence in 
the community of basic infrastructures, previous experience with 
associative forms of production, a sufficient level of agricultural 
development, and a cohesive leadership. Like planners of other 
rural development projects, then, the indigenistas had been placed 
in the position of supporting the •~est bet" within the Indian 
sector. Disenfranchised Indian peasants and communities without a 
stable organization seemed unlikely candidates for state support. 
Between March and November of 1976, IAN conducted seven 
workshops among 15 ethnic groups belonging to 109 Indian 
communities. As a result of these workshops, 47 new empresas, the 
largest number ever to be organized were constituted, four of which 
were inter-community empresas,. benefiting a total of 1,498 Indian 
families (Clarac and Valdez, 1976). 
3. The Adopted Design for Empresas Indigenas--Similarities and 
Differences with Empresas Campesinas 
The organizational structure of all empresas consisted of a 
General Assembly, an Administrative Junta, and a supervisory 
counci 1 or "Comite de Vigi lancia.1118 IAN indigenis tas contended 
that this organizational structure was mainly a bureaucratic 
requirement and that modifications within that structure to 
accommodate key traditional elements were possible. A case in 
point was the incorporation of elder traditional leaders into the 
supervisory council and the election of an administrative 
committee, made up of the president, vice president, treasurer, and 
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secretary, through a combination of consensual and majority rule.19 
An important and rather neglected part of the empresa program 
and analyses of the program is the nature and degree of women's 
participation in empresa activities and related changes in their 
participation in subsistence and household activities.20 
There was a serious lack of formal participation of women 
within both the decision-making structures and the new market-
oriented activities of the empresa. The absence of women in 
political participation, except through pre-existing informal 
means, resulted from the national agrarian reform law, which 
recognizes only men as heads of household and as official members 
of economic organizations such as the empresas. Women are 
represented by their husbands (Agrarian Reform Law of 1960). This 
obviously has important implications such as further tying women to 
the household sphere in a situation of dependency.21 Aggravating 
the situation is the apparent lack of awareness of IAN personnel of 
the need to address the special problems of women from a 
contemporary and well-informed feminist perspective. In fact 
Clarac and Valdez (1976), in their only mention of the program's 
activities for women in the empresa communities, specify that 
efforts to include women in the empresa are confined to the area of 
"cultural reactivation" and consist of sending women to courses on 
pottery making.22 
4. Financial Support for the Empresas 
Earlier I cited the argument of some of the program founders 
that a registered and juridically recognized economic organization 
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would grant Indian communities the access to material support 
virtually denied to them until that time. However, program 
documents as well as interviews with Clarac revealed that such 
material support was often not forthcoming or was minimal when it 
did exist. 
The program, while functioning under FRIDA until mid 1975, was 
not allocated its own budget for agricultural projects in Indian 
communities. FRID.A's budget for areas with Indian populations from 
1970, at the beginning of the Indian development program, to 1974 
was approximately Bs. 28,000,000 (the equivalent of about 
$7,000,000). This was the largest amount of money ever invested in 
Indian areas before and after the Indian program was in full 
operation with its own budget. One must note that the budget was 
allocated to areas primarily, but not solely, occupied by Indian 
groups (Clarac, 1974-5). 
FRID.A's support was significantly, if not totally, 
concentrated on rural development projects of a desarrollista bent. 
This implied that resources were mainly distributed to individual 
farmers as opposed to communities, and primarily to those already 
engaged in production of foodstuffs that were part of the wage 
bundle of proletarian and semiproletarian workers--beans, potatoes, 
and rice. As I contended at the beginning and as the literature on 
integrated rural development projects has made clear, the implied 
purpose of these projects was to "re-create" a disappearing 
peasantry that could, with state support, afford to produce the 
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otherwise nonprofitable wage goods, while capitalist production in 
agriculture was directed toward the more profitable luxury and/or 
export items.23 IAN Indian Program staff struggled to obtain its 
own budget and thus insert its own indigenista orientation into 
official programs in Indian areas. 
With regard to credits to the individual Indian communities, 
severe obstacles faced the newly constituted empresas. The 
Institute of Agricultural Credit (ICAP), founded by the COPEI 
administration to serve small producers, was reluctant to loan 
money to the empresas indigenas because these collective-type 
organizations deviated from traditional organizational structures 
followed by other subjects of agrarian reform. The Warao empresa 
of Hobure was finally given a small loan but ''with much reticence 
and limitations.1124 Such limitations included bureaucratic 
inflexibility with respect to the exact amounts of money allocated 
per cultivated hectare. Most important, ICAP sought to impose 
restrictions regarding the type of crop that could be cultivated. 
Often, this meant mono-cropping production destined primarily for 
the urban market and requiring a significant increase in labor and 
capital inputs. This emphasis on individual vs. collective 
production switched suddenly in 1974, during the newly elected AD 
administration of Carlos Andres Perez. The Perez administration 
supported the notion of empresas campesinas as a way to reorganize 
a peasant sector that was " in a frank state of deterioration" 
(IAN, 1974). However, at this time IAN's Indian program was still 
quite young and it was not until 1976-1977 that the first phase of 
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organization of the empresas was completed. By this time, the 
general enthusiasm for these new collective organizations (both 
Campenianas and lndigenas) had began to wane, and the indigenistas 
were unable to make a case for funding these new organizations25 
PRIDA was dismantled in 1975, and from then until 1977 the 
Indian program received no program budget. In addition, the Indian 
Land Office was also dissolved by 1976, and from then on land grant 
requests were handled by a single staff member in the general Land 
Of £ice for IAN (1984).26 During the first part of 1977, a large 
interagency meeting was planned and attended by representatives of 
all the government agencies involved in some way with the Indian 
development program and by empress representatives who were eager 
to consolidate their economic organizations i.e. to receive the 
seed moneys to begin operating. In the week-long meeting, 
preliminary agreements were made between credit agencies and 
empress representatives, which according to Clarac, would have 
meant the final consolidation of these economic organizations. As 
it was, Clarac, who was then director of the Indian program, was 
told before the conference was over that he, together with other 
staff members, had been dismissed from his job. This meant that 
for almost two and a half years the empresas were organizations 
that existed only on paper; all the planning and financial and 
technical assistance commitments that had been prepared were 
frozen. "The empresas were left completely alone.1127 
Interestingly it was during this dormant period of the program that 
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the Apure empresa of Kumani, where part of my research was 
conducted, was organized in 1978 during the last months of Carlos 
Andres Perez's administration and just before to the presidential 
elections. In this last year, the Indian program received a budget 
for the first time, amounting to approximately Bs. l,000,000 or 
$25,000; but only two or three empresas were organized.28 
The next chapter covers the next period of the program in more 
extensive detail. At this point I will only summarize the most 
important outcomes of this latter period. 
During the second phase, beginning in 1979, and after Clarac 
was rehired as director of the Indian Program, the staff devoted 
itself to reactivating the empresas that had been abandoned for 
two and a half years (IAN, 1984). In 1980 the program obtained a 
budget of more than Bs. 3,500.000, the largest budget received by 
the program in either of its two phases. For each remaining year 
within this second phase, the program again received Bs. 
29 1,500.000. 
Of the 51 empresas formed during the first phase of the 
program, IAN provided minor assistance to 33, although 17 new ones 
were organized (see Appendix C). New efforts were made to convince 
credit agencies connected with agrarian reform to extend benefits 
to the Indian economic organizations. In fact, credit became a new 
objective of the Indian program, replacing support for an organized 
Indian movement. The results were quite dismal. Only a little 
over Bs. 2,000.000 were al located to IA1, from 1981 to 1983 to 
distribute among 34 organizations, which encompassed more than 
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1,300 families (IAN, 1983) 
B. Indian lands 
The second and perhaps most urgent Indian program objective 
was to secure land titles for Indian communities. During this 
period the urgency for land titles was heightened because of 
renewed invasions into Indian areas, precipitated by the Conquest 
of the South. The organization of the empresas under agrarian 
reform was, in these circumstances, the only option for a juridical 
structure that would quickly secure a portion of those lands. 
According to a 1984 IAN comprehensive report, between 1972 and 
1978, 89 Indian communities with approximately 2,500 families 
received provisional titles to almost one million hectares (IAN, 
1984). 
The IAN indigenistas' immediate objective was to secure 
collective as opposed to individual land titles for the 1,600 
Indian communities in Venezuela. The indigenistas succeeded in 
creating the special office of land titling for Indian groups soon 
after the start of the program in 1971 (Oficina de Dotacion de 
Tierras a Comunidades Indigenas). The general goal was to secure 
official allotment of lands "in a collective form and encompassing 
an area that guarantees to each group its possibilities of 
development in their original land base, al lowing for the 
incorporation of new members and natural growth of the communities" 
{Clarac and Valdez, 1976). 
The first obstacle IAN indigenistas confronted in trying to 
112 
address the land problem was a knot of contradictory legal 
proscriptions. Most of the area occupied by Indian groups had been 
transferred to the state as "empty" or "wastelands" (baldias). 
Within this context, the agrarian reform law of 1961 and article 77 
of the Venezuelan Constitution (1961), which gave Indians rights to 
the lands they had traditionally worked and occupied, essentially 
contradicted the laws that declared those same lands to be vacant 
national territories. In addition, some of the Indian lands--even 
those that had been declared Indian reserves, such as the Sierra de 
Perija occupied by the Bari and the Yucpa-fell within with national 
forest reserves or parks, making it difficult for agricultural 
development projects to be conducted there.30 Finally, in cases 
such as the state of Apure where the Pume are located, the entire 
Indian territory had fallen i~to private hands. Haciendas and 
cattle ranches crisscross all of the Apure state where the Pume and 
the Cui va sti 11 1i ve. 
There were technical and administrative complications as well. 
There does not exist an adequate census or typographical survey of 
Indian areas. Whenever lines have been drawn, old maps and 
i~formants have been used, with highly contraditory results.31 
Facing such obstacles and having limited time, IAN staff, 
according to Clarac and Heinen,32 decided not to try to immediately 
reconcile those legal discrepancies. They sought, instead, to 
guarantee at least portions of Indian lands through the 
conventional mechanisms of agrarian reform. The sentiment both 
Clarac and Heinen had expressed earlier when justifying the 
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organization of the empresas--that they were running out of time to 
stop the ravaging of Indian lands--acquired its highest urgency at 
this point. The normal procedure utilized by IAN, as the agency in 
charge of the implementation of the agrarian reform, was to ask the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MAC) to transfer to IAN unoccupied 
national lands under its administration. IAN, in turn, distributed 
such land for agrarian reform development projects. The juridical 
structure provided by the empresas indigenas, as a certified 
economic organization within agrarian reform, gave IAN the legal 
argument to request the transfer of selective Indian lands under 
MAc' s jurisdiction.33 
All titles given to Indian communities, with two recent 
exceptions, were ''possessory" (provisional) as opposed to 
"def init i ve"--the two moda 1 ities used under the agrarian reform 
law. Obtaining definitive titles requires a long bureaucratic 
process that may never reach completion.34 This obviously keeps 
the Indian population in a vulnerable situation whereby titles can 
be rescinded depending upon the vagaries of state policy and 
changes in administration.35 The office of land allotment was 
dismantled late in 1975, and no further changes with regard to the 
status of Indian land were achieved by the Indian program. 
During the second phase of the program, between 1979 and 1984, 
67 additional communities with more than 1,500 families received 
tit le to some 3 ro,000 hectares (see Appendix E)(IAN, 1984). The 
office of land allotment was never reinstated. Instead the Indian 
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program, already into 1985, was allowed one staff position which 
specialized in Indian lands and worked within the general office of 
land allotments to the Venezuelan peasantry. During this period 
the indigenistas tried to resume their regulation of the Indian 
land situation, but most activities, were confined to 
administrative tasks such as organizing registries of existing 
titles and securing copies of the same. According to the 
individual in charge of Indian land allotments in 1985, a specific 
set of guidelines had been developed and implemented whenever 
possible. These guidelines included IAN"s obligation to include 
community representatives in decisions concerning the traditional 
1 . . f h . . . 1 b d · 36 1m1ts o t e1r terr1tor1a oun ar1es. 
But IAN"s progress report of 1985, indicates that stumbling 
blocks continued to be thrown .in the way of the IAN program, 
specifically in its efforts to address the Indian land situation. 
Today, Indians may be in a more vulnerable position than they were 
ten years ago as a result of the Guanai case.37 
c. Cultural "Re-activation" and Promotion of Native Crafts 
The not so explicit objective behind this program area seemed 
to transcend pottery-making classes and cultural events. Instead, 
Clarac and Valdez in their "Propositions for a IAN Indian 
Development Program" proposed a series of activities that were 
clearly aimed at the articulation of an indigenista "counter-
ideology." This counter-ideology included the promotion of 
collective organizations and self-determination as they seemed 
interested in promoting a new degree of "ethnic" solidarity (and 
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even fostering emergent forms of ethnicity) among the Indian 
communities. With regard to the non-Indian sectors, they sought to 
promote the view that Indian communities were capable of self-
sustained development while contributing to the national economy 
(Clarac and Valdez, 1976). As an example, these two authors cite 
the case of Karina communities, located in the State of Anzoategui 
which have long been involved, as individual peasants under FRID.A's 
empresa model, in peanut production. According to Clarac and 
Valdez (1976) this is "a key site for this sort of [cultural 
promotion] activities because of the level of conflict between the 
Indian empresas and peanut cultivators, and the large producers of 
the same product who are interested in the Karina lands located in 
privileged agricultural areas, as well as in cheap labor." These 
local conditions, they argued,· "turn supportive activities, such as 
a Karina cultura 1 gathering, into a priority" (Clarac and Valdez, 
1986). Emphasis was also placed on strengthening ties among the 
different Indian federations. 
Clearly then, at least in its formulation, these cultural 
activities were to be intimately related to the political 
organization of the federations--and the empresas as well. It was 
obvious that IAN indigenistas understood that for this significant 
shift in policy to occur, the work had to to be done at all three 
1 1 ' 1· ' d 'd 1 38 eve s--econom1cs, po 1t1cs, an 1 eo ogy. 
The "ideological" work took place de facto and simultaneously 
with various events organized with the participation of Indian 
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leaders. In an IAN progress report of 1983, only activities 
related to the creation of a pottery-making school in 1974 and the 
number of courses dictated figure under "accomplishments" for the 
first period of the program--from 1971 to 197 8. For the second 
half, the report lists additional courses dictated, the 
establishment of 36 pottery-making shops at the community level, 
and agreements with the government industrial promotion agency, 
CORPOINDUSTRIA, for technical assistance and commercialization of 
the products. There is no mention of cultural events organized 
under this program area. Instead, IAN staff complained about the 
meager material and logistical support they received for fulfilling 
objectives here. 
D. Support for an "Organized Indian Movement" 
I have already reviewed mo.st of the issues connected with the 
organization of the six Indian Federations and the national-level 
Indian Confederation of Venezuela, given that their creation was 
intimately connected with the birth of the Indian program itself. 
These federations and the national confederation constituted the 
heart of what the IAN Indian program staff cal led the "organized 
Indian movement. 11 
According to the IAN indigenistas, the rationale behind the 
support for these organizations was basically that within a 
realistic evaluation of Venezuela's political reality, groups that 
remained outside of political parties or powerful pressure groups 
such as the Venezuelan Peasant Federation, had very little chance 
of having their demands heard, let alone obtaining state resources 
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to which they were en tit led.3 9 The movement received its strongest 
support during the COPE! administration of Rafael Caldera. When 
Perez came to power in 1977, support dwindled and turned into 
outright opposition to the promo,tion of the Indian Federations.4O 
During the second half of Perez's presidency, which I have 
identified as one of little or no activity in IAN's Indian program, 
the old Central Indigenist Office (OCAI) was given new life. This 
intensified the historic rivalry between IAN and OCAI in their 
struggle to control the conduct of Indian policy. While the 
tendency of the Indian offices, functioning first under the 
Ministry of Justice and later the Ministry of Education, had been 
to promote relief-type programs as well as formal education, IAN 
indigenistas from the beginning espoused a policy of economic 
development and political organization in the form of th~ 
federations and the confederation. These differences deserve 
further analysis and I will return to them at the end of the 
chapter. Regarding the attack on IA.N's involvement with the 
development of an Indian leadership, a concrete expression of 
OCArs war on those activities was a discrediting campaign whereby 
IAN indigenistas began to be labeled as communists.41 
The political and philosophical differences--not to mention 
the competition for state resources--between OCAI and IAN officials 
also opened a rift in the Indian leadership that had come out of 
IAN's organizational efforts. I am not sure, however, of the 
extent to which political differences were, in fact, the main 
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forces dividing this nascent and rather fragile leadership.42 
There were also individual problems not uncommon to a population 
group that has suffered such extensive social and economic 
disorganization. Many of the Indian leaders selected through the 
series of meetings held by IAN were simply those most fluent in 
Spanish and who had acquired some knowledge and skills in handling 
the relationship between their communities and the outside world. 
On the other hand, these were also the individuals most likely to 
have suffered the alienating effects of living in the outside 
society as Indian individuals. 
During the second half of Perez's administration, as part of 
the efforts to undermine IAN, and, by implication, COPErs sway 
over the Indian peasantry, attempts were made to promote an 
alternative set of leaders wh~ would be closest to AD and OCAI's 
position. In spite of such efforts, many Indian leaders came to 
the defense of IAN officials who had been fired and defended their 
views of Indian development, while criticizing the entire history 
of the state's degree of attention to the problems of the Indian 
population (Serbin, 1983). 
Today, the activities related to maintenance of Indian 
leadership are no longer part of the Indian program agenda. They 
have totally disappeared from its operational plans. The Indian 
leadership, although much less forceful and visible, has tended to 
become somewhat more autonomous from the vagaries of these two 
political parties. In 1979 the new COPE! government of Luis 
Herrera called an unprecedented meeting of Indian leaders in the 
11 9 
Amazonian territory, but it was done at the same t_ime that Indians 
themselves were organizing their own independent gathering in 
another part of the country. It was not until the "Guanai Case"43 
that visible expressions of Indian politicization would be seen 
again. After the Guanai case, new meetings were called by the 
Indian leadership with the support of indigenista anthropologists. 
The repressive forces of the state were mobilized at the time to 
invoke the decree #283 (Ministerio de Educacion, 1979) that 
prohibits access of non-Indians to Indian territory. Many 
sympathizers.of Indian people were turned back and not allowed to 
participate in the gatherings in support of the Piaroa. These last 
events signaled what appears to be yet another shift in Indian 
policy, a shift from the populism and reformism that started in 
1969 to new forms of repression in the 1980s. These last events 
will be reviewed and analyzed in greater detail in the next 
chapter.44 
III. Final Analysis and Conclusions: Evaluating the 
Alleged Policy Shift 
In the last two chapters, I have tried to accomplish two major 
goals. One was to provide an analytical history of the economic and 
political forces that led to an apparent change in Indian policy in 
196 9. This was a change from basic assistance ("asistencial ista") 
to economic development. Secondly, I have examined in detail the 
new policy orientation, focusing on its concrete form as well as 
aggregate outcomes. Despite the fact that this policy shift was 
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never articulated in a very coherent or consistent manner, the 
various reports from both IAN and OCAI, as well as the actual 
implementation of new development programs are ample proof that 
there was, in fact, a re-orientation of Indian affairs after 196 9. 
In the next paragraphs I will offer a final assessment about the 
Indian program based on the national-level data presented here. I 
also will assess some of the harshest criticisms the more radical 
indigenistas have directed against the program and evaluate them in 
light of the theoretical notions and empirical information 
introduced in the last chapters. 
I have argued that by the end of the 1960s clear signs 
appeared in the Venezuelan economy to signal a potential crisis of 
accumulation. Fedecamaras, the organization representing major 
capitalist interests within Ve_nezuela, gave a clear mandate to the 
candidates in the coming presidential elections to increase the 
intervention of the state in the drafting and implementing of 
''heroic measures and a new strategy" to deal with the economic 
problems emerging from a slow growing oil sector, the narrowness of 
import substitution and the consequent shortage of capital 
(Economic Review, 196 8 13). Some of the projects considered within 
this new "industrial strategy," as it was cal led in the development 
plans (Perez Sainz, 1979), in turn threatened a latent legitimacy 
crisis among the rural sectors and the urban intellectuals--both 
were groups COPEI was attempting to attract to its political camp, 
being traditionally AD constituencies. 
The two projects with the most direct participation in 
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frontier areas were "The Conquest of the South" and the integrated 
rura 1 development program "PR IDA". 
Couched within a "desarrol lista" perspective, the capital and 
technological intensive character of these projects had an 
unexpected impact on Indian areas and provoked an equally 
unexpected wave of protests from Venezuelan anthropologists who had 
become the voice of the few Indian leaders who had emerged by this 
time. This situation threatened to create serious legitimacy 
problems and forced the COPE! administration to find different 
answers to a resurgent "Indian problem". These answers had to be 
consistent with the new political and economic reality and the 
demands of the Indian population, and their neo-indigenista allies, 
if a new full-fledged social and political crisis was to be 
avoided. The AD-controlled congress did not make matters any 
easier. The fact that this body seemed to once again "come to the 
rescue" of rural groups by both opposing PRIDA and supporting an 
investigation of the Indian situation, gave COPE! no choice but to 
enthusiastically embrace the new development program. 
The IAN Indian program emerged then as a political concession to 
social pressures threatening to discredit the new Caldera 
government's nationalist and populist stance taken in an effort to 
distance itself from its elitist past and to neutralize the growing 
force of the left. After all, the government had campaigned on a 
Program of concern regarding unequal distribution of wealth, and 
sympathy "for those who 1 i ve in the margins of society.1145 But 
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even responses to legitimation crises are ultimately constrained by 
the objective requirements of the existing capital accumulation 
model. In the struggle between indigenistas and desarrollistas, 
economic arguments weighed heavily in the decision of the 
desarrollistas to integrate Indians into state supported 
development projects. 
The crucial point to be made here is that up to this moment, 
no plans existed within the Caldera administration to redirect the 
existing approach to Indian policy. As I have said repeatedly, 
this was fundamentally a welfare approach, which had led to a 
"passive" sort of proletarianization for Indians under the tutelage 
of the Catholic church, and a more "active" proletarianization for 
those Indians whose communities were largely dismembered and had 
come under the "protection" of. state programs such as the Central 
Office of Indian Affairs (OCAI). Even the COPEi administration's 
Conquest of the South and PRIDA programs were not primarily 
intended as policies of incorporation of Indians into the national 
society--although their unintended consequences definitely led to 
an accelerated process of incorporation via "active" 
p~oletarianization (Offe, 1984). This newly strengthened presence 
of state agencies in Indian areas was not motivated, as some 
radical indigenistas would like to argue, by the need of capital 
interests or "the state" to integrate Indian production and workers 
into regional and national commodity and labor markets. If these 
Policies addressed the Indian question at all, it was because 
Indians once again were situated in land areas that were crucial 
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for this new stage of Venezuela's capitalist expansion. 
Ironically, it was the neo-indigenistas' demands that forced the 
compromise which, in essence, resulted in the more direct policy of 
political and economic incorporation of Indians into the state via 
the empresas and the Federaciones Indigenas. But as authors such 
as Hall (1988) and Bradby (1975) have made clear, incorporation of 
non-ca.pitalist areas into the capitalist sphere of development may 
not only respond to very different needs of capital and the state 
at different places and points in time, but its consequences are 
necessarily mediated by the concrete conjunctural circumstances 
within which it takes place--including the reaction from those who 
are the subject of incorporation. 
Similarly, the dominant position of the National Border 
Council at the beginning, as critics themselves recognize, was also 
a desarrollista position which fundamentally opposed a border 
policy supported by local populations. Only the contingent 
presence of a vocal minority of council members who believed in the 
natural function of Indians as defenders of the border later 
provided additional support for the IAN indigenistas. The growing 
split in the Catholic church and its support for state programs.for 
the poor also played a role in the change in direction of Indian 
policy. 
Critics have also pointed out--and at times primarily 
emphasized--the political objectives of the indigenistas vs. the 
economic objectives of the desarrol listas. In their view, the 
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former simply favored a more subtle approach in controlling the 
Indian population. (Arvelo-Jimenez and Perozo, 1983). If the 
indigenista orientation seemed to triumph over that of the 
desarrollistas, these critics argued, it was because of the 
existence of "an inefficient bureaucracy" and did not in any way 
represent the victory of a counter-integrationist position (Arvelo-
Jimenez and Perozo, 1983). These critics have accused IAN 
indigenistas of misinterpreting their writings and ''having 
converted their ideas and objectives--self-government, self-
determination, and liberation struggle--into hollow, manipulated 
concepts". They contend that an Indian minority saw this new 
indigenismo as "the most refined program of domination of al 1 the 
programs designed up until the present" (Arvelo-Jimenez, 1984:113). 
Critics have thus interpreted _the actions of IAN indigenistas 
within a highly conspiratorial framework, ascribing to them the 
role of providing the legitimacy the state needed to complete its 
colonization of margina 1, frontier areas, and also having "as tu tel y 
created an Indian leadership that gives an aura of legitimacy to 
its Indian strategies before the public" (Arvelo-Jimenez, 
1984:112). No doubt there are some partial truths in the 
statements of the radical indigenistas. Going beyond the explicit 
objectives of social policy and programs, and deducing "implicit" 
objectives from the logic and specific limitations of capitalist 
accumulation and the nature of the state in Venezuela is a 
necessary and important task. De Janvry, (1981) for. example, 
suggests such an exercise when evaluating rural development 
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projects such as· PRIDA. 
To adequately deduce "implicit" policy objectives presupposes, 
then an equally adequate theoretical as well as empirical 
understanding of the Venezuelan state in this case. This 
understanding includes the particular logic and conjunctural 
circumstances characterizing Venezuelan capitalist development, the 
unique configuration of classes and their organizations, the 
linkages that exist between non-capitalist Indian societies and the 
Venezuelan capitalist economy, and finally the role of the state in 
promoting such linkages. A concise outline of these ideas was 
presented in the introductory chapter and is more useful-and 
rigorous-than say an internal colonialist perspective, for 
discussing the implicit and explicit objectives as well as the 
limitations and uneven results of the Indian program. Elements of 
this discussion are already interspersed in previous paragraphs, 
but·I will summarize and elaborate on some final points. 
I said that the radical indigenistas arrived at some partial 
truths. In my view, it is impossible to deny the tendency of 
capitalism to expand into non-incorporated areas and transform 
economic conditions in accordance with the logic of capitalist 
production. This refers, in part, to the advancement of the 
process of commoditization and proletarianization understood in its 
widest sense--i.e. not necessarily always equivalent with the 
establishment of wage labor but a process of a progressive loss of 
control over one's means of production.47 But this is, as said 
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earlier, a process influenced a series of additional structural and 
historical factors having to do with, among other things, the 
particular needs of capital, the particular configuration of power 
relations within the state, the relative economic and 
administrative strength of the incorporating state,48 the 
geographic and physical conditions of the targeted areas, and the 
internal characteristics political strength of the communities 
present in the area. All of these set new, often contradictory, 
criteria as well as limitations for policies of incorporation of 
new areas and the non-capitalist societies that may inhabit them. 
In the end, incorporation of non-capitalist areas is a very uneven 
process that is plagued with regressions and contradictions. 
However, the theoretical vision of the state adopted here, 
directs us to some alternative_ explanations regarding the 
"ontogeny" and fate of new policy processes. 
The state is not homogeneous, but is a "complex structure" in 
which conflicting interests representing society's power relations 
occupy different positions and are in constant competition. Such 
interests are, of course, not arranged according to pluralistic 
principles but reflect the hierarchical power structure of society 
in general. A series of contingent circumstances leading to a 
reconfiguration of forces within the state and the ascendancy of a 
political party in search of a broader political base allowed the 
IAN indigenistas to become involved in Indian policy formulation. 
As Bollinger and Lund (1982) note, this became possible for 
several progressive indigenistas throughout Latin America as a 
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result of the campaign mounted by the Barbados' participants. 
Radical indigenistas tended to fal 1 into the "hyper-functionalism" 
that beset orthodox Marxists when they contend that all social 
policy, even when it appears to benefit dominated classes, is the 
clever design of capitalists and the state to fulfill long-term 
accumulation needs.49 
The very real limitations that agencies and individuals higher 
in the administrative hierarchy offered to the development and 
implementation of the Indian program, should consti~ute irrevocable 
evidence of the lack of commitment to the program. Moreover, the 
program with collective enterprises and Indian Federations, in all 
likelihood represented a potential threat to interests within and 
outside the state.SO 
The issue of limitations to social programs has special 
theoretical significance and I must expl_ore it a bit further to 
understand the levels at which such limitations occurred and their 
implications for the long-term prospects of the empresas indigenas. 
Analytically, the outer boundaries of limitations to state 
intervention in the form of economic or social programs are defined 
by the inherent contradiction that exists between the states 
accumulation and legitimacy functions.SI The erratic and 
apparently "un-imaginative"--as described by some--nature of 
explicit Indian policies, which have been to a great extent 
politically motivated, is ultimately caused by their special 
vulnerability to changing economic concerns that affect Indian 
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areas. The traditionally low level of political mobilization among 
Indian groups, resulting from a series of factors such as 
isolation, state repression, control of the church, and their 
relatively small numbers, has not improved their odds of becoming a 
higher priority in the states consideration of its own legitimacy. 
But even if Indians managed to increase their political power, the 
same contradictions would again set new limits to the structural 
transformations they may demand of the state. It is possible, for 
example, that collective enterprises may be tolerated as long as 
they constitute isolated experiments with relatively insignificant 
production and the enterprises are concentrated in production 
activities of low capitalist penetration, which will not be seen as 
a threat to capitalist production. This last issue is part of the 
second major question raised at the beginning of the dissertation 
i.e., it pertains to the long-term impact of those programs on 
Indian cotmnunities. 
Data on integrated rural development projects all over Latin 
America, including Venezuela's PRIDA project, accurately suggested 
that these programs often contributed to the pacification of a 
restless rural population by implementing programs that ultimately 
benefited a very small portion of .the peasantry while deepening 
their internal differences, i.e. widening the gap between the 
richer and poorer peasants and thus increasing the number of 
Proletarianized peasants. It would not be hard to foresee a 
similar situation occurring with Indian empresas. In fact this has 
already occurred, It is obvious that clear limits have been reached 
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in terms of the number of Indian communities that are actually 
served and provided with what are highly inadequate material and 
technical assistance resources. As I showed in the discussion of 
program results, the budget that was finally allocated to the 
program was rather minimal, while peasant organizations were 
receiving often 40 times as much.52 
Analyses of the Indian program have often paralleled that of 
rural development projects in general, and have emphasized the 
political factor as a crucial "motivating" force behind it. 
Undoubtedly, political changes have affected the content and 
priority assigned to Indian policy. But one must also keep in mind 
that political parties and different regimes simply filter into 
active policies particular interests, demands, and objective 
exigencies of the economic and.political system according to their 
own reading of such interests and exigencies. Such a reading is 
itself constrained by the particular configuration of class forces 
within which these regimes operate and by their perceived relevance 
for the party's social base. 
COPE! was interested in opening up its own social base to 
include elements from the rural sector. The indigenistas seized 
this moment, and aided by other favorable circumstances, founded 
the Indian program. There is no doubt, that once these 
"compromises" have been reached, every attempt wi 11 be made by 
political and economic agents to reap benefits from such 
concessions. In the case of COPEI, the Indian program clearly 
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contributed to its political goals of enhancing its popularity 
among the rural sectors while having the added benefit of keeping a 
lid on any independent forms of political mobilization. In fact, 
Arfs model of fostering the organization of peasant federations was 
very likely in the minds of party leaders who supported a similar 
organization for the Indian peasantry. COPEI actively supported 
the organization of these federations while providing little 
material incentive for the alternative economic organizations 
proposed by the indigenistas and kept them under the thumb of 
PRIDA. For AD on the other hand, and as the best proof of what I 
just stated, the existence of these Indian federations and the 
national confederation, created under the auspices of COPEI, was 
rather problematic. It is no coincidence that we see serious 
efforts by Perez's administration to undermine the existence of 
these groups while emphasizing the economic components of the 
program. 
Economic reasons and constraints were also relevant. The 
presence in the COPEI administration of the desarrollistas 
represented an obstacle to the indigenista's economic goals. 
Because Caldera governed during a period of fiscal constraint, it 
became even more difficult for IAN indigenistas to justify 
virtually non-productive government spending. The economic 
situation of Venezuela changed dramatically during the government 
of Carlos Andres Perez. Agriculture became, after basic 
industries, the second major priority of government spending. 
This, coupled with Perez's broader social base and commitment to a 
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progressive administration, also proved beneficial for the 
indigenistas, at least at the beginning. They obtained enough 
support to organize more than 40 empresas. Public spending was 
again dramatically reduced by 1977, about the time that all 
material support commitments for the empresa communities were 
canceled and control of Indian affairs was transferred to AD-
controlled OCAI--later re-organized into a new office of Indian and 
frontier affairs (OMAFIO. Both parties took their cues from the 
objective material conditions and the particular context of social 
forces within which they governed, and clearly adjusted their 
support for Indian policy and programs accordingly. 
Explanations that stress the economic factor must also be 
approached with caution. Often such explanations have been colored 
by a functionalistic view of the necessary articulation of pre-
capitalist and capitalist production necessary for the latter's 
survival. De Janvry's view of rural development projects is very 
much conditioned by such functionalist notions. On the other hand, 
studies of Indian communities such as Bradby's in Peru suggest that 
there is no permanent ''necessity" for capital ism to 
articulate/subordinate with all remaining non-capitalist economies. 
"Necessity" is a contingent, historical phenomena that may appear 
as a result of changing requirements of different branches of 
capita 1, and, in fact, capital may be (at times) "perfectly 
indifferent to what happens in "'natural economies'" (Bradby, 1975). 
ln other words while one can incontrovertibly assert a general 
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tendency for capital to expand to non-capitalist areas, neither the 
nature of that penetration, nor the extent can be absolutely 
predicted. 
Neither can the outcomes of such attempts at incorporation and 
integration of non-capitalist Indian areas be predicted from policy 
designs and formulations. In this manner, the "motives" and 
results may range from subordination, and even re-creation of, non-
capitalist forms of production, to their total integration into the 
capitalist mode of production (subsumption) to even physical 
extermination of entire Indian communities. But most importantly, 
the conflictive nature of the state apparatus and countertendencies 
emerging from subordinate groups and their allies make the smooth 
implementation of goals that fit the political and economic 
interests of dominant classes .and parties an impossible task. 
In the case of Venezuela, indigenistas are correct in pointing to a 
continuous advance of capitalist development into Indian areas, but 
policy activities--which include those of CODESUR and PRIDA--
offer no evidence that such advancement was motivated by the needs 
of capital to secure new agricultural products and labor from the 
I~dian communities. This, together with the information contained 
in national and regional development plans, suggests instead that 
the interests in these areas had to do with a desire to incorporate 
new lands and raw materials into Venezuela's capitalist 
development. The IAN indigenistas, by advocating an "articulation 
route" to incorporation, may have served the interests of capital, 
but that is not saying the interests of the desarrollistas who 
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openly represented capitalist interests and the interests of the 
neo-indigenistas were perfectly harmonious. Policy formulations, I 
said earlier, must once again be understood, not as the expressions 
of monolithic interests represented in the state, but as ultimate 
compromises among competing interests. 
The recognition of possible "implicit" objectives and clear 
limitations at the level of the state is still insufficient for 
predicting the more specific as well as long-term outcomes of the 
Indian development program. Examining the policy at the 
implementation level, as Offe suggests, means taking into account 
the actions and reactions of those who are the subjects of such 
policies--as well as of their indigenista allies in this case. 
Despite the apparently dismal quantitative results of the 
Indian program, one cannot deny the independent force established 
by what started out as an officialist Indian movement. Hardly a 
day goes by in Venezuela without the press dealing with concerns of 
the Indian community. Similarly, even though radical indigenistas, 
in many cases correctly, point to the reduction of the Indian land 
base through the legalistic process of titling under the agrarian 
reform, total land loss has possibly been averted by the legal 
maneuvering of the IAN indigenistas. 
Focusing specifically on the empresas indigenas at the local 
level, the more radical indigenistas also contended that 
limitations existed at the level of design as well as the level of 
implementation. They alleged that the empresas' collective 
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structure and western-style decision-making system conflict with 
the traditional organization of Venezuelan Indian communities. 
The organization of empresas in these communities, according to 
them, constituted a unilateral imposition of a state that is 
committed to activities that are most beneficial to the capitalist 
economy. 
These indigenistas concede that no research has been done that 
looks at concrete empresa communities and examines the changes in 
their organization of production as well as political and 
ideological structures. It is only at the concrete level of each 
empress community that the question of incompatibility of modern 
and traditional designs for collective economic production can be 
answered. My case studies are a modest attempt to fill that 
research void. Other Latin American researchers, however, have 
already taken a position that contrasts with that of the radical 
indigenistas and believe that Indian peasants in Latin America have 
not had to be cajoled into joining government programs which, 
however reformist, may still represent an improvement for the 
selected few (Grindle, 1986). Petras and Havens (1981) also 
present a case that demonstrates that there is no natural 
resistance to cooperatives among Indian peasants. The failure of 
cooperatives has more to do with the kinds of limitations emerging 
from the state. I explore these alternative theses within the 
examination of my case studies in chapters 5 through 8. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. IAN (1983); (1984). 
2. Clarac and Valdez (1977); Interview with program Director 
(1985 ). 
3. Instead of formal research, with one exception, IAN staff 
devoted itself to traveling around the country and holding 
numerous meetings with Indian groups in an attempt to obtain 
input into the design of new economic organizations and to 
deal with all aspects of agrarian reform, especially the land 
is sue. ( idem) 
4. The Barbados meetings were organized in 1971 and 1977 by 
"radical" indigenistas who became important al lies of Latin 
American Indians and who often had an important impact on 
Indian policy. These meetings signaled a break with 
assimilationist principles and an inclination to a romanticist 
view of Indian autonomy. However, the radical indigenistas 
played an important role in introducing the notions of 
emancipatory development projects and self-management. See 
Bollinger and Lund (1982) for an analysis of the ideological 
underpinnings of the Barbados Group. See Grupo de Barbados 
(1979) and Bonfil Batalla (1978) for an outline of the 
Barbados 11 former progr~m Director (1977) goals. 
5. Telephone interview with Clarac, 1987. 
6. Interview with IAN officials (1986). 
7. Serbin (1986); Clarac and Valdez 0976). 
8. For an outline of C0DESUR's goals and analysis see Coppens 
(1973). 
9. IAN (1983). In the original report these were listed in a 
slightly different order. 
10. Telephone interview with former Program Director (1987). 
11. In his article of 1981, Heinen explains that this ''hybrid" 
denomination of empresa campesina-indigena was not adopted 
with the intention of subsuming the Indian groups into the 
peasant category (a charge often made by the more radical 
indigenistas). Rather, he says, the term had to be adopted 
given the legal constraints established by the Agrarian Reform 
Law of 1960 regarding the types of economic organizations that 
were al lowed within any program covered by the law. 
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12. For works detailing the characteristics and particular history 
of "empresas campensinas" see Cox (1981); Soto (197 9)· IAN and 
CIARA (1971). ' 
13. Interview with Program Director (1987); Arvelo-Jimenez and 
Perozo (19 83). 
14. Interview with anthropologist, consultant to the Indian 
program (19 85). 
15. Critics believed that rather than preventing the erosion of 
Indian territory, the demarcation of Indian lands according to 
agrarian reform criteria de facto reduced the traditional land 
rights of most groups to a minimum area. 
16. Interview with former program Director (1987). 
17. These criteria are, after all, not dissimilar from the 
particular factors recognized by the literature on 
cooperatives as potentially minimal requirements for such 
organizations to succeed. 
18. This structure was required by law, and its imposition on what 
some believed were the traditional leadership structures in 
these Indian communities was at the center of the controversy 
that later developed between the IAN and the more radical 
indigenistas--to which I wil 1 often refer to as "empresa 
critics". See IAN (1981). 
19. Dieter Heinen was asked by the members of the inter-community 
empresa of Tujuumoto, made up of Ye'kuana and Sanema Indians, 
to conduct a basic evaluation and make specific 
recommendations for structural changes. In his evaluation, 
Heinen (1981) points to organizational adjustments in the 
empresa system and also adjustments that came with changes in 
the political and economic structure that had occurred prior 
to and independent of the empresas. One example was the 
individualistic forces within the production and distribution 
sphere due to the long-time insertion of Ye'kuana canoe 
builders in the market. Similarly there were already in the 
communities salaried Indian personnel, including teachers and 
nurse's aides, whose income did not enter the community's 
treasury. Through Heinen's recommendations, efforts were then 
made to have the better-off members contribute a share of 
their income to the empress's general fund. In exchange, the 
individual males--heads of household who had control over this 
additional income--were given a larger role in the decision-
making process that had been initially concentrated in the 
hands of elected members (Heinen, 1981). Clearly, then, it 
was possible to overcome limitations arising from the way the 
empress design was implemented. Other limitations emerging 
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from the logic of the articulation of the Indian and national 
societies, may not be as easily overcome. 
20. Heinen (1981) alluded to this but did not include it in his 
evaluation. This is a difficult area to research; it requires 
long stays in the field as well as a means of communicating 
with the women who tend to speak less Spanish than do the men. 
Yet some speculation is possible based on available 
information. In his evaluation of the Ye'Kuana empresa of 
Tujuumoto, Heinen (1981) pointed to some preliminary issues 
regarding the introduction of time-saving technology in the 
processing of the manioc, a task traditionally done by women. 
As time-saving devices such as the mechanized manioc grater 
(ciguena) are introduced--and they are already in use in many 
communities--a woman's production as compared to a man's can 
be significantly higher, and problems may surface in gender 
relations. The introduction of technology may not be totally 
controllable through conscious, internal decisions. Increased 
economic integration in, and dependency upon, the market 
economy may require Indian empresas to progressively update 
their means of production in order to compete favorably with 
other producers. 
21. With regards to the empresas' market-oriented economic 
activities, the example of Tujuumoto revealed that women's 
participation was also minimal, potentially introducing or 
reinforcing gender stratification. 
22. This is not much of an advance from the period when Indian 
affairs were controlled by the OCAI agency. That office's 
program for women concentrated on "sewing and knitting" See 
the various reports on the "Activities" of OCAI and OMAFI in 
various issues of the Buletin Indigenista and mimeos. Judging 
from most recent reports coming out of IAN, at least on paper, 
there seems to be a growing sensitivity to the unequal 
participation of women in state-supported Indian development. 
See for example, IAN (1987). 
23. See de Janvry (1984); Gusti (1984). 
24. Interview with former program Director (1987). 
25. See next chapter for a more complete review of the events that 
led to a cancellation of credit agreements for the empresas. 
By, 1977 reveal for example, figures from the Venezuelan 
Central Bank (BCV) that in the 1975-1976 credit year, only 
37.6% of total agrarian reform beneficiaries had received any 
credit at a 11, and 44.3% had only cultivated one crop. IAN 
officials also remarked during several interviews that ICAP 
had introduced al 1 kinds of problems due to its 
administrative inadequacy: seeds often arrived late or were 
rotten, there was poor distribution of cash benefits, and so 
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on. IAN indigenistas also failed in their efforts to 
establish an Indian office within IACAP. It was not until 
1981 that a semi-official arrangement between IAN and ICAP was 
established and a smal 1 line of credit was specifically 
directed toward Indian projects. See IAN (1984). 
26. IAN O 984). Interview with land grant officer (1985). 
27. Interview with program Director 0985). 
28. Restrictions in budget allocations may result from fiscal 
constraints by the state and as such are a common limitation 
the capitalist state confronts in its conduct of social 
policy. Such limitations also are clues as to the priority 
assigned to specific projects by different state apparatuses, 
and they illuminate the internal contradictions between forces 
hierarchically arranged across the various departmental layers 
of the state bureaucracy. In the final analysis of this 
chapter, I will discuss my ideas as to how these theoretical 
notions apply to the contradictory events that unfolded within 
the Venezuelan state as a result of the Indian program. 
2 9. Interview with former Director (1987); IAN (1984). 
30. For a brief review of Indian land problems see Heinen and 
Coppens (1986). For more detailed analysis of the lega 1 
situation of Indian lands see the various papers cited in the 
bibliography under IAN (n.d.), Coppens (1971), Dominguez 
(1986). 
31. Interview with land grant officer (1985). 
32. Interviews (1985). 
33. Interview with IAN national office staff (1985). 
34. The main distinction between these two, as the name suggests, 
is that possessory tit lee are given "temporarily" during a 
probation period to assure that the land is used for the 
intended purposes. Upon the completion of such period, which 
is arbitrarily determined by government officials in most . 
cases, definitive titles can be obtained. Interview with land 
officer. 
35. It is precisely the manipulation of these legal loopholes that 
in 1984 led to disputes stemming from the illegal invasion of 
Piaroa territory by a cattle rancher associated with North 
American and well-connected Venezuelan entrepreneurs--the 
"Guanay case." The affected Piaroa communities had 
provisionary title, but the land had not yet been for~ally 
transferred to IAN in what had become a modus operandi between 
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IAN and the Ministry of Agriculture to avoid further delays 
due to pending cases. Should the Guanay case. become a 
precedent to question all titles awarded prior to the formal 
transfer of the land from MAC to IAN, many Indian communities 
would again have no legal rights to their allotted areas. See 
El Nacional, various issues during 1985. 
36. Interview with land grant officer (1985). 
37. The program's director was eventually fired (in late 1985) as 
a consequence of his firm stand behind the Piaroa community 
involved in the Guanay case, and against the Ministry of 
Agriculture's decision to disavow the provisionary title. 
This occurred as I was beginning my field work under his 
personally approved institutional support. 
38. In the cooperatives' literature there has been an ongoing 
debate as to the significance of political mobilization as a 
necessary ingredient in the mobilization and sustained 
existence of cooperatives (See for example, Kanel, 1982). In 
reality, most Latin American state and non-state supported 
cooperative movements, or major rural development projects 
have, in general sought to mobilize cadres of potential 
beneficiaries as a means for achieving broad participation. 
Obviously, the motives behind such actions have varied 
according to the not always explicit goals of the projects in 
general. Latin American governments have been severely 
criticized for their sometimes blatant manipulations of local 
leaderships in order to earn support for agrarian reform or 
rural development projects. The radical indigenistas and 
other program critics later also used similarly harsh 
criticisms against IAN promoters of the Indian federations. A 
final analysis of this particular aspect wil 1 be developed 
later on in the dissertation. 
39. Interview with Director (1985); interview with consultant 
anthropologist (1985). 
40. Ibid. 
41. lnterv iews with regional IAN offices' staff (1985). During my 
field work in Venezuela and after Clarac had been fired for a 
second time, I personally heard those accusations from MAC 
officials with whom I met. In addition, field personnel in 
the state of Apure also "confided" in me al 1 sorts of 
innuendoes about the director of the former Indian program. 
It was clear that the war on IAN had been once again been 
declared during this new AD administration. 










This was the name given to the recent incident involving the 
invasion of Piaroa territory. 
It also demonstrated the various ways in which the state 
mobilizes various "apparatuses" and strategies to maintain 
social peace and other conditions necessary for the normal 
functioning of the capitalist accumulation process. 
See COPEI"' s government program (196 9). 
Offe (1984) also offers an important suggestion that 
partially overlaps and also complements that made by de 
Janvry. Speaking of evaluations of social policies in 
general, Offe maintains that these evaluations cannot be 
conducted solely at the level of design and policy outputs 
(statutes, public pronouncements, reports), but must include a 
thorough investigation of the process of implementation during 
which new obstacles and limitations may be revealed, and 
results may appear as "a social process ridden with conflicts 
for which policy only provides the rules" (Offe, 1984). Both 
authors, Offe and de Janvry, are, in different ways, 
reaffirming the point that program objectives cannot be taken 
at face value because competing interests may intentionally or 
unintentionally direct these programs to paths that differ 
sharply from those that were overtly or covertly advocated. 
Offe, however, given his interest in the internal workings of 
the state, is directing one to dig even deeper into levels of 
concreteness when examining policy formulations and to be 
aware of determining factors that mediate between the more 
general requirements of capital accumulation and state 
legitimacy. Such factors have to do with the reality of 
competing interests within the state--and the political system 
in general--and which ultimately give state programs their 
unique content. 
See the discussion on peasant subordination on Chapter 1, and 
endnote No. 26 of the same chapter. See Bernstein (1981) for 
an explanation of the peasant's commoditization process. 
See Ha 11 (1988). Al so Howe (1988) introduces the concept of 
"uneven administrative development" of the state which also 
points to the heterogeneous forms in which processes of 
incorporation of the agricultural frontiers take place. 
This refers back to the largely outmoded instrumentalist 
position but which at times slips into the analysis of 
incorporation processes. 
On the other hand it is true that administrative limitations , , 
or bureauratic rules can get in the way of the states 
effective implementation of its policies. 
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51. Carnoy, on Offe (1984). 
52. Interview with former Director (1987). 
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CHAPTER 4 
MACRO-STRUCTURAL CONTEXT TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE TWO EMPRESAS: 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN VENEZUELA AFTER 1976 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 delineated the general macro-structural scenario 
within which the Indian Development program came into being in the 
early 1970s, and traced the impact of structural and historical 
factors on the content and aggregate results of this program. 
Here, in chapter four, I focus closely on the social, 
political and economic arrangements that~ characteristic of 
Venezuela after 1977. These arrangements constitute the more 
immediate context within which the empresas of Kumani, created in 
1978, and the empress of Saimadoyi, created in 1980, were 
organized. The fact that these two empresas were organized in 
these particular periods is itself methodologically significant 
because the level of support that the program enjoyed in 1977-1979 
was significantly lower than it had been in previous years and also · 
lower than after 1980.1 
The task is again guided by the theoretical arguments and 
"analytical model" outlined at the beginning of this work and 
employed in the selection of key factors that make up the macro-
structural and historical context of the new Indian policy and 
Program. Particularly important are those arguments that enhance 
our understanding of Venezuela's pattern of capitalist development 
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and the state's mode of intervention (policy-making) in the 
maintenance of that pattern. The key elements in this development 
pattern, emerge from the relationship between agriculture and 
industry. It is not necessary to repeat those arguments here, but 
I would point to some key notions that are particularly relevant to 
the analysis of the ''macro" scenario presented in this chapter. 
First, the purpose of reconstructing the general political 
economic context within which these empresas came to be organized 
in Indian communities is not to conduct an exercise in narrative 
history. Rather, such reconstruction reveals, as it did in the 
consideration of the Indian program as a whole, the different 
"levels of determination" affecting the policy process and hence 
the mode of organization and subsequent results of these two 
empresas.2 
Second, and regarding such levels of determination, it has 
been stressed throughout this dissertation that state commitment to 
a collectivization policy, and, more generally, to a meaningful 
transformation of the structural situation which negatively affects 
the Indian peasantry, is a decisive factor in the promotion and 
successive performance of the empress program. However, such 
commitment is in itself constrain~d by the different objective 
requirements of the accumulation process, as well as subjective 
class demands or legitimacy requirements which confront the'state 
at different historical moments. Contrary to state autonomy 
perspectives, state commitment to different forms of socio-economic 
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re-structuring is not solely, or even primarily, determined by 
ideological convictions or by the material or political interests 
of independent state agents and party leaders.3 
Third, it is obvious that diverse political party interests, 
which shift in dominance during different administrations or within 
different state agencies--and even bureaucrats' self-interests--
represent one important level of policy determination. But neither 
politicians nor bureaucrats can for long act in a structural 
vacuum. Their individual decisions are constantly shaped, 
constrained and even undermined by the larger accumulation and 
legitimacy requirements that face the state. Furthermore, their 
interests are not totally divorced from class interests, and what 
often appear to be squabbles between competing parties or self-
serving bureaucrats are more ~£ten than not overt expressions of 
the underlying and competing interests of classes, class fractions, 
and of other major social and other inter-groups conflicting 
interests--often concentrated in separate agencies. In Venezuela, 
as I will illustrate again in this chapter, the relationship 
between class and political interests is often less than hidden as 
dominant class agents increasingly occupy key positions within the 
state apparatus. 
Fourth, and as illustrated in the last chapter, the state's 
non-monolithic nature, and the related class and group struggles 
that define new levels of legitimacy, create spaces for the 
representation of subordinate class and group inter~sts. These 
spaces widen and narrow in the context of such struggles and 
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depend, to a large extent, on the effectiveness of the different 
11weapons" each class, fraction, or group brings to bear. New 
commitments made by the state to such subordinate classes or groups 
may thus be unsucessfully opposed by dominant fractions of classes 
at the national or regional levels. Limits to those commitments, 
within Venezuela's existing pattern of capitalist accumulation, are 
however sure to appear when legitimacy threats from dominant class 
fractions, usually occurring during economic compressions, are 
serious enough that the very survival of the democratic state--
and/or the desired accumulation environment are put into question. 
At this time, the state may resort to the use of repressive 
measures against previously incorporated subordinate groups, alone, 
or in combination with new strategies of cooptation and appeasement 
of such subordinate groups. 
As in the last chapter, a key task in this chapter is to dis-
aggregate, at the macro level, the various layers of factors that 
contributed to the changes in the Indian program and aggregate 
outcomes after 1977, and which in turn affected in unique ways the 
empresas that were founded after this date. This approach 
represents an alternative to the reductionistic tendency of 
collapsing a composite of influencing factors into single causes of 
policy shifts and program results. Such reductionism inevitably 
results in either statist, politicist, voluntarist, or 
economicistic explanations of policy processes.4 The more concrete 
set of factors is situated at the ''micro" level of the communities 
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themselves. This includes not only the unique structural 
configuration of these communities and the specific application of 
state policies, but as I have said repeatedly, the consideration of 
the fact that these are communities of actors who can activate 
defensive or offensive responses to such policies and modify their 
outcomes. This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
The data for this chapter come.primarily from government 
reports and statistics, interviews with IAN officials, and 
published works on Venezuela's political and economic changes from 
1977 to the early 1980s. 
II. Macro-level Changes During 1977-early 1980s: New Constraints 
and Possibilities in the Organization of Empresas Indigenas 
The Pume empress of Kumani, located in the state of Apure, was 
founded in 1978, during the l~st year of Perez' AD administration 
at the same time, the Indian program had lost considerable 
government support. The Bari empress of Saimadoyi, in the Sierra 
de Perija, was founded· in 1980 at a time when the Indian program 
was experiencing a mild resuscitation under a new COPEI 
administration, which, among other things, brought the more 
experienced Indigenistas back to head the Indian program. The 
environment within which each of these empresas came into being was 
thus quite different. The differences are not confined to the more 
apparent competition between two political parties and their 
respective administrations' policy styles and philosophical bases. 
Consistent with this chapters opening statements, one must instead 
look for the combined effect of factors such as changing economic 
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conditions and the related fiscal, social, and economic development 
policy decisions made by each administration. Particularly 
important in the latter instance was each administration's level of 
commitment to the transformation of the agrarian structure as 
expressed in such policy decisions, and more specifically, to the 
use of a collectivization formula for affecting the said 
transformation. The analysis of these economic and political 
factors is useful not only for understanding the different fates 
met by the two empresas, but for expanding our overall 
understanding of the prospects and limitations of state-promoted 
Indian development programs as a whole. 
A. 1977-1979: The Interim Period 
We recall from the last chapter that the organization of 
empresas campesinas was central to Perez' agrarian policy after 
1974. It was on Perez' support for a collectivization solution to 
peasant productivity problems that the lndigenistas capitalized on 
and organized over 40 empresas Indigenas, even before the major 
drive for empresas campesinas had begun (see Appendix C). However, 
during the first quarter of 1977, Perez' administration suddenly 
withdrew its economic support for the Indian Program, fired its 
staff, and canceled the first credit agreements for the amount of 
Bs. 11.000.000, (Bs. 4.3 .. $1) which would have supposedly 
consolidated the newly formed empresas--most of which still existed 
only on paper. 
To understand these sudden changes in the Indian program it is 
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necessary first to understand the changes taken place at the 
economic level. In the last two decades or so, oil revenues had 
facilitated an expansive industrialization process in which the 
state had played a major role. National and foreign industrial 
capital have been the major beneficiaries of this trend, and their 
agents have occupied a privileged presence in state agencies, a 
fact that has become even more apparent since the oil boom of the 
middle 1970s.5 Correspondingly, the agricultural sector has been 
increasingly relegated to a secondary priority despite periodic 
efforts to revitalize it at times of food or social crises in the 
countryside. Most importantly, given the central role that the 
state occupies in capital accumulation and the preference given to 
industry over agriculture, major reductions in state revenues 
necessarily affect the latter.more than the former--especially in 
what concerns the peasant sector of the rural economy. 
By the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977, it had become 
apparent that the economy was again experiencing a downward trend. 
The oil boom of the middle seventies had propelled an unprecedented 
wave of investment activity by the state which toward the late 
seventies had to be increasingly financed with foreign borrowing. 
This, combined with high levels o! corruption, precipitated an 
unexpected budget deficit of Be. 1.5 billions. At the same time, 
oil revenues had begun to decline, and export earnings in general 
declined while imports grew by 24.7%. In other words, there were 
new signs of an economic crisis of some significance toward the end 
of Perez' administration. 
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Of special significance was the fact that the country had 
experienced in 1976 a severe food crisis caused by adverse 
climatological conditions and a serious deterioration in prices.6 
This acute food shortage forced the government to lift all import 
restrictions, including import duties, by April of 1977. This in 
turn led to the largest amount of food imports ever, accompanied by 
massive food airlifts from several countries. 
This disappointing performance by a government that came to 
power claiming it would restore the viability of the agricultural 
sector and eliminate the need for food imports led to a new 
reevaluation of agricultural policy. Such reevaluation was 
particularly colored by a perceived situation of crisis confronting 
other sectors of the economy and the state. 
It was clear that the economic bonanza of the early part of 
Perez' administration, a boom fueled by unprecedented highs in oil 
prices and government spending, was coming to an end toward the end 
of his administration. It was also clear that the industrial 
classes were determined to put up a strong fight to avoid sharing 
the cost of this new crisis as much as possible. Given the 
relative weakness of the state by this time, and the fact that 1978 
was an election year, this was not a particularly difficult task. 
The direct presence of members of the industrial class in state 
agencies became more visible still. It successfully resisted a 
much needed radical tax reform and blamed government overspending 
and corruption for the crisis. Such accusations were not unfounded 
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but it was unquestionably this same class of industrialists who had 
benefited the most from the flurry of government spending that took 
place in the first years of Perez' administration; and many members 
of this class benefited from corruption as well. Conventional 
economic analysis set in once again and there was a major call from 
national and international economic institutions to reduce 
government spending. The agricultural sector, and more 
specifically the empresas campesinas program, would be particularly 
affected by this call. Agricultural policy was once again to be 
re-assessed and re-directed after 1977. As usual, the changes 
would not affect the entire sector evenly, and the changes in the 
Indian program after this time can be best understood as the impact 
of these overall changes on low-priority state efforts--which 
included more than the Indian-program. 
A comprehensive review of the Perez administration's 
agricultural programs show that despite attempts to re-incorporate 
the peasantry into the central plans to improve agricultural 
production, credit policies and financial packages benefited the 
larger producers and those connected with agribusiness in general. 
According to Herman (1986), ro% of the credit went to large 
commercial farmers and agroindustry in general, while only 10% went 
to small and medium producers; and 00% of national income went to 
the cities. 
The Fondo de Credito Agropecuario (FCA) was the main agency to 
distribute credit founded during the Perez administration. 
However, it was structurally set up to channel credit through 
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commercial banks, and thus to benefit the larger and more 
successful producers who were the ones with credit records strong 
enough to have access to such banks. The IAN-ICAP agreement of 
19767 which established a means to channel funds for the empresas 
campesinas and borrowers' unions (uniones de prestatarios) was 
canceled by 1977. ICAP would resume its credit responsibilities to 
small and medium producers, including the peasant organizations, 
but, the budget al location for peasant organizations dee 1 ined 
considerably (Cox, 1981). The peasant organizations' own credit 
recovery rate compared poorly to that of individual small farmers 
(20.1% vs. 33.4%) which further eroded the enthusiasm for these 
organizations, and particularly for the collective formula of 
empresas campesinas (Cox, 1981). 
The reorganization of the· Perez cabinet revealed the 
increasing dominance of the industrial sector over the state's 
budget. For example, a prominent member of FEDECAMARAS, became 
head of ICAP; the left-leaning Minister of Planning, Gumercindo 
Rodriguez, was replaced by the pro-business Azpurua Marturet8; and 
most significantly, the pro-collectivization IAN president La 
Corte, was replaced by two subsequent Presidents who were openly 
unsympathetic to the program of empresas campesinas (Autogestion 
lndigena/Dirigents lndigenas, 1977). The pendulum in agrarian 
Policy seemed to have swung back from any serious consideration of 
the peasant sector as the solution to this later version of the 
"agrarian quest ion." A 1 though support for agricu 1 ture diminished 
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in general, it was evident that the emphasis continued to be on 
restoring and expanding opportunities for the private sector's 
participation in agriculture and hence for the capitalist 
transformation of this sector. State expenditures in 1977, for 
example, already showed a concentration on capital improvements, 
primarily machinery, reflecting the continuous and growing trend in 
the mechanization of agriculture which would unlikely benefit the 
smaller labor-intensive peasant units of production.9 Figures also 
show a geometric growth in the participation of private commercial 
banks in the agricultural sector--but not in capital investments 
which were assumed by the state--but mainly in areas like livestock 
production.IO In terms of agricultural products, those connected 
with agribusiness continued to benefit most from financial 
packages. Livestock production, the key activity of most of the 
empresas Indigenas, was not a priority item in this regard and 
large state expenditures and registered productivity in 1978 found 
in this area had to do primarily with imports. As the 1978 
election approached, prices were held in check, especially meat 
prices. Besides the fact that this price structure could affect 
tte fate of the newly formed empresas, what is important to note 
here is that, up to this point, livestock production, especially in 
middle size units, was not a priority within government financial 
packages. This in itself could become an important "external" 
factor affecting the survivability of different types and size 
enterprises--very possibly with regional variations--and must be 
watched as the empresas develop. In other words, market conditions 
153 
are also bound to affect each empresa differently, thus increasing 
or hurting its chances of survivability. 
In contrast to this effort to provide new incentives for 
capitalist investment in agriculture, which would ultimately 
benefit larger producers, and as Table 4.1 show, we begin to see 
the decline in numbers of and credit allo~ated to collective 
peasant organizations or empresas campesinas--at least in the short 
term, For the 1978-79 crop year the number of empresas campesinas 
declined by 159, while borrower's unions (credit cooperatives) 
increased by 174 (Cox, 1981). 
This latest dis-incorporation of a major fraction of the 
peasant sector from agricultural development plans was facilitated 
by yet one more step in the decreasing significance of the 
peasantry as a powerful constituency in Venezuela. By this time, 
Venezuela's rural population was already under 25% of the total 
population, and rural development programs like empresas campesinas 
had produced new waves of differentiation and outmigration of the 
majority. These programs also fostered, in a typically 
clientelistic fashion, new corporatist arrangements with at least 
part of the peasant leadership which further weakened the tone of 
the opposition to the apparent dismantlement of the empress 
solution. Despite these arrangements, the Peasant Federation 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the reduction of credit to 
empresas campesinas, not only because it represented another 
retreat from the agrarian reform, but because it further undermined 
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credit received by the empresas (Cox, 1984). 
In this complex political economic environment the Indian 
program, a low priority item in the government's agricultural 
policy given the insignificant contribution of this group to 
agricultural productivity, was almost fatally undermined. Just as 
the worrisome figures for the first quarter of 1977 were being 
released, IAN Indigenistas once again mobilized the Indian 
leadership and brought them together in a national ''business 
meeting" to formalize their request for the Bs. 11 million credit 
from ICAP--a credit line ICAP had apparently already agreed to in 
an un-official manner.II One may also recall that the Perez 
administration had from early on discouraged an independent Indian 
Federation, which tied to the weakening of the peasant federation, 
made this latest move toward the Indian program politically 
feasible.12 By this time, the state was clearly unwilling to 
commit any resources to the Indian Program beyond what was 
minimally necessary to preserve a sense of social justice, as wel 1 
as "rural peace"--not only among Indians but the peasantry as a 
whole--and secure the basic survival of the Indian population. The 
rest of the history of the Indian program will show that, despite 
mild revivals, the program's economic and political limits had been 
set during this latest struggle between Indigenistas and more 
powerfu 1 state agents. (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and Appendix C for 
changes in financial support and number of organizations created 
during various years.) 












IAN INDIAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM BUDGET AND NUMBER OP 
COMMUNITIES SERVED 
1978-1985 









47 5, 23 8. 400** 
• approsimate fiaure obtained through interview• and indirect 
calcul1tion1 • 
** By 1985, Sl.00 • appros Bl 16.00 v1. $1.00 • 4.30 Bl in 1978 
Source,: Interv iev1; lAR. Operativo• 
157 
of Indian affairs was re-organized in April of 1977 as the 
Ministeria 1 Office for Frontier and Indian Affairs (OMAFI).13 It 
continued to be dependent on the Ministry of Education ''but with 
faculty to coordinate Indian-related programs generated by all 
official and private organisms."14 This move of empowering the 
party-staffed OMAFI while undermining the more independent IAN 
office was consistent with the latest attempts from Perez 
government to assert more direct control and limitations over 
Indian affairs.IS Eleven new government posts were created in 
Indian areas under this offices' supervision in l 9r8 and despite 
changes in language, the orientation continued to be predominantly 
relief orientation. This stirred new opposition from some Indian 
leaders and other activists which may have also helped the 
congress-mandated Indian program to operate even if at a mini:mal 
level.16 However, the so called "shift" in Indian policy appeared 
to have been exaggerated at best. 
IAN's Indian program could now function safely within the 
newly established constraints. In 1978, an election year, it was 
given its first independent budget line for programs that were to 
be carried out in coordination with OMAFI.17 It is at this 
juncture that the empress Kumani in Apure was organized--one of 
. . h' . . . d 18 JUst a handful of empresas organized during t 1s 1nter1D1 per10. 
Despite the good intentions of those who worked for the transfer of 
the Santa Cecilia ranch to the Pume, and as I will show in the next 
chapter, this new set of "external factors" had a lasting impact in 
the development of this empress. Among other things, the empress 
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became a good illustration of the attempted return to the welfare 
as opposed to comprehensive development approach to government-
sponsored Indian programs. 
By the time the Bari empress of Saimadoyi was organized in 
1980, the economic and political climate had again began to change 
in some important ways, although it continued along the same paths 
of Perez' administration in others. I will examine this sub-
period next. 
B. 1980-1985 and Beyond: Resuscitation Attempts 
When Luis Herrera of COPEi assumed the presidency in 1979, 
there was again a realization that the agricultural sector required 
some urgent attention and re-assessment. The end of the Perez 
administration had been marked by serious drops in agricultural 
prices and productivity and resultant growth in out-migration rates 
and lack of incentive for increased productivity. Confronted with 
an equally serious deterioration of oil revenues, the option of 
importing food to make up for the loss in productivity, available 
to Perez, was increasingly closed off to Herrera Campins. 
The recurrent "agrarian question" returned with a vengeance 
and Herrera's team decided to once again attempt to salvage the 
most promising sector of the peasantry while continuing to support 
the modernization of agriculture and a growing role for 
agroindustry. In short Herrera, like all the others before him, 
was forced to come up with new/old ways to juggle these largely 
competing objectives within the context of a more difficult 
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economic environment. 
Taking cues from both the agroindustrial and peasant sectors, 
the Herrera administration first offered specific support for the 
rural semiproletariat which continued to have an important role in 
providing cheap labor for larger enterprises (The VI National Plan 
for example, emphasizes explicit support for this sector, including 
new land distribution and support for subsistence production). On 
the other hand, as with Perez, there were new attempts to 
consolidate a middle peasantry,-but within still tighter 
connections with agroindustry, through renewed integrated rural 
programs (now called PIRA and ARDI), and support for peasant 
organizations like empresas campesinas and borrowers' unions. 
Finally, and primarily as a result of a series of marches staged by 
dissatisfied peasants in the cpuntryside in the first year of his 
administration, Herrera was forced to increase agricultural prices 
to benefit the small and medium size producers. He also eliminated 
subsidies and tariff exemptions to food imports established by 
Perez as a sign of his commitment to boost domestic agricultural 
production (Herman, 1986). 
It is within this new politically sensitive environment and 
hopes for a small fraction of peasant sector that the Indian 
program was given new life. This included the re-hiring of the 
expert indigenistas and the program's largest budget ever (Bs.3.5 
million) The indigenistas resumed the empress programs and by 1981 
successfully negotiated their first credit agreements with ICAP 
(see Table 4.3). Nonetheless, as expressed earlier, the rest of 
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the program's history makes it clear that the limits set by Perez' 
administration regarding the participation of the Indian sector in 
the state would hold with minor variations till today. 
Despite hopeful pronouncements, the agricultural sector 
experienced few successes during Herreras administration. 
Producers at all levels were negatively affected, albeit in an 
uneven fashion. In other words, policies such as price 
liberalization, subsidy removals, and the diminishing role of the 
national marketing cooperative (CORPOMERCADEO) benefited the larger 
producers at the expense of the smaller. This was confirmed by the 
increased role of the private sector in agriculture as well as a 
new drop in number of peasant organizations created by 1983 (see 
Table 4.1), and statistics showing state credit going primarily to 
larger producers (see OCEt's s!:!ries estadisticas from 1980-1985). 
On the other hand, cattle production was becoming established as an 
important domestic product and thus obtain increasing private and 
state support.I 9 
These results were heavily conditioned by the serious declines 
in oil exports and prices, together with the privileged presence of 
large producers in key organizations, inside and outside the state, 
who could more easily control these dwindling government 
resources.20 The Indian program's budget became fixed at the old 
level of the Perez administration and experienced no major changes 
unti 1 1985. 
The economic situation of Venezuela continued to deteriorate 
during a new AD administration headed by Lusinchi. Foods began to 
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be imported at prices lower than those paid to domestic producers. 
However, shrinking foreign exchange reserves began to provide 
incentives for domestic production and 1985 was a boom year in 
agriculture. Government policy for this sector appeared more 
erratic than usual reflecting the transitional character of the 
economy as a whole. For example, early in Herrera's administration 
talk of collectivism and self-management had again made its way 
into AD policy pronouncements and the VII National plan, only to be 
quickly and firmly "filed away" (engavetados). However, toward the 
end of 1985, there was yet another effort to consolidate middle 
peasant producers and tighten their link with a growing 
agroindustria 1 sector through the now named "integrated" empresas 
campesinas. Similarly, a new group of "commercial II middle farmers 
who came primarily from the cities and who benefited--legally and 
i1 legal ly--from their participation in the public and private 
sector during the oil boom period, began to use their connections 
and entrepeneurial skills to harness a significant share of state 
and private support. 
But despite the new emphasis on associative models of 
production in national economic policies, the Indian program seemed 
to be under attack once again as its Director forcefully protested 
a private rancher's illegal takeover of a portion of Piaroa 
territory in the Amazonian territory. He was again fired and 
replaced with a party loyal, connected with the Venezuelan Peasant 
Federation, and with no experience in Indian communities. Since 
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then, there have been several incidents which indicate a turn 
toward a more repressive rather than redistributive approach to the 
Indian question. These have gone from preventing Indian supporters 
from attending a national meeting in the Amazonian territory, to 
the recent support for extensive mining projects in Bari territory 
which threatens the very empresa the gov_ernment helped organize. 
III. Analysis and Conclusions 
The sketch of post-1977 political-economic changes at the 
macro level of the Venezuelan society just presented was meant to 
accomplish two distinct but related purposes. One was to offer 
additional evidence, by examining a new historical period, 
supporting the arguments about state policy processes offered in 
earlier chapters. More specifically, it corroborates. in a broad 
sense, how the Indian Program ·at its different stages of 
development is conditioned by a multiplicity of factors arranged in 
layers from more abstract to more concrete, and from more to less 
immediately determining. Secondly, and most importantly, the 
sketch constitutes the immediate background within which the two 
empresas studied here were organized and subsequently developed. 
Within the Venezuelan pattern of accumulation which emerged in 
recent history, it is the relationship between industry and 
agriculture, between the city and the countryside--and the class 
arrangements which underlie such relationships--that is 
particularly relevant for the analysis of the Indian program. The 
Program, as we know, was conceived first and foremost as a rural 
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development program to be run from the agrarian reform institute 
headquarters. Although other components of this pattern, such as 
geopolitical concerns, have also influenced Indian policy, the 
program's limitations, at the broadest level, have to do with this 
structured relationship between agriculture and industry and by the 
policies that maintain such a relationship. 
In this regard Venezuela's pattern of development, has not 
been very different from the one de Janvry and others have outlined 
for Latin America as a whole.21 In recent years this pattern has 
been increasingly tilted toward an oil-financed, export-oriented 
industrialization process, but which has still not significantly 
altered the subordinate position of the agricultural sector. Given 
that the main axis of socio-economic reproduction is found outside 
of Venezuela in export earning_&, the internal market has until 
recently been quite insignificant and therefore wages have been 
ke_pt low. The peasant sector has played an important role in 
producing cheap food· products which make up the wage bundle, and it 
has provided rural enterprises with cheap wage labor. Capitalist 
investment in agricultural production has been very uneven and 
confined primarily to non-wage export and luxury crops. This 
dynamic interplay between peasant and non-peasant production is 
what de Janvry has referred to as "functional dualism." De 
Janvry' s we 11 known argument is that given this "disarticulated" 
pattern of accumulation (capital accumulation occurs outside), the 
Peasantry is locked into the production of the leas~ profitable 
Products while nt the same time becoming increasingly 
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proletarianized as prices drop and they are no longer able to 
reproduce themselves and their units of production. Concomitantly,-
the state's role has often been to prevent, through agrarian reform 
and rural development projects, the total disappearance of this 
important semiproletarianized and cheap food producing peasantry. 
But some important caveats must be introduced into de Janvry's 
model before continuing the examination of the remaining levels of 
conditioning factors. First of all, it is no longer true that the 
internal market plays no role in Venezuela's capital accumulation 
process. Industrialization has generated some backward and forward 
linkages within the country's economy and a middle class, not 
totally dependent on government jobs, has clearly emerged and 
fueled the growth of the internal market and of the import 
substitution process. Wages a·re not simply a "cost" anymore, but 
they are important vehicles for internal consumption. All of this 
has not necessarily translated into an active dynamism of the 
agrarian sector, but some changes have been taking place. For 
example, as the historical sketches of the last two chapters 
illustrate, agroindustry and capital penetration in general have 
played an increasingly important role in this sector. Second, and 
most important, the classic picture of peasant differentiation 
painted by de Janvry does not portray accurately the heterogeneous 
developments taking place within the rural sector (an argument 
which others have made for Latin America as a whole). There is no 
question that semi-proletarianization and out-migration have 
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increased, while only a few peasant enterprises may have become 
large capitalist enterprises. However, as an exciting new chapter 
in the peasant literature has begun to point out, De Janvry and 
others have failed to take note of a growing presence of middle-
size capitalized farmers who has emerged largely as a consequence 
of the import substitution process (Lehman, · 1985; Llanvi, 1988). 
In other words, the largely functionalist argument about capital's 
necessity to first subordinate and ultimately eliminate non-
capitalist peasant forms of production no longer holds. 
Similarly, and in light of this evidence, one can no longer 
assume, in an equally functionalist fashion, that the state's role 
is to always and unequivocally maintain the logic of functional 
dualism de Janvry talks about. In fact, despite its erratic nature 
and undeniable failures, the a?ove macro-historical context 
suggests that the Venezuelan government has not simply returned to 
these peasant-based policies time after time as a way of fulfilling 
its legitimating function. It has actually been struggling with a 
formula to promote the consolidation of at least a fraction of the 
most successful middle size farmers-while unquestionably engaging 
in strategies to preserve a still needed semi-proletarianized labor 
force. A formula that for reasons that should have become at least 
partially apparent by now, condenses many of the complexities, 
contradictions, and tensions which confront a liberal democratic 
state--and a dependent one at that--and which again defy simple 
causal exp lanations.22 
The strikingly erratic and contradictory agricultural policies 
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(at times appearing to favor the consolidation of a peasant sector, 
at times undermining their survival) also respond to the highly 
heterogeneous character of the rural sector--including the Indian 
communities--and the fact that the penetration of capital in this 
sector occurs not only in an uneven but sporadically. For all 
these reasons it is not always possible to determine specific state 
objectives a priori, they must ~e deduced from the examination of 
both structural and conjunctural factors. Although it is not 
automatic, those moments within which the state increases its 
support for the peasant sector should at least be potentially more 
beneficial for Indian development projects than when large capital-
intensive projects become the core of agrarian policy. However, I 
already noted that in 1985 while a new version of peasant 
organizations was being promoted, the program was experiencing new 
opposition from above. This serves to remind us of the complexity 
of factors that determine policy decisions and specifically popular 
participation in the state--including the possibility of irrational 
or simply bad decisions on the part of public officials. 
These policy decisions, and their impact on Indian development 
policies and programs are thus constrained by yet another layer and 
more concrete set of factors located within the political 
structure. These include the political parties and their specific 
legitimacy requirements, the relative strength of different social 
classes and groups in influencing the policy process, and the level 
of the state's institutional development, and administrative and 
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financial capacity to carry out policy. 
The unquestionable salience of political factors in shaping 
socio-economic processes in Venezuela, and particularly the 
prominent role of the parties and the of the state itself in 
shaping such processes, has tempted many authors to give 
exaggerated weight to these factors at the expense of others. 
In the analysis of the post-1977 period offered here, the role 
of the political parties, the electoral process, and of the 
Venezuelan state as a whole is duly recognized. Authors such as 
Silva Michelena and Sonntag (1979) are largely correct in pointing 
out the low level of development of Venezuela's civil society (when 
compared to western democracies) and the correspondingly large role 
of maintaining the systems legitimacy that is assigned to 
political institutions.23 In this context, political parties have 
become the primary means of social representation and elections are 
more than just an exercise in electoral democracy; although as 
Sonntag and de la Cruz also emphasize, this is itself very 
important. They are key conjunctures within which legitimacy 
problems are corrected through the forging of new alliances--in 
which political parties play a major role--and reassessments of 
policy directions. It followed logically from this that major 
changes in the Indian development program would occur with changes 
in administrations. 
As principle vehicles in the ''management and transmission of 
class and group interests to state agents, and in building 
political legitimacy in general, both COPEI and AD balanced their 
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reading of the strategies necessary to support Venezuela's dominant 
development pattern with strategies necessary to preserve their 
power positions. The latter has included first and foremost the 
mobilization of constituencies for electoral processes, and the 
cyclical undermining of the other party's previous administration's 
programs. The ups and downs of the Indian program respond to large 
extent to the changing nature of these political strategies and 
legitimacy requirements as a whole. When peasant mobilization was 
high and the sector's political support was considered important 
COPE! and AD opened a space in the policy process to accommodate 
the new demands. It was partly this space that Indigenistas seized 
upon to create the Indian program. When fiscal constraints and 
competitive demands from dominant classes emerged later on, the 
state swiftly moved to narrow·such a space. 
But to recognize the role of political parties in 'determining 
social processes, is not equivalent to the argument that political 
objectives were the primary determinants in the organization and 
haphazard development of the Indian program--let alone of its 
ultimate results.24 This would be erroneous on two counts. One, 
because the weakness of a Venezuelan civil society unable to 
generate its own legitimacy should not be exaggerated given recent 
developments previously mentioned, namely, the growth of an 
internal market and a prosperous middle class--to say nothing of 
democratic rights and new freedoms. State actions cannot be 
mechanically read as simple vehicles for system legitimation.25 
170 
What can be argued is that the development of this civil society is 
still quite uneven and its benefits do not stretch to encompass 
groups like Indians and major sectors of the peasantry. That the 
state and political parties would move to establish that legitimacy 
among such groups is thus understandable. But this statement must 
also be qualified in two ways. First, I would dispute the rather 
explicit statements made by some authors that the Indian program 
was but a mechanism to incorporate an until then disenfranchised 
fraction of the peasantry into the electoral process and in so 
doing obtain not only more votes, but a new level of political 
legitimacy (Serbin, 1983). The Indian constituency was all too 
insignificant as an electoral mass. And second,.while elections in 
Venezuela may alone support liberal and democratic claims among a 
great many people, they were, an~ continue to be, fundamentally 
meaningless in the lives of this country's frontier inhabitants. 
To the extent that the Indian program contributes to the legitimacy 
of these political institutions and the system (regime) as a whole, 
it would seem to do so through the statement it may make about the 
state's responsiveness toward the rural ·classes--and not 
necessarily toward the Indian population--especially at a time when 
agrarian reform had taken a definite turn away from social and 
toward a more transparent concern for economic productivity. 
Secondly, it is erroneous to consider political factors as 
primary determinants of the Indian program because it obscures the 
other "layers of determination" operating at higher and lower 
levels of concreteness. At the more general level it obscures the 
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kinds of considerations parties must give to strategies conducive 
to preserve the overall accumulation environment vis-a-vis their 
own narrow interests. At a more concrete level, it obscures the 
complexity of the state's internal structure and the specific 
configuration of classes and groups, together with their 
mobilization capacities at different moments in time--with which 
the parties also have to contend.26 Finally, these ups and downs 
of the Indian program and of the individual empresas are also 
shaped by the institutional capabilities--or lack thereof--and 
resources available to the state at a particular point in time. 
In summary, this last discussion ultimately addresses itself 
to the larger questions of the state's role in promoting different 
forms of agrarian transition, and to the more specific issue·of the 
state promoting such transition for a specific group: the Indian 
population. I have argued that the question about states' 
''motives" for intervening in Indian communities through rural 
development programs cannot be answered by either transferring 
popular explanations for projects conducted among the peasantry as 
a whole, nor by reducing such explanations to monocausal factors--
whether they be political factors such as parties or a highly 
"autonomous" state pursuing its own interests, or socio-economic 
factors such as a logic of "functional dualism" between peasant and 
non-peasant production. 
Regarding the second objective of this chapter, the layers of 
factors discussed here as determining the development of the Indian 
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program after 1977 also constitute the "external" factors which 
specifically affected the development of individual empresas 
organized after this date. Both of the empresas selected for this 
study were organized after 1977. 
The leap from factors located at such a macro level of the 
Venezuelan formation to changes occurring within individual 
empresas is not easily accomplished and requires some 
qualification. The task is not to draw direct causal lines between 
events occurring at the macro-structural level and each empress's 
internal organization--this is not only impossible-but ultimately 
erroneous. But it is possible to extend the analytical model used 
here, and the theoretical arguments regarding different levels of 
factors and their impact on the policy process to the this most 
concrete level of individual empresas. At this level, a new. set of 
market and non-market factors interact with, modify and are 
modified by at least some of the factors located at the more 
general national and macro-structural level. The task is then to 
uncover such combined effects with the help of the revelant 
analytical tools and arguments, and even modify the latter when 
necessary. This task will be developed throughout the next 
chapters but the ultimate synthesis wi 11 probably not be totally 
clear until the final conclusion when all the factors have been 
assessed. 
At this point it can again be anticipated that differential 
levels of state commitment to rural transformation (including 
commitment to socialized collective organizations) and Indian 
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development--themselves constrained by factors located within the 
various layers of determination discussed here--will be reflected 
in specific differences in items such as state budgets, expert 
field personnel, and local support of individual empresa projects 




1. Comparisons with individual empresas before 1977 are possible 
to some extent because of the existence of one or two partial 
evaluation reports of a Warao and a Ye'Kuana empresas. 
2. This follows the analytical model which is explicitly and 
implicitly elaborated throughout this dissertation. The model 
has been informed by the methodological theses of several 
authors also battling with the question of how best to connect 
macrotheoretical notions and historical-structural forces to 
the ana~ysis of micro-level social processes. Among others, 
see Elkin Cl 985); Kent Cl 983); Gulalp Cl 988). 
3. Grindle (1986), for example, explains the origin of agrarian 
reforms in Latin America as responding neither to accumulation 
crises nor to the sharpening of class conflicts in the 
countryside. These reforms in her view, were instead 
motivated by the "development ideology" of state bureaucrats. 
The theoretical underpinnings of such a view are closest to 
the 11s tate-centered" approach adopted by socio log is ts like 
Theda Skocpol, who utilize a historical-comparative approach 
to social policy. Skocpol (1980) and her 'associates' have 
carried the notion of state autonomy (or Poulantzas' relative 
autonomy) to its logical extreme and argued for complete 
independence of state managers and party structures in the 
determination of state policies. This narrow approach to 
state policy analysis thus ignores the structural constraints 
introduced by the objective (and contradictory) requirements 
of capital accumulation processes and the specific nature of 
class conflicts and struggle of a particular society at a 
particular time. (For a similar analysis see Levine, 1988). In 
the "analytical model" employed in this work, due recognition 
is given to political and bureaucratic·structures, and even 
independent state managers, in shaping policy processes. But 
there is a clear recognition of the fact that such structures 
are not erected in a vacuum but are constrained by other 
"levels of determination." Most importantly, and as Levine 
(1988) says, Skocpol and her followers obscure the impact of 
inter- and intra-class conflict on these structures. Finally, 
notions of state autonomy often filter into some of the 
explanations given by empress critics who tend to attribute 
undue foresight to state officials in their articulation and 
implementation of the new Indian policy. 
4. See the notes on methodology in the preface and first chapter. 
5. Perez Sainz and Zarambka Cl 97 9). 
6. See the lnforme Economico of the Banco Central de Venezuela 
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(BCV) (1977), and the Quarterly Economic Reports of Venezuela 
(QER) for the same year. 
7. Thi~ is described in Chapter 2. It basically refers to the 
period when IAN acted as credit agency for the first time and 
took over from ICAP responsibility for credit for small 
pro~u~ers. _The agree~ent ~as short-lived in lew of major 
adm1n1strat1ve and f1nanc1al confusion. 
8. QER (1977) • 
9. Credit for these categories increased by 103% from the 
previous year; see BCV Cl 977). Figures also show a 
geometrical growth in the participation of private commercial 
banks in the agricultural sector; except for capital 
in!est~ent~ which were largely assumed by the state, but 
pr1mar1ly 1n large livestock enterprises. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Personal communication with Indian Program's former Director 
(1986). 
12. This is in sharp contrast with the situation in 1972; see the 
last chapter. 
13. This Office has traditionally been much more vulnerable to 
clientelistic arrangements than IAN'S Indian Program which has 
been commonly staffed by independents or left-sympathizers. 
14. OMAFI Cl 977); my translation. 
15. Among other initiatives designed to expand OMAFrs action 
area, and for it to resume the pre-IAN, assitentialist 
orientation to Indian affairs, 11 new Indigenista centers, now 
cal led "nucleus," were established in Indian areas. In the 
1960s, these centers had been the bases from which official 
Indian policy was implemented. They concentrated on basic 
social assistance and vocational training. In 1975, at the 
same time when IAN assumed a central role in Indian affairs 
and largely succeeded in changing Indian policy's orientation 
from assistentialism to self-development, there was a new 
drive on OHAFl'S part to establish more centers or nuclei. 
Purportedly however, both agencies would coordinate their 
actions and OMAFI would concentrate on supportive educational 
activities. Twenty-two new nuclei were created at this time, 
and according to several public officials interviewed there 
was more inter-agency rivalry than cooperation. In 1978, when 
the IAN program was at its lowest, OMAFI organized new centers 
and adopted much of the language of IAN's ''mandate" to support 
development projects (see the Department of Education Memorias 
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for the years 1 97 8-7 9). The ro 1 e of OMAFI is made real c 1 ear 
in the documents organization of the Kumani empresa. 
Interviews with Pume members also confirmed that OMAFI took an 
active interest in recruiting potential leaders and members 
for the empresa. 
16. See Serbin (1986); and Bonfil Batalla (1981; 1982). 
17. For example, the 1978 Memoria of the Education Ministry cites 
60 development programs as part of their accomplishments. 
18. Apure had also been a specially targeted area during the 1973 
and 1978 presidential elections. See QER (1978). It is 
impossible to establish a direct linkage between any of these 
broader, ''macro-level" events and the decision to organize an 
Indian empress in the middle of criollo territory and among a 
group that was notoriously disenfranchised from the political 
process. In fact, one is hard-pressed to even logically 
connect these two levels in this instance. This again 
illustrates the complexity of factors that mediate between 
broader economic and political concerns and individual policy 
decisions. In the case of Kumani, besides those factors 
mentioned, it is very possible that the uneven development of 
party and state bureaucratic control allowed well-meaning 
individuals to use the campaign environment to sell state and 
party officials on this project. Or, it is possible, that in 
combination with the above, local party officials in pursuit 
of their own narrow interests believed--not necessarily 
correctly--that supporting land for Indians in the state would 
be a vote-catching action. 
19. See Herman (1986); and BCv's Informe Economico (1987). 
20. Ibid. 
21. De Janvry (1981); Hein ( 1980). 
22. Elkin (1985); Kent (1983). 
23. Silva Michelena and Sonntag (1979). 
24. This is Serbin's argument (1983). 
25. Elkin (1985). 
26. Although I would not go as far as Elkin (1985) in his a~gument 
against the state being an arena of c~as~ st~ugg~e, he 1s 
correct in pointing out that democratic 1nst~tut1ons ~re not 
simply a source of legitimacy. The democrat1~ state 1s an 
"intricate set of practices that are both ~lums for 
advantages and claims about how the community should be 
177 
rul~d;" (1985). The state I _would say slightly modifying 
Elkins argument, does not simply legitimize "implicit 
objectives" related to private capital accumulation or 
particularistic claims shrouded in demagogic langua~e and 
popular program~ also designed to fulfil 1 these objectives 
through strategies such as cooptation and divisionism. The 
content of a democratic state activities is also, at least 
part of the time, derived from wider claims about what is 
"just", or what is ''beneficial" for the country as a whole. 
To the extent that these activities reflect more than 
particularistic interests of a dominant class, they are· 
themselves legitimizing those claims, not simply acting as 
vehicles for something else. Venezuelan public officials who 
supported a program of empresas campesinas and Indigenas did 
not simply justified such support on the basis of this being a 
good formula to get the country out of the agricultural 
productivity slump in which it found itself. They also spent 
a great deal of time elaborating on the model of collective 
ownership and self-management as one which was more socially 
responsible and in agreement with democratic principles. Soto 
(1973), among other promoters of the empresas campesinas, 
spoke of a different kind of capitalism for Venezuela. In 
fact, one where capitalist principles were only some of the 
principles applied in the organization of production. He 
defended the "peasant-based" solution to the re-organization 
of agriculture based on a concept of mixed-economy and 
democratic participation of the peasants as the ''motor" of the 
agrarian reforms. In fact, Soto went further in his attack of 
rural development programs such as PRIDA which in his view 
"look toward the development of integrated areas (areas 
integrals) with the particularity of constituting 'peasant 
e 1 itee' in a position of privilege vis a vis an immense mass 
of marginal peasants" (Soto, 1973: 74). As Elkin says 
however, there is nothing to prevent someone from acting in a 
totally cynical fashion and cast about a popular doctrine only 
to pursue his own interests. And governments can do a lot of 
this. But again they do not act in a structural or social 
vacuum and popular classes take promises of democratization 
and economic improvement seriously. Especially when the 
state's legitimacy is partially maintained through popular 
actions as in the case of Venezuela. Of course, it also 
means that other objective and subjective factors can severely 
limit or distort the popular objectives behind such actions. 
Thie takes us back once again to factors having to do with 
objective requirements of the accumulation (economic 
productivity) process; there are also contradictions embedded 
in a capitalist liberal democratic state, which are 
I • h accentuated in third world capitalist countries sue as 
Venezuela and its supposedly "over-blown" state. These are 
fundament~l contradictions between liberal principles such as 
private property and free-market society and about communal 
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property and public interests in general. The fact that the 
Venezuelan state is itself a major source of capital 
accumulation frees it--not always or totally, but at times-
from some of the pressures that a capitalist class can exert 
when it is in total control of economic productivity. 
Collective organizations such as the empresas or marketing 
cooperatives contradict liberal claims. This is why they 
cannot be viewed simply as benefiting private accumulation--
even if they are ultimately "functional ized" for that purpose. 
The fact that they confronted so much opposition from 
different layers of government and the private sector 
precludes us from locating them into black and white 
categories of capitalist or popular objectives. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ETHNOHISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE BARI AND THE YARURO: 
FORMS OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
This chapter offers the reader a brief historical and 
ethnographic overview of the two communities where the study of the 
Bari and Yaruro empresas was conducted. The chapter is not 
intended to reconstruct the entire ethnohistory and ethnography of 
the Bari (see Beckerman, 197 8; Pinton, 1965), or the Yaruro (Pume) 
(see Leeds, 1974; Petrullo, 196 9; Mitriani, 1975 ). Beyond the 
ethnohistorical sketch, the chapter examines issues related to the 
internal characteristics of these groups and were discussed in 
Chapter 1 as the main criteria for the definition of these groups' 
internal socio-economic organization. In this manner, it serves as 
a baseline from which to re-examine those issues in the 
contemporary period and note their particular function and 
transformation throughout the development of the Pume empresa of 
Kumani, and the Bari empress of Saimadoyi. It pays close attention 
to this issue of transformation from the very beginning of the 
groups' contact with white society. The intention here is to 
demonstrate the extent to which these groups are now--in differing 
degrees--£ ar removed from their "tribal II origins. Hence, it is 
necessary to go beyond kinship analysis and to examine the types of 
external relations that are now an integral part of their 
reproduction as a social group. 
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A. A Brief Ethnohistorical Sketch 
The Bari are tropical horticulturalists of the Chibchan family 
who live in northeastern Colombia and northwestern Venezuela, an 
area that contains the rainforests of the southwestern Maracaibo 
Basin. They are one of the least acculturated groups in either 
Colombia or Venezuela, and hence, a group whose ethnographic and 
historical features have only begun to be understood (See appendix B). 
Although absolute limits to the Bari habitat can not be 
established, some approximations are possible. The Bari inhabit 
the plains that border with the Andean cordillera in the South, the 
Sierra de Perija to the west, the Lake of Maracaibo to the east and 
the dry forests to the north (Lizarralde and Beckerman, 1980). 
Elevations of this region do riot exceed 15.000 meters with the 
majority of the land where Bari have traditionally built their 
houses being much lower. There is a wet season lasting 
approximately from May through December, and a dry season that goes 
from January through March (My field visits were conducted during 
the rainy season). However rain falls all through the year, 
although less heavily during the dry season. Access to the area is 
difficult. 
"M t . 1 " "M t . 1 The Bari are commonly referred to as o 1 ones or o 1 ones 
Bravos", 8 nnme that is purported to derive from the Spanish verb 
''moti lar" (to cut the hair), and it alludes to the tonsorial habits 
of this group (Beckerman, 1975). The term motilon, however, became 
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increasingly associated with ''wild" or "savage" as the raids and 
counter-raids that took place during colonial times between the 
Bari and the Spaniards, and which continued into the post-
independence period, became rampant. 
The result of these confrontations was that, today, the Bari 
control approximately 1900 Km out of the 16,000 Km or 12% of the 
territory they held in 1900 (Lizarralde, 19m). In order to best 
assess the current situation of the Bari it is thus worthwhile to 
review in somewhat greater detail the history of the reduction of 
the Bari territory as a result of their contact with various 
colonizing elements. To do this, I will mostly make use of 
recently published secondary sources. 
Among others, Lizarralde and Beckerman (1982) have attempted 
to trace Bari history based on the availability of the information 
for different historical periods, and data describing major changes 
in Bari territory in the decades since 1900. Beckerman (1978) 
divides Bari ethnohistory into six different periods. The first 
runs from the first exploration of Lake Maracaibo in 1529 to 1622, 
when the first mention of the word motilon appears in a document 
representing the investiture of the first governor of the province 
of La Grits. It refers to "the nation of Indians who are cal led 
motilones, fierce and cruel people, who, for twenty years, 
committing murders and robberies, are impeding the navigation of 
the Rio Zulia ••• " (Nectario Maria, quoted in Beckerman, 1975). 
The available ethnographic information for this first period 
does not make totally clear whether the motilones mentioned in the 
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period's documents are the same Bari we know today--although 
according to Beckerman, the evidence points to that likelihood. 
What does become clear from historical documents is that there 
existed in the Maracaibo basin region a great number of different 
but interdependent Indian societies that were either destroyed or 
dispersed as their members were subjected to the Encomienda system. 
Somehow, the Bari was one of the few groups of the region that 
managed to survive this and later attempts by the Spaniards to take 
over their land and enslave their population. 
The second period outlined by Lizarralde and Beckerman (1980) 
extends to the year of 1772, the year Alcacer (1962) marked the 
first "pacification" of the motilones. It is during this period 
that Bari resistance to Spanish encroachment became most fierce. 
The Spaniards hoped to control the Maracaibo basin region in order 
to establish commercial operations that included cattle production 
and cultivation of cocoa and sugar cane (Buenaventura-Posso and 
Brown, 1980). Documents reviewed by Alcacer (1962) reveal that 
the Bari were not only successful in thwarting the attempts-of the 
Spaniards to invade their territory, but they, in fact, expanded 
their area of influence and are reported to have forced the owners 
of eleven cacao haciendas on the southern shore of Maracaibo to 
abandon them. Nevertheless, Beckerman (1975) points out, with 
convincing historical data, that these gains of territory by the 
Bari were not so much due to the strength of these groups but to 
the relatively weak social and power structure that characterized 
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the region. Penetration of the area had always been difficult and 
by the end of the seventeenth century, when access had begun to be 
less difficult, the power of the Spaniards had begun to decline due 
in part to the successful raids of English and French pirates. 
"The Bari extension represents more an expansion into a vacuum 
than the active conquest of determinedly.held territory" 
(Beckerman:1975:96). This vacuum was further enhanced by the 
decimination of competing Indian tribes by diseases carried to the 
New World by missionaries and other whites. The Bari seemed to 
have escaped the full effects of these diseases because of their 
widely dispersed settlement patterns, their sporadic visits to 
neighboring long houses, and their cultural response to illness, 
which was to confine themselves to their individual hammocks until 
no longer sick (Beckerman, 1975). 
These fortunate set of circumstances did not prevent the 
eventual re-establishment of Spanish control over the territory. 
Numerous military expeditions were sent out to capture and subdue 
the Bari population though the Bari continued to raid and offer 
significant resistance to these attacks. Missionaries, themselves 
not exempt from Bari raids, had began to set up outposts around 
Bari territory. By the end of this period the Bari, while not so 
subjugated, were surrounded. All neighboring tribes had been 
pacified. 
The first "pacification" of the Bari took place at the 
beginning of the third period in 1772. It began with a peaceful 
contact mediated by a captured and cooperative Bari, and was 
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consolidated by a fuller expedition that followed·the initial 
contact. The historical record suggests that the missionaries were 
never to be as successful with the Bari as they had been with other 
groups in the region. The captured Bari were constantly fleeing 
the missions and by 1818 abandoned them completely to return to 
their traditional land area. The Venezuelan independence wars had 
weakened the position of the Capuchin missionaries who were loyal 
to the Spanish Crown, and, in 1921, were finally expelled from the 
Perija region by the newly independent government. 
The fourth period marks the return of the Bari to their 
original, though significantly reduced territory, and is 
characterized by a large void of ethnographic and ethnohistorical 
data. Only two important points of information can be extracted 
from this period. One, as they returned to the forest, the Bari 
took back with them a number of items gleaned from the Spaniards' 
material culture that would have a permanent impact on the Bari. 
These included metal tools, pots and pans, cloth and perhaps corn. 
Also important are the items they did not borrow, including the 
construction and use of canoes and alcoholic beverages (Alcacer, 
1964). Other groups in the region, the Yucpas, for example, did 
adopt the use of alcoholic beverages and, as with the North 
American Indians, it has become one more enemy in their attempt to 
regain control of their lives.I A second noteworthy characteristic 
of this period is the general renewal of hostilities and 
confrontations between the Indians and white elements seeking to 
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settle in the area. Alcacer laments the return of the Bari to 
h . " . . . b b . II t e1r pr1m1t1ve ar ar1Sm , and the fact that the missionary is no 
longer there to defend the Bari from outside, hostile elements--
suggesting the continued encroachment of whites into the area 
(Alcacer: 1962, p.237) 
The entrance of American and Dutch oil corporations into the 
area around 1913 marked a new period in Bari history and in the 
reduction of their territory. At about the same time, Capuchin 
missionaries returned to the area after their expulsion shortly 
after Venezuelan independence. Their activities ceased at the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, but resumed again with renewed 
force during the 1950"s and 1960"s when the final effort for 
"pacification" was made. 
Beckerman (1975) and Lizarralde and Beckerman (1982) describe 
the activities of the oil companies in the area during the next 50 
years. These companies entered Bari territory protected by their 
own armies in order to set up drilling equipment, transport oil 
workers, and build a steel pipeline on the southern edge of 
Motilonia territory, where an access road contributed to the 
increased penetration of white settlers into the area east of the 
Catatumbo River. The flurry of oil activity peaked by the 1940's 
and most of the Bari territory lost during this period was on the 
Colombian side. In contrast, between 1945 and 1959, the major loss 
of Bari territory took place in Venezuela and was no longer due to 
oil companies but to the influx of white colonists who began 
deforesting Bari territory for cattle ranching and other 
1 86 
agricultural activities. For the most part, the process of 
colonization of Perija was slow and most settlements took the form 
of small or medium-size ranches. Even so, by the 1960's most of 
the area had been taken over by ranches of various sizes (Llanvi, 
1987). 
The sixth and last period outlined by Beckerman (1975), begins 
with what has been cal led "the second pacification" carried out by 
Capuchin Missionaries and culminating in 1973. Lizarralde and 
Beckerman produced an article that constitutes an update on the 
Bari's situation up to 1983. However, other than the census data, 
information referring to the post-1973 period does not seem to have 
been collected in the field. 
The renewal of missionary activity was headed by Father-Adolfo 
de Vil lamanan from the Mission of El Tokuko, which had been 
established in 1945 for the pacification of .the Yukpa. After 
several confrontations with local land-owners who feared the 
Capuchins' interference with their efforts to continue their 
advance into Bari territory, Father Villamanan appealed to the 
government and the media for support. At the same time, the 
Comision Indigenista (Indian Commission) came under pressure by AD 
party officials to organize a state-sponsored peaceful expedition 
of its own and in 1960, asked a leading Venezuelan anthropologist, 
Roberto Lizarralde, to coordinate such an expedition. Shortly 
after this expedition made its first peaceful contact with the Bari 
on July 19, 1960, the Capuchins made a successful one of their own. 
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In their article, Lizarralde and Beckerman mention, without much 
explanation as to why, that within a few days the government 
pacification plan was scratched and the anthropologists were not 
allowed to return to the area (Lizarralde and Beckerman, 1982).2 
By 1964 then, both Colombia and Venezuela declared that the 
pacification of the Bari had been completed. The overall 
evaluation of that pacification has yet to be conducted. What is 
known is that the "tamed" behavior of the Bari facilitated the 
renewed encroachment into Bari land by hacendados, oil companies 
and colonists--a process that has yet to end. Between 1960 and 
1970 Lizarralde and Beckerman calculate that the Bari lost 
approximately 21% of the land held in 1900, which left the Bari 
with 3.300 Km2 
In 1961, based on the second article of the agrarian reform 
law, (1961) which guarantees the right of Indian people to make use 
of the land and water resources in the areas they presently occupy, 
an Indian "reserve" or zone of Indian occupation was established in 
Venezuela. The extension of land included in this reserve equals 
1,492 Km2, or 9% of the area the Bari held in 1900. The legal 
guarantees offered by this juridical form of an Indian reserve are 
not totally clear, and there are many obstacles to such 
clarification. For one thing, part of the Indian reserve overlaps 
with a Forest preserve that comes under a totally different set of 
legislative measures. (See Appendix D for a graphic illustration of 
the reduction of Bari territory at various historical points). 
In 1974 the Colombian government also set aside what was left 
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of Bari territory for their exclusive use. Neither reserve is an 
absolute guarantee of the protection of the Bari's territory, but 
the effort has slowed down outside penetration--especially as the 
Bari become even more conscious of their right to this territory 
and its boundaries. 
In Venezuela, at least, Bari are eager to report illegal 
settlements of neighboring Colombian homesteaders.3 But as 
Lizarralde and Beckerman (1982) remind us, the erosion of Bari 
territory has by no means stopped. In fact, they believe that the 
territory is in a gradual process of disintegration as hacienda 
owners and homesteaders continue to push from all sides of the 
reserve, including the until recently ignored western border.4 
In the years that fol lowed the 1960 "pacification," until the 
present, the Capuchin missionaries, supported by the Sisters of the 
order of the "Madre Laura," have remained in the Bari area and have 
founded a number of missionary outposts within the reserve. The 
outposts in the reserve, together with several other small hamlets 
or villages outside the reserve, have become the new communities of 
previously dispersed smal 1 groups of Bari families that had been 
for the most part living in the traditional longhouses. In 
Venezuela, these multi-family longhouses have been completely 
replaced by single-family dwellings. Of the four missionary 
outposts that were originally founded, two remain, Bokshi and 
Saimadoyi. The Empress is located in Saimadoyi, where a major 
portion of the data for this work was collected. 
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The Indian census (1985) reported the Bari population of 
Venezuela to be 1,083 grouped in 35 different communities, the 
largest of which is Saimadoyi with a population of 276 individuals 
living in 42 single-family houses. 
Both the Venezuelan and the Colombian Bari population--the 
latter reported by Lizarralde and Beckerman (1982) to be 475 
individuals--have shown a substantial increase from post-1964 
figures, which put the total Bari population at about 000 
individuals. This figure is still below the pre-.1960 estimates 
when the population was calculated to be around 1000 individuals. 
The drop is attributed to the effects of the "second pacification" 
which among other things, brought epidemics of influenza and 
smallpox into the area (Pinton, 1965; Jaulin, 1966). 
B. Economic and Social Organization of the Bari 
Until very recently the Bari were split into semi-sedentary 
groups of about 50 individuals who lived in single communal 
longhouses. Apparently, it was rare for more than one house to be 
built within the same land clearing, although a group often owned 
more than one house in its territorial range of 400 to lOOOKm2. 
Dwellings were built in the lowland forest and seldom on land as 
high as 600 meters. However, there was seasonal migration between 
lower and higher lands, depending on the amount of rainfall. The 
internal arrangement of the house reflected to a large extent the 
social organization of the community, just as the exterior 
reflected the economic organization and labor proce_sses.5 
Inside the longhouse or ''bohio" as it is cal led in Venezuela, 
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''hearth groups" usually consisting of one or two nuclear families, 
not necessarily closely related, and maybe a few other individuals, 
had specific areas of the bohio for sleeping, cooking, and storing 
their belongings. Individual groups were subsequently responsible 
for the repairs and maintenance of that particular section of the 
bohio. 
The bohio was surrounded by a communal field that was split 
into individual parcels corresponding to the hearth group divisions 
inside the house. The individual fields were not separated by any 
special devises, yet each hearth group knew very well which plants 
it owned (Beckerman, 1975). (See Appendix F for drawing of typical 
garden before "pacification.") 
Kinship relations among the Bari were also extremely fluid and 
although they regulated social·relations, which served primarily to 
distribute marriageable singles and to form alliances, these 
kinship rules did not, according to Lizarralde and Beckerman 
(1980), by themselves regulate relations of production. Social 
relations were organized within two categories known to the Bari as 
sagdojira and okjibara, which Pinton (1965) translates into ally 
and kin respectively (1975), and which Beckerman and Lizarralde 
Cl 982) translate into consanguineal and affine. The latter authors 
· d " l" stress that these do not necessarily correspon to rea 
consanguineal and affine relations. The Bari kinship system is 
fundamentally fictitious and fluid and it represents alliances more 
closely than it does true kinship relations.6 This description of 
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Bari social relations as two distinguishable categories has 
sometimes been confused with moieties. These two categories are 
also not to be confused with perfect halves or moieties. 
The fluidity with which these alliances or kinship relations 
are made and the fact that they can be either abscribed or 
acquired, precludes the formation of a stratified socie~y divided 
into two groups or lineages. The only rule never to be broken is 
that a man and his wife are always okjibara. 
The system is simply a complex of dyadic ties, which 
explains why it does not refer to actual groups, and also 
why inconsistencies are permitted which would make 
formation of such groups impossible ... There is probably 
no mechanism for compelling two people to make their tie 
consistent with anyone else's if they choose not to. A 
relationship between any two people is primarily their 
business, and not the affair of anyone else. Thus here 
as everywhere else in Bari life there is a cheerfully ad 
hoc approach to the world (Beckerman, 1975:50). 
All authors who have undertaken the study of the Bari, whether 
historical or ethnographic, agree that there is among this group, a 
strong sense of privacy and autonomy between family (hearth) groups 
and great respect for individual property. Relationships between 
the genders and among the members of the group as a whole are 
perceived as being extremely egalitarian and a sense of harmony 
permeates the communities. (Alcacer, 1964; Buenaventura-Posso and 
Brown, 1900; and Pinton, 1965). 
1. Labor Relations 
The description of the bohio suggests a complementary relation 
between individual and communal divisions and activities among the 
Bari. This dual "foundation" of the Bari society is clearly 
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delineated all throughout their production and reproduction 
activities. Yet, once again, the rules are extremely flexible and 
there is plenty of room for individuals to organize themselves 
according to personal preference for any of the tasks that need to 
be done. 
Although an examination of the care of the gardens and of the 
individual portions of the house each family occupies may 
deceivingly suggest the presence of a household-based economy or a 
sort of "domestic mode of production," there are significant 
collective elements within Bari production and reproduction that 
defy such narrow interpretations of their economic organization. 
Houses are built by al 1 future inhabitants. The land, as already 
mentioned, is held communally and on an usufruct basis. The 
gardens are communally-cleared fields even if individually planted. 
Furthermore, individuals are free to cross and even build pathways 
through other family parcels. Fishing, the second major 
subsistence activity is a highly collective enterprise. The whole 
community participates in the building of two stone dams, sealed 
with ''mijao" leaves, between which the fish are trapped. Catching 
and distributing the fish is, however, an individual activity 
organized by hearth group.7 Special alliances can come into play 
and fish redistributed to hearth groups that were unlucky on a 
particular fishing day. Hunting expeditions are also communal 
where men, women and children participate. The man who kills the 
game is in charge of the distribution of the catch and today this 
distribution seems to take place at a wider community level than 
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the distribution of fish or other subsistence products.8 
I should point out that besides the one or two communal 
fields, "subsidiary" fields or complimentary individual fields are 
also common. These are plots cultivated by single men or a small 
family group. Rather than exhibiting the variety of cultigens 
present in the communal fields.9 The three major subsistence 
activities, gardening, fishing and hunting, reflect a clear but 
also flexible division of labor by gender. The men, for example, 
prepare the field and do the planting while the women we~d and 
harvest. Yet the men may assist the women in some activities--
including processing food and child care. Men build the larger 
fish dam and the women the smaller; men catch the larger fish with 
spears, and women and children catch smaller fish with their hands. 
In hunting expeditions, women carry food supplies and the products 
of the hunt. Women make baskets and mats and men make hammocks and 
bows and arrows. But once again, it is the interdependency among 
the sexes that is most emphasized by the different authors who have 
written about the Bari. (see for example Pinton, 1965; 
Buenaventura-Posso and Brown, 1980; and Neglia, 1974). 
2. Leadership and Political Relations 
Traditionally, when a group·decided to migrate and build a new 
house, the man who coordinates its construction and digs the larger 
holes · · · f house's ma1.'n ch1.'ef or "natobay." is given the d1.st1.nct1.on o 
He was usually assisted in the coordination of the building of the 
· 11 d "d h ' 11 house by another individual or second chief ca e uas 1.na. 
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They each carried out specific responsibilities throughout the 
construction of the house, as did other members of the group. All 
authors stress that the responsibilities of the natobay did not go 
far beyond this activity and that of heading and coordinating 
fishing and hunting expeditions. The natobaf s authority, like 
that of the second chief, was quite limited and his position was 
neither permanent nor hereditary. They clearly dismiss the 
possibi 1 ity that the Bari were a lineage society. 
It was common for the natobay to occupy the eastern part of of 
the house and to lead with the rest of the members of that 
location, any expedition to the outside. However, as Pinton (1973) 
emphasizes, neither this, nor the other two parts of the bohio 
meriting specific names, correspond to a stratification system. 
Somehow they simply serve to identify the locations each family 
group occupies, probably to facilitate the division of tasks and to 
create a sense of order within the bohio, while also providing a 
form of identification for the individual groups and their members. 
These locations are fluid and they may change as individual 
families change houses. 
The chief of the bohio was al so to be found on the "front 
1 ine" during any encounters with outside elements. His role was 
basically one of protecting the territory--including punishment of 
transgressors, and seeing that Bari material life was smoothly 
carried out. Al 1 students of the Bari agree that the chief's 
authority had no coercive powers and individuals were quite free to 
choose not to obey his commands. (Beckerman (1975) narrates an 
195 
instance during his field work in which the natobay announced in a 
non-demanding tone that it was a good day to go clean the field and 
proceeded to head out. Soon it became clear that not all felt that 
way and only a few trickled out slowly.) 
Alcacer (1964) mentions that although the position of natobay 
is not hereditary, the chief names his replacement. Caballero 
(1974) says the second chief is the one who takes over in case of 
absence--whether it is temporary or permanent (death)l0. The issue 
of prestige seems relatively clear and there does not seem to exist 
any system resembling a differential appropriation of resources by 
the chiefs or the elders of the community. However, Alcacer (1964) 
makes a note in passing about how the special prestige enjoyed by 
the chief en tit led him to receive more of the "values" of the 
group. I don't believe this assertion is confirmed in any way to 
suggest an incipient tributary system existed. What has been 
better documented is the fact that upon contact, Bari chiefs were 
often seen from whites as having much more authority and were the 
receivers of gifts by the whites. Needless to say this introduces a 
new prestige-attainment mechanism. 
One last aspect regarding the traditional political structures 
of the Bari is relevant for the analysis of empress-introduced 
changes later on. This has to do with community-wide decision-
making mechanisms and levels of participation. While Alcacer 
(1964) stresses the fact that nothing resembling advisory councils 
or deliberative bodies existed, Caballero (1974), based on 
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informants he used during his 1974 field work, contends such bodies 
did exist. The discrepancy seems to be due to the different times 
the two authors were writing. All evidence seems to indicate that 
there were, in fact, (there had to be) moments when important 
decisions such as moving to another location required part or all 
of the community to meet with the natobay. ·The higher degree of 
visibility and formality that Caballero attributes to what were 
probably very informal gatherings is probably the result of 
missionary efforts to constantly 11rationalize" the various aspects 
of Bari life. One point both authors agree on is the fact that 
women did not seem to have much participation in these major 
deliberations. Buenaventura (1980) is probably correct in 
asserting that decision-making among the Bari is highly diffused 
and made by those men or women_who are directly affected by the 
particular decision. Beckerman (1983) confirms this when examining 
the differential input that men and women have within the different 
types of subsistence activities; for example fishing decisions are 
made by men; an activity where women's labor is not as productive. 
The reverse is true for foraging. 
Finally, networks of food sharing among families seemed 
limited and sharing took place only upon request. Both men and 
women participate, depending on what is being shared. 
3. Recent Changes 
1 have al ready alluded to some of the changes in Bari society 
introduced by white settlers and missionaries. In the paragraphs 
that follow twill summarize the most important changes experienced 
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by the various Bari groups in Perija. I will make use of both 
secondary information and my own observations while visiting the 
community of Saimadoyi. In Chapter 7, I will examine the 
contemporary socio-economic organization of the Bari of Saimadoyi 
specifically, as the immediate structural and historical context 
within which the empress was organized. 
Settlement patterns and type of housing are among the first 
changes that had a very significant impact in Bari social 
organization. In Venezuela the communal houses no longer exist, a 
change that came at the insistence of missionaries who convinced 
the Bari of the advantages of individual family dwellings. A major 
impact of the disappearance of the bohio was the transformation of 
the role of the natobay. No longer named for his ability to direct 
the construction of the bohio,· the natobay in many Bari communities 
has been transformed by the missionaries into a western-style 
leader who has been given increased decision-making 
responsibilities. Subsistence activities continue in almost the 
exact manner as before. However, the Bari have for some time taken 
jobs as temporary wage laborers in local haciendas, which makes 
cash for commercial foodstuffs available. This will weaken 
subsistence activities but not necessarily eliminate them as we 
know from the peasant experience. In Saimadoyi and other 
communities, there has been a slow introduction of cattle for 
either subsistence or market purposes. The priest in Saiuiadoyi, 
for example, purchased in the course of several years, a few head 
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of cattle that he distributed among the different families. 
The collective fishing expeditions still take place among the 
Bari. In Saimadoyi this happens twice a week on Wednesdays and 
Saturdays. Obviously these pre-set days indicate that the criteria 
that previously governed the decision to fish, namely lack of 
protein and rainfall, no longer operate •. Once again, in trying to 
"rationalize" Bari use of time and space, but seeking to avoid 
accusations of destroying Bari culture, the missionaries have 
"strongly suggested" the changes mentioned. In my interview with 
the priest of the Saimadoyi community he says that they used to be 
on Sundays ''but he changed it." 
Formal education has made its way into communities 1 ike 
Saimadoyi which has an elementary school operated by nuns but with 
the participation of some (one now, two previously) Bari teachers, 
and it includes bilingual education~ Some Bari have begun to study 
at th)! high school level in mission schools outside of Saimadoyi. 
11. The Yaruros (Pume) of Apure 
A. Brief Ethnohistorical Sketch 
Ethnohistorical and ethnog~aphic research about the Yaruros is 
sorely lacking, and what exists is often contradictory and 
incomplete~-much more so than with the Bari. One possible reason 
is that missionary activity among the Yaruro was not as systematic 
and long-lasting as it has been with the Bari. Although no one has 
yet analyzed the historical record in all its possible dimensions, 
the missionary documentation does not seem as extensive as it was 
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with the Bari. 
The first attempt to conduct extensive research on the Yaruros 
was done by Vincenzo Petrullo in 1933. For a long time that 
remained the main source of information about this group. More 
recently, Anthony Leeds (1961) embarked on a similar project and 
contradicted several of the assertions that had been made by 
Petrullo and those who based their work on Petrul lo's studies. 
Perhaps the single most important element of contention has to 
do with the earlier classification of the Yaruros as a hunting and 
gathering tribe and that agriculture was recently introduced into 
their society. Actually, the reliance of the Yaruro on aquatic 
game, placed them within the meso-Indian fishing societies (Leeds, 
1961). The implications of this are important as the socio-
economic.organizations and types of political structures vary 
sometimes quite significantly between hunting and gathering and 
horticultural groups. Mitriani (1973) agreed with Leeds in his 
position that authors who wrote of an absence of horticulture among 
the Yaruro labored in error. These errors resulted from an 
insufficient examination of the historical record of the 17th and 
19th centuries; the fact that Petrullo did his research in a 
restricted area and during the dry season only; and the 
perpetuation of the errors on the part of American authors who 
based their explanations on Petrul lo's work alone. In addition, 
Kirchhoff, Steward and Faron seemed to have misquoted or erred in 
the translation of a quote by Gilij (1965), who alluded to the use 
of "fresh" corn by the Yaruro, It was translated by the authors as 
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"green" corn--the type used at times by hunting and gathering 
tribes in the initial stages of practicing horticulture. 
Mitriani's work is the most recent and provides a convincing 
re-examination of the historical and ethnographic evidence that 
supports the classification of the Yaruros as a horticulturalist 
group. 
I will offer a brief summary of the history of the Yaruros,· a 
description of the area they inhabit, which will help us understand 
the major features and transformation in their mode of production 
and social organization. 
The Yaruros have inhabited for centuries the southwestern 
Venezuelan savannas ("llanos"), and are today confined within the 
1 imits of the Apure State of the llanos area (See Appendix B). 
Their settlements were traditionally (and to a large extent stil 1 
are) found in the riverine areas bounded by the Arauca-Cunaviche 
-' 
on the northern part of the state, and where the empress is now 
located; the Capanaparo - Riecito River in the center; and the 
Capanaparo River in the southern part of the State. The 1980 
Census places the Yaruro population at 3,859, all but 22 of whom 
1 i ve in Apure. 
The earliest records of this group came from Fray Jacinto de 
Carvajal who in the 17th century recorded 105 tribes located in the 
riverine areas of the Apure state and the Orinoco tributaries 
between the Apure and the Meta rivers. The only interesting piece 
of information that I can detect from Mitrianis mention of this 
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record was the suggestion of the formation of Indian confederations 
at the time, which seemed to be organized under the authority of 
one chief for the purpose of warring with other tribes. Other 
evidence, however, suggests that the Yaruros were not a warring 
tribe but might have been subjected to attacks by other tribes in 
the area, even prior to colonization. This .can begin to account 
for the simplicity, semi-nomadism and small size of the Yaruro 
society as it has been described by different authors. 
The entrance of the Capuchin Missionaries to the Apure area, 
and the Yaruro territory specifically, takes place relatively late. 
The first reference of a missionary town mentioned by de Carrocera 
(1972) cites 1768 as the year when the Capuchins organized the 
town of San Jose de Leonisa de Cunaviche, not with Yaruros but 
Otomacos, a tribe now extinct. Several other mission towns were 
founded in the years prior to Venezuelan independence. However, as 
far as I ha_ye been able to determine, none were formed with Yaruro 
populations in the fashion of Saimadoyi; or as happened with other 
tribes in Apure. Individual Yaruros were taken to mission towns 
and priests did have some Yaruro settlements as their 
responsibility, but as a whole, missionary activity among the 
Yaruros was not significant. 
That is not to say that Yaruro society was not influenced by 
its contact, however brief and indirect, with white society. Aside 
from the missionaries' presence, perhaps most significant was the 
growing penetration in the area by whites searching for cattle and 
for ranch land. For a long period of time, the Indians of this 
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area were engaged in severe clashes with the white cattle ranchers 
who tried to claim traditionally occupied Indian lands. In fact, 
Apure is the state with the worst reported instances of Indian 
genocide in Venezuela--the latest one of occurring in 1967. Of all 
the tribes that inhabited the Apure llanos, only the cuivas 
(Guahibos) and the Yaruros remain. Their story does not differ 
from that of other Indian tribes who entered into contact with 
white civilization and whose fate was slightly more fortunate if, 
as in the case of the Yaruros and the Cuivas, they inhabited or 
retreated into more remote areas. According to Mitriani (n.d.), 
the traditional area of the Yaruros was more to the south of the 
state, in the Capanaparo and Cinaruco region. White penetration 
began in the northern part of the state. But eventually the 
pressure was also felt from the south and west, and toward the end 
of the 19th century, and the beginning of the 20th, the Yaruros 
found themselves increasingly in conflict with the new settlers. 
According to Mitriani, it was about this time that Yaruros began to 
settle into northern territory and became progressively 
incorporated into the cattle economy as cheap laborers.11 
Paradoxically, from the beginning of white penetration of the area, 
there were numerous reports of massacres of Indians by white 
ranchers. Petrullo (1969) himself reported a whole village of 150 
Yaruros wiped out during the period of his field work. This is 
explained by the fierce competition for land in the area. Even as 
late as the l 970's, informal reports were heard of individuals who 
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engaged in what had become a loca 1 sport by the name of "Cui vear" 
or "Guahibear", a verb used to mean "to hunt cuivas or Guahibos.1112 
The transformation of Apure into a major cattle producing 
region for the nation had a devastating effect on the lives of the 
Indians in the state. With the war of independence, the missionary 
influence in the area virtually disappeared and church lands were 
often awarded to those private individuals who fought in these 
wars. Contrary to the situation of the Bari, the missionaries were 
not successful in retaining control of these areas, and, as ironic 
as it may be, in acting as protectors of Indian land and 
populations as well. This is largely explained by the physical and 
ecological differences found in the two regions and the type of 
economic structure favored in each case. Perija, where the Bari 
live, is a rugged and highly inaccessible frontier, which has, 
until very recently, slowed down the colonization process. The 
Apure savannas on the other hand, contained ideal conditions for 
) 
the development of extensive cattle-raising operations. Already by 
the 17th century, the llanos had become an important center of 
livestock production in the country. About the same time, meat and 
cattle sub-products such as leather had joined cacao and tobacco as 
important products for export (Brito Figueroa, 1975). Needless to 
say, the colonial, and later independent, Venezuelan state were 
particularly interested in supporting this important economy. 
The economic power of invading landowners in the region was 
reinforced by several other factors. The long stretches of 
scarcely populated areas, combined with difficulties in reaching 
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them due to lack of any viable road system and the flooding of 
major portions of the state during half of the year, have 
contributed to the extreme power these landowners enjoy with 
regards to al 1 economic and political aspects of life.13 
Today, the Yaruro live in a number of fixed or "corporate" 
communities, (Wolf, 1961) made up of individual family units 
grouped in a common area. With rare exceptions, they do not 
possess any kind of title to the land they occupy and cultivate. 
The majority of such land falls under the legal category of 
''baldias" or "un-occupied" lands. The population of these towns 
ranges from 274 to a handful of inhabitants. None of these 
villages seem to be vestiges of missionary towns. Instead they 
appear to be spontaneous and growing settlements formed by 
independent Indian families i~ the areas not yet taken by whites. 
Similarly, coming together in this new fixed-village pattern seems 
to be an "ethnic-based" adaptive strategy of mutual protection 
1 
against the ever-constant threats of losing their land and even 
their lives, rather than a mere continuation of their traditional 
residential pattern.14 
Aside from changes in the settlement pattern, whose impact on 
the traditional mode of production and social organization I will 
explore in more detail later, the Yaruros borrowed little from the 
white culture. As with the Bari, they borrowed some iron tools 
(the machete) and the use of western dress. Unfortunately, they 
borrowed the consumption of alcohol, which is easily available.15 
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B. Economic and Social Organization of the Yaruro or Pume 
Before examining the type of economic organization of the 
Yaruros it is necessary to have a more detailed picture of the 
ecological and geographical conditions that influenced the form of 
economic organization. 
As already mentioned, the Yaruro live in the savannas of the 
Apure state. These savannas are characterized by a conglomerate of 
micro-habitats that are ultimately mirrored by the micro-socio-
cultural forms of Yaruro society (Leeds, 1961). These micro-
habitats are defined by differences in slope and climate variations 
that run from east to west of the state. The land rises to the 
west as it meets the Andean cordillera; the average rainfall also 
increases with the slope of the land and these two conditions 
parallel the types of soil found in the region: from clay/loam in 
the east to more sandy and arable in the west. The region of 
Guachara where the empresa is located, is classified as one of 
.... muddy and sandy loams. 
One of the important environmental features of the savannas is 
that of a very sharp seasonal variation in rainfall. Up to 90% of 
the total rainfall occurs from May to November, and the savannas 
are almost constantly flooded, while the rest of the year they are 
transformed into a virtual desert. (My field work took place 
during the rainy season.) 
Although the matter of Yaruro subsistence has not been totally 
resolved, I believe Leeds (1961 and 1969) and Mitriani (1975) are 
closer to the truth than previous authors. I will follow their 
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work for this aspect of Yaruro society. Subsistence activities of 
the Yaruros vary according to the location of their settlement and 
the two seasons. However, except for very reduced areas in the 
Capanaparo region, where Petrullo did his field work and where 
flooding is excessive, all Yaruros practice horticulture as their 
main means of subsistence. The areas in which horticulture was 
possible were restricted by a number of factors characteristic of 
savanna areas, such as poor and sandy soil, the presence of tough, 
long-rooted grasses, and the occurrence of excessive flooding. It 
is only in the median stretches of streams, where rich soil from 
the savannas accumulated, that gallery forests emerge. This 
provided humus to the better soils and thus made the area more 
suitable for horticulture (Leeds, 1961). The 11montes" (depressions 
in the savanna that remain above-enough water), are the only other 
areas believed to be adequate for cultivation, though only during 
the wet season. 
< 
Land cultivation followed the usual pattern of slash-and-burn 
horticulture, with an average of three years of planting and a 10-
to 15-year fallow period. Today, this is heavily restricted due 
to the small areas they occupy. The main crop cultivated by the 
Yaruros, as with the Bari, was and still is manioc. The Yaruros, 
however, also cultivated the bitter variety. Corn also is found, 
and, as with the Bari, its origin has not been satisfactorily 
established. Plaintain, sugar cane, yams, squashes and chili 
pepper form the rest of the inventory of foods produced.16 
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Horticultural activities take place mainly during the rainy 
season. Traditionally the Yaruro remained in their more permanent 
villages during this period. And even today they emulate this 
pattern of semi-nomadism with slight variations. On the other hand, 
hunting, fishing and gathering were the principal activities of the 
dry season and required the Yaruros to set up temporary housing in 
the areas where these resources were found, thus increasing their 
nomadism. All activities can take place during both seasons, only 
the intensity level varies, and so does the location in which they 
are conducted. For example, animals traditionally.hunted by the 
yaruro included deer, paca, armadillo, and iguana, which are 
distributed according to their own ecological niches. In addition, 
the seasons also mark clear limits for bunting and fishing, making 
necessary changes in location, and use of different techniques. 
Certain animals could not be hunted during the rainy season. 
Contemporary Yaruros have also adopted animal husbandry, but 
for the most part raise pigs, not cattle, like the majority of the 
l 
non-Indian inhabitants of the llano (''Llanero"). 
The establishment of these ecological limitations to Yaruro 
subsistence becomes highly relevant when understanding other 
features of Yaruro society as Leeds has already demonstrated in bis 
various works and as I will explore. But 1 should mention at this 
point that these ecological limitations are also significant when 
considering the organization of the empresa in an area that 
exhibits ecological features that may or may not be conducive to 
the continuous equilibrium of Yaruro subsistence. 
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Not all of these subsistence activities continue unchanged. 
Garden cultivation is still a major source of food, but as noted 
earlier, productivity has been greatly compromised by the small 
size of Yaruro plots and the length of the fallow period. A measure 
of the declining importance of garden plots is the fact that most 
Yaruro men must at some point participate in the wage labor force 
as workers in the large hatos. 
Similarly, deer hunting, a major source of protein for the 
Yaruros in the past, has been practically abandoned because of the 
persecution of white cattle ranchers who accuse Indian hunters of 
trespassing on their land. Several species of animals the Yaruro 
have traditionally depended upon, like turtles, for example, have 
become almost extinct because of the over-hunting by white 
ranchers. Fishing still provides a significant amount of protein, 
but it is also limited to areas not controlled by white ranchers. 
1. Labor Relations 
Kinsh~p relations were fundamental in the organization of 
horticultural groups such as the Bari and the Yaruro. For those 
who study the Yaruro, all the questions regarding the specific type 
of kinship and residence patterns continue to produce some 
contradictory answers. Again, Le.eds (1961), and Mitriani U 975) 
provide the latest interpretations of the historical and 
ethnographic evidence. I wi 11 fol low them most closely, though 
of fer ing my own interpretation. 
Petrullo (1969) described several aspects of Yaruro kinship 
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and marriage system that Leeds (1969) and Mitriani, (1973) among 
others, have now disputed. According to Petrullo, the Yaruro were 
divided into two different matrilineal clans or moieties. Marriage 
was governed by rules of exogamy between these two clans, and it 
took place among matrilateral cross-cousins. Other authors find 
no evidence to confirm such divisions and the unilineality implied 
by them. Leeds, Cl 96 9) on the other hand, be 1 ieved that kinship is 
traced through bilineal lines and marriage takes place among 
bilateral cross-cousins, though matrifocality is often found. 
Mitriani (1973) agr~ed with Leeds and confirmed much of his 
findings through his own field work. With regards to exogamy 
however, Mitriani once a~ain qualified the existence or lack of 
existence of this rule in terms of the changing conditions of 
Yaruro society. Pragmatic considerations, such as the availability 
of marriageable men or women within villages that may have been 
dismembered or regrouped, become important factors in determining 
whether marriage would be exogamous or endogamous. 
,-
Al though, information on Yaruro kinship often seems 
contradictory, it is stil 1 possible to draw some conclusions. What 
is apparent from a review of the ethnographic record of the Yaruro, 
including the aspect of kinship, is that it was a tribe in 
transition at the moment of contact, although the explanations for 
its stagnation and even regression vary according to different 
authors. 
Traditionally, Yaruro from the different regio~s of Apure were 
grouped in villages of one or more longhouses whose number of 
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inhabitants varied from 20 to 100 individuals--with fewer and fewer 
numbers found as a result of contact. The local group often 
consisted of an extended family and even independent individuals 
organized as independent hearth groups. According to Mitriani 
(1973), the size of these villages was much greater before the 
intrusion of cattle ranches, a.nd were often transformed into single 
residential groups. Most of these have by now regrouped into 
western-style villages situated in the Riecito area where a Centro 
lndigenista was established and in the north, around the Guachara-
Cunaviche area. Thie is the case of the villages of Fruta de 
Burro, Palmarito, and Las Matas, from where the members of the 
Empresa come. 
During the dry season, these communities and independent 
households divided and set up temporary and very squalid dwellings 
in the riverine areas. The permanent villages were set up farther 
from the river on higher land. 
The social organizational unit of the Yaruro was the entire 
,.. 
vil lage--not the entire Pume society, while the main economic unit 
of production was the hearth group.17 Al 1 economic activities, 
including fishing and hunting, were performed at this level. 
A point emphasized by Leeds is that labor arrangements among 
the Yaruro tended toward the "re-distributive" as opposed to the 
"cooperative" pattern. This meant basically that labor tasks were 
often "redistributed" to one or two members rather than performed 
by large groups and according to individual choice. None of the 
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Yaruro economic activities actually required the participation of 
more than one individual at a time--though it was not uncommon to 
find fishing and hunting teams of two or three individuals who 
simply elected to work together. The technology--adapted to the 
specific habitat and employed for these activities--also precluded 
the organization of wider work teams, unlike the case of the Bari, 
who for example needed the larger group to construct fishing weirs. 
It is hard to determine to what extent there may have been earlier 
forms of cooperation that have disappeared as a result of tribal 
dismemberment after-contact with white settlers. For one thing, 
there are some references made by several of the ethnographers that 
suggest communal clearing of the gardens and community-wide work 
teams for the construction of the dwellings. Mitriani (1975) also 
believed that Leeds had overestimated the level of individualism 
that exists within Yaruro society. What is probably fair to say is 
that the Pume organization of production corresponded to a narrower 
hearth unit than that of the Bari. In addition, such hearth groups 
were more likely to break up into yet smaller units of individual 
families during the dry season. It is only in this instance that 
one can accurately speak of "household" level production. On the 
other hand, there is evidence,that community-wide distribution 
networks were highly valued, and each household (or hearth) 
distributed goods and foodstuffs to other households in the village 
along kinship and co-residence lines (Leeds, 1961). Inter-communal 
networks were also important, although it is not clear whether 
their main contribution was of subsistence per se, or to maintain a 
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tribal cohesiveness that might be important for defense purposes. 
There is no evidence of war within this tribe although they were 
often exposed to raiding by neighboring tribes such as the Guahibo. 
Inter-communal alliances could have been an important source of 
insurance against starvation when these raids occurred. Trading, 
on the other hand, was important but seemed to take place mainly 
with extra-llano groups, for items not produced in the area. This 
combination of household production with community-wide 
distribution networks would resemble the organization of foraging 
tribes whose environment precludes the organization of production 
at any other level, yet its harshness demands the guarantee of 
alliances at distant places. 
Another, and perhaps the most important element regarding labor 
relations among the Yaruros, is the sharp gender division of labor 
and property found in this group. Men did and still do all the 
hunting and fishing and the clearing of the fields. Women do the 
gathering, which is very significant during the dry season, and 
harvest the fields. Men make hammocks and haul lumber while women 
make pottery, baskets and manioc squeezers and process the food. 
Traditionally, objects that were made by women were inherited 
by women and those made by men were inherited by men. Male animals 
were owned by men and female animals were owned by women. Today 
many of these divisions seem to have disappeared.18 
As is usually the case with horticultural societies, the lines 
separating the division of labor between the sexes are not 
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absolutely rigid and when necessary there is cooperation between 
the sexes in activities that theoretically may fall in the purview 
of either one. There is a gender division of labor among the 
Yaruro, yet, to date, male-female activity is highly complementary 
and the work of both is equally valued.19 
Another point of contention between Leeds and Mitriani has to 
do with the limits the environment places on the accumulation of 
any type of surplus. Mitriani (1975) believed that Leeds (1969) 
had also exaggerated some of these restrictions and fall victim to 
a sort of ecological determinism regarding Yaruro socio-economic 
organization. For Mitriani, many of the limits on Yaruro economic 
production and productivity were the result of recent encroachments 
of whites into Yaruro lands. In fact, making use of comparisons of 
types and levels of productivity of yields. Mitriani showed that 
tropical forest peoples like the Llano Otomacos and Guamo were able 
to produce higher yields of corn than their counterparts in the 
andean and litoral areas. Under these conditions, Mitriani 
contended,, surpluses were a must, although they were not limited to 
corn but included other food items such as turtle eggs. 
Mitriani also disagreed with Leeds in his interpretation of 
the level of fissioning that went on and that still goes on in 
these communities. Here too, Leeds believed that ecological 
limitations and related problems of scarcity of resources were the 
major determinants of village or household fissioning. For 
Mitriani, it was the absence of any centralized, coercive authority 
in charge of decisions related to migration and house construction 
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(as with the Bari) which accounted for an apparently high rate of 
fissioning. But following Mitriani's own warnings to Leed, it is 
necessary once again to consider encroachment by whites into Yaruro 
territory as a factor involved in these decisions. 
Mitriani consistently separates his analysis of the less 
acculturated and more isolated Yaruros of the Capanaparo and south 
of the Cinaruco in the southern part of the state from those of the 
Arauca-Cunaviche area where I did my field work. This distinction 
is important because it provides one with an opportunity to know 
what changes have taken place when comparing the least with the 
more acculturated group. The groups of the Arauca-Cunaviche area 
are much less likely to preserve the migration patterns found among 
the groups to the south. 
2. Leadership and Political Relations 
Power among the Yaruro seems even more diffused than with the 
Bari. In the contemporary history of the Yaruro, the "capitan" 
constitutes the central authority of the villages, and may or may 
not be the<shaman or religious leader as well. It is not known the 
extent to which the double function of "chief-shaman" existed in 
the past and how the transfer of office occurred (Mitriani, 1973). 
"Capitan" is the term the Spaniards gave to the civil authorities 
of local districts, and the term later was imposed on or adopted by 
the Indian groups that settled in permanent villages. 
The moral authority of the village, had in the past rested 
with the male elder, who according to Mitriani, also was the figure 
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of "political representation." "Ote-Pume" was the term used to 
refer to this religious-moral figure. Women did not occupy a 
formal position within this diffused leadership structure but were 
consulted and ''never commanded" (Leeds, 196 9). 
The figure or figures of authority commanded no real power and 
there were no rules of obedience. Even the coordinating functions 
of the Bari "natobay" seemed to be absent within the Yaruro 
structure, except for a modified function of "consultative funnel 
through which community decision poured back and forth." (Leeds, 
1969; 1974). These figures then were not expected to make any 
outright decisions governing the day-to-day life of the Yaruro.20 
However, a special status or respect was assigned to those who 
excelled as intermediaries between the Yaruro and other groups. 
This status the Spaniards seem~d to have understood well when they 
assigned these figures a special tit le, "capitan, 11 and empowered 
them with authority they never had before. Today the capitans are 
chosen from those individuals who know Spanish and are more 
accultura~ed--and know how to deal with the criollo world. 
Both Mitriani and Leeds agreed on this absence of coercive 
power and supreme authority among the Yaruros. Mitriani believed 
social control rested primarily on ethical and religious norms. 
Leeds does not really address this directly but he was concerned to 
show how ecological constraints inhibited the formation of formal 
authority and reinforced the individualistic and independent nature 
of the Yaruro. His argument is quite rigorous in this instance and 
draws on the respected thesis that connects, in a non-mechanistic 
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way, the development of factors of production to socio-cultural 
patterns. For example, he linked the absence of any meaningful 
surpluses in Yaruro economy and the simplicity of their technology 
(adapted for use of single individuals), to the lack of need for 
any sort of managerial functions or specialization. All 
individuals had equal access to the knowledge and experience 
necessary to survive in the savannas and coordinated work was 
virtually unnecessary. Mitrianis ultimate argument with Leeds is 
that there is an underlying evolutionism in Leeds' argument that 
the Yaruro is a tribe whose evolution is frozen by the area's 
ecological limitations. Should those limitations not exist, they 
would have followed the path of more advanced tropical forest 
groups like the Kuikuru of Brazil who, in many respects, wer~ a 
very similar group. But in my. view, Leeds evolutionism does not 
affect the validity of some of his arguments regarding the effect 
of the unique ecological conditions of the savanna on the socio-
structural organization of the Yaruro. 
3. Recent Changes among the Yaruros: Comparisons and Contrasts 
withthe Bari 
r 
The historical and ethnographic review of the Bari and Yaruro 
tribes constitute the backdrop against which it is possible to 
reconstruct the essential features of these societies' modes of 
production and socio-political organization. Most importantly, it 
reveals those changes in production and. social organization that 
have taken place in recent years and that have not yet been totally 
integrated into existing analyses. For example, most discussions 
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regarding the development and impact of development programs on 
these communities began with an incomplete understanding of where 
these societies are today; what has changed and what hasn't 
changed; and what options they realistically have to adopt one or 
another strategy to preserve their unity as a distinct social 
group. 
No changes are more important than those that result from the 
mode and intensity of contact with the white society. In spite of 
their bloody encounters with Spanish society, it i~ clear that the 
Bari have fared better than the Yaruro. The land of the Yaruro was 
more accessible to criollo individuals and was incorporated very 
early into the main dynamic of the Venezuelan cattle economy and 
the international market. Although both tribes have experienced the 
fractioning of their communities and the disruption of kinship 
relations, these effects have been more devastating in the Yaruro 
communities. Even today, the Bari preserve many collective 
features and continue to rely on cooperation and reciprocal 
exchanges for much of their integral reproduction. 
The Bari~ and particularly those of Saimadoyi, are faced with 
the daily and permanent presence of the priest and the nuns who 
have become an institutionalized source of control-particularly 
social and ideological. The missionary presence has, on the other 
hand, prevented the total elimination of land rights as happened 
with the Yaruro. The Yaruro, like the Bari, live in a cattle 
breeding area. But it is only recently that a small minority of 
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Yaruro have had access to cattle-raising to complement their 
subsistence economy. Even when they worked in the criollo cattle 
ranches, they were assigned to cultivation tasks and never really 
learned the skills required to handle a cattle economy. The Bari 
on the other hand, were hired in the local ranches to work with the 
cattle--although their participation in the wage economy seems to 
have been less intense. The Bari was a warring tribe that avenged 
every act committed against its people and continues to have a very 
zealous attitude toward outsiders. The Yaruro were a peaceful 
society and now seem more like a downtrodden people who exhibit 




1. I made a field visit to a couple of Yucpa communities that 
were in the process of organizing an empresa lndigena. At 
this time, I had a chance to observe and hear about some of 
the serious health and social problems that confront these 
communities and are largely caused or aggravated by high 
levels of al coho 1 consumption. 
2. During my interviews with Lizarralde and Bari, it became clear 
that the battle for establishing "innninent domain" over Bari 
territory is all but over--at least as far as the Catholic 
church is concerned. In terms of state functions, this 
competition between various political and 'surrogate state' 
"apparatuses" to control territorial rights is easily 
understood. As I have pointed out in previous chapters, 
already in the late 1950s, Venezuela had begun an incipient 
industrialization process financed with a growing influx of 
oil revenues. This created possibilities for new investments 
and interest in new agricultural frontiers and a Venezuelan 
state that controlled a large share of the oil revenues and 
was in the position to become directly involved in capitalist 
development in these areas. 
3. During my fieldwork, the head of the area National Guard, an 
influential general in Venezuela visited the community of 
Saimadoyi and in the course of the conversations with them and 
the Bari, I learned of instances where the Bari had reported 
seeing groups of Colombian homesteaders who were subsequently 
expelled by the National Guard. 
4. As I was leaving the community after my first visit, we 
encountered whole families of Colombians who had obviously 
just descended the Sierra and were probably headed to local 
haciendas in search of work. It is somewhat ironic that the 
new threat to Bari territory comes from a very poor working 
group of CoJombian nationals who most likely are campesinos 
that like the Bari have been pushed out off their land by rich 
landowners. The authors also mention the presence of 
Colombian guerrillas in the area as an indirect source of Bari 
territorial loss. The Colombian government has begun to build 
access roads on the eastern part of the Colombian reserve 
facilitating the access of new homesteaders; and on the 
Venezuelan side there is evidence guerrilla movement toward 
the Bari area as they flee Colombian troops--though this 
penetration has been way to the South of the Venezuelan 
reserve. 
5. A few longhouses of this sort still exist in Colombia, but as 
mentioned earlier, none remain in Venezuela and most Bari live 
in single-family, multi-house, communities. 
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6. Lizarralde and Beckerman (1982)--these translations may be 
technically more precise but convey the same notion as 
Pinton's definition, i.e., sagdojiras of the opposite sex are 
not allowed to marry, while okjibaras are not. 
7. Field work interviews did point to the reduction of 
distribution networks to the, also reduced composition of 
hearth groups, to extended or nuclear families. 
8. Beckerman (1975); Lizarralde and Beckerman (1980); field 
observations (1985). 
9. Besides manioc and plaintains, the main staple, crops such as 
sugar cane, yams, avocados, etc. are found. See Beckerman 
(1983) for an entire list. The smaller fields usually have 
manioc and plaintain or just sugar cane. 
10. It is possible they were both referring to the same process 
whereby, the second chief, who is in fact named- by the first, 
assumes the leadership. 
11. As Brito Figueroa (1975) points out, slave labor was never 
effectively incorporated into the non-labor intensive cattle 
raising economy. Slave labor was non-cost efficient, and the 
open savannas were inviting for slaves to escape. 
Interestingly enough, Brito Figueroa refers to the alternative 
adaptability of "foraging· Indians" to the new tasks of 
extensive cattle raising. 
12. Cuivear is most often used on the Colombian side, while 
Guahibear is used more often on the Venezuelan side. "Indear" 
is another verb still heard at times and it refers to the 
search for Indians to work in the cattle ranches (hatos) as 
peons who are to be treated by the most unscrupulous 
landowners as their personal property. 
:t' 
13. The continuous pressure for land on the part of the cattle 
ranchers makes the possibility of creating an Indian reserve 
almost nil. In fact, such a reserve was decreed by a governor 
of the state in 1975. The reserve covered the southern part 
and most traditional Yaruro and Cuiva territory. However, the 
decree (141,1975) was never ratified at the national level and 
its boundaries have never been respected. 
14. For a discussion on ethnic-based strategies see Arizpe (1980). 
15. In this last sense they are very different from the Bari, and 
more resemble the situation of many North American Indian 
groups. 
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16. For a more complete account of Yaruro horticulture, see Leeds 
(1961). 
17. Extended family and fictive kin ''household." As we can see, 
"household" must be contextually defined because in cases such 
as these, and as with the Bari, they were often equivalent to 
what we could call a "village". 
18. lnterv iews with Pume (1985). 
19. However, as the usual ethnographic literature on the subject 
suggests, it is possible that women's contribution to 
subsistence production is somewhat greater given their 
important role in caring for and harvesting the gardens. See 
Sandai (1981) for an excel lent analysis of gender roles in 
horticultural and hunting and gathering societies. 
20. In this sense, they again resemble the hunters and gatherers 
more closely than they do horticultural groups. 
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